Dear John, list -
I perfectly agree there are two quite different question here - the ideal, 
conceptual question of the synthesis of e.g. subject and predicate in 
propositions - and the actual, empirical question of how brains perform that 
synthesis. Both of them are crucially important questions. The solution of the 
former will set the frame for the latter; the solution of the latter will 
provide input to the former.
 In my book, I treat the linguist James Hurford's intriguing proposal that the 
ventral-dorsal split in perception forms a central part of the latter question.
Best
F
________________________________
Fra: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sendt: 24. januar 2016 19:07
Til: Robert Eckert; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

OK, Robert. That puts a somewhat different light on it, since the issue is then 
an empirical one rather than the conceptual relations. I was mostly addressing 
the latter issue. (As was Frederik, I think.)

It is certainly possible that the same brain processes could be involved in 
more than one function, depending on how they are connected to other brain 
areas that might serve different functions, or to external factors that govern 
functions. My understanding is that syntactic and semantic functions interact, 
but are distinguished by different brain processes. That doesn’t mean that 
there might not be a common area that actually carries out the process of both 
coupling and merging, and then feeds them back to the relevant divergent 
functional regions for further processing. Chomsky and his colleagues in their 
recent work argue for the convergence of a number of different processes in 
syntax, but the most significant for its power is recursion, which underlies 
the merge function in particular. They argue that this function is especially 
general in humans, but not other animals, and there is a lot of experimental 
evidence for this (but based on behaviour, not brain studies). It might well be 
that the RAS plays an essential role here for recursion in general, whether 
semantic or syntactic (also tool use). I don’t know of any studies, though, 
that would make the RAS function in recursion show the right sort of activity 
and structure to explain the human capacity for recursion. One worry I have is 
that tool use also requires recursion, and some birds show this ability, even 
showing planning of tool use (in corvids in particular). This has led me to 
suspect that an old hypothesis that language capacity has an evolutionary 
origin in tool use might have something to it. However I know little about the 
equivalent of the RAS in corvids, if any. Their forebrains are quite different 
from ours and  our close relatives that also use tools.

Again, more to untangle here, but it seems to me that the conceptual issues and 
the brain structure and function issues are at least partially independent. 
Your hypothesis might be correct, but still not tell us very much about the 
functions involved and their relations to each other.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Robert Eckert [mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu]
Sent: Sunday, 24 January 2016 6:21 PM
To: John Collier; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

John, List,

What I am suggesting is that the same triadic neurophysiological synthesizing 
mechanism accounts for both semantic coupling and syntactic merging. The same 
neurophysiological structure, the "coupler", that Percy suggests accomplishes 
symbolization  makes the formation of both words and sentences possible.

The elements of grammar are themselves signs. Universal grammar restricts 
output and structure. The coupler synthesizes the relation between meaningful 
elements.

The results of this throwing together mechanism are different--semantics is not 
syntax, but the underlying merging/coupling mechanism can still be the same.

This hypothesis is a bit of a stretch....

my guess--the coupler is the reticular formation, or reticualr activating 
system, as it controls the pryamidal system from its position at the 
decussation of pyramids (where the neurons of our "cross-wired" nervous system 
cross) in the brain stem. The system responsible for wakefulness and arousal is 
the same system that wakes us into the form of consciousness made possible by 
the use of symbol systems lie language. The recognized areas of the cortex like 
Wernicke's and Broca's areas are involved, but do not control, the elements of 
language which suffer when these areas are damaged. The neurophysiological 
activating mechanism for language is the reticular activating system.




=========================================


On Wed, Jan 20, 2016 at 12:40 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Interesting questions, Robert. They certainly deserve further investigation.

One difference I see is that Chomsky’s merge is a syntactic operation, whereas, 
If I understand him correctly, Peircean coupling has a semantic aspect as well. 
Chomsky consistently separates syntax and semantics, but he perhaps has a more 
narrow view of semantics than Peirce did. This latter issue is especially worth 
exploring, I think.

I believe that Chomsky’s merge (and many if not all of his earlier syntactic 
operations) is nonreducible to component parts (especially linguistic 
behaviours), and in this respect seems to be a Peircean third. Likewise for 
Peircean coupling. So in this respect they are species of a common genus. But I 
don’t think this directly implies they are of the same species of this genus 
for the reasons I gave before.

I have considerably more I could say, but I will leave it at that for now. I 
was exposed to Chomsky (as a professor of mine) and to Peirce (by independent 
study) more or less at the same time as an undergraduate, and I am probably 
more inclined than many to see connections between the two. This has only been 
reinforced by my subsequent studies, though the differences have also become 
more apparent.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Robert Eckert [mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu<mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu>]
Sent: Wednesday, 20 January 2016 1:49 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

Dear list,

Is it possible that Peirce's thirdness, Percy's coupling and Chomsky's merging 
are the same?

Could this bringing together, symbolization, merging, of two other things, 
explain our language ability?

If so, this basic exemplification in diagrammatic form defines humans.

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