Hi everyone,
An update on *this* phaneron and actions toward reaching the three categories: “…I examine the phaneron and I endeavor to sort out its elements according to the complexity of their structure. I thus reach my three categories." ~Peirce The surprising fact C (microcephaly) is observed. But if A (Zika) were true, C would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. http://www.npr.org/2016/02/22/467704594/cdc-arrives-in-brazil-to-investigate-spread-of-zika-virus On Sat, Feb 20, 2016 at 12:15 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > Thanks Clark. I don’t think of Heidegger as a phenomenologist as much as > an existentialist (view from studying Heidegger from Bert Dreyfus). Merleau > Ponty fits the Husserlian model more closely, I think. > > > > Husserl distinguished between surface and depth phenomenology. The second, > while not analytical, does involve a further degree of abstraction. I think > it is there that Husserl become more clearly non or anti psychological. > Surface phenomenology can be seen as psychological, I suppose, but I was > taught not to see it that way, because of the bracketing. That leads away > from a number of important psychological aspects of our normal experience. > I do think that Ransdell is right in negatively comparing Merleau Ponty’s > view of science with Peirce’s, but I am not sure that Husserlian deep > phenomenology has the same problem, nonetheless, despite the second order > bracketing involved. It just isn’t of the same nature as the move to > scientific thinking, which certainly does care about existence issues. > > > > Though I agree that Husserl was Cartesian in some respects, his > anti-psychologism in this bracketing form undermines the similarity with > Cartesian access to the mental. I suppose that bracketing could be seen as > doubt based, but I don’t think it needs to be seen that way. However, I > agree with Ransdell that the phenomenological reduction does not apply in a > straight-forward way to Peirce’s thinking. > > > > I think that the way in which objects of thought are understood in Husserl > and Peirce are quite different, for example. (I have always found Husserl’s > approach to psychologistic for my taste, or at least too reductive.) I > think Ransdell was correct in focusing on the differences with Peirce here. > > > > John Collier > > Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate > > University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > *From:* CLARK GOBLE [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] > *Sent:* Friday, 19 February 2016 9:14 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron? > > > > > > On Feb 19, 2016, at 9:08 PM, CLARK GOBLE <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: > > > > > On Feb 19, 2016, at 4:03 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > > > > Husserl explicitly uses the idea of “bracketing” questions of existence in > phenomenology. In other words, you ignore existence and truth issues. > > > > Yes, in that they are similar. In other ways they are quite different. The > list starter, Joe Ransdell, did a nice overview. I think Joe neglects the > range of views in post-Husserlian phenomenology but for Husserl himself I > think he gets the big points. > > > > Whoops. Forgot the link: > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/PHENOM.HTM > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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