Jeff, list,
Thanks for the positive response, Jeff! As for where the discussion goes from here, that's up to you and whoever else wants to follow up on specific ideas in it. A closer look at determination and reference would certainly be worthwhile. Another matter that seems to me closely connected is the discussion we were having awhile back with Franklin Ransom about term, proposition and argument. The very end of the 1906 "Prolegomena" has a lot to say about that. As far as NDTR is concerned, I was thinking of applying to it the idea of taking the Argument as the one sign type in which the other 9 are involved, instead of taking it as the one that the others build up to. I've put together a spreadsheet reformatting much of the latter part of NDTR so that it's easier to read it backwards, so to speak, working down from Argument to Qualisign (reversing Peirce's order of presentation) while looking at how specific parameters change along the way. But I won't have much time in the next week or so to develop any of these threads in great detail myself, so I'll just try to follow whatever threads you or others choose to spin off from here and help out when I can. One thing I did come across recently "about the role of the different correlates in these genuine triadic relations" is this bit from the late piece on "Some Amazing Mazes" (CP 6.318): [[ I have, since 1870, written much about the logic of relations. In those writings, I have usually restricted the terms "relations" and "relationships" to existential relations and relationships. By a relationship I understand the conception of a fact about a set of things abstracted from the representation of the things themselves or, in other words, a predicate which requires more than one subject to complete a proposition, or conception of a fact. A "relation" only differs from a "relationship" in that one of the subjects is regarded as being taken account of first, and is usually called the subject nominative, while the others are called the direct and indirect objects. In other words a relation is a predicate requiring one subject nominative and one or more objects in a definite sequence. In my earlier papers I use the conception of relation chiefly; in my later ones that of relationship. The difference is little more than trifling. ]] But that's it for now. Gary f. -----Original Message----- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: 30-Mar-16 14:03 Hi Gary F., List, The detailed post you've made on "Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations" is quite helpful in framing a number of issues. Having been through it a few times, I don't see any places where I would want to voice disagreement. In fact, I think you've sorted through a number of interpretative questions and issues in a sensitive and thoughtful manner. You've covered quite a lot, so where should we focus our attention? I have a particular interest in looking more closely at two relations that are central in Peirce's account of signs: determination and reference. In both cases, I am wondering if we might draw out what Peirce is saying about the role of the different correlates in these genuine triadic relations when they have the character of possibilities, actualities and general rules. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354
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