Gary,
I don’t want to diffuse away Jeff’s intention and the work he put into presenting his perspective, so this will be my last post about this. We can take things off line if I am leading us astray. You said: I'm not sure what you're saying here. CP 5.189, as I recall, concerns abduction. But I was speaking not about the inquiry process (whereas abduction, 1ns, is 1st, deduction, 3ns, is 2nd, and inductive testing, 2ns, is 3rd), but about semiotic determination. Inquiry is an entirely different vector than semiosis, and is follows what I've called the order or vector of process, namely, 1ns -> 3ns -> 2ns (which Peirce also offers as the order of biological evolution). To me, they’re all the same; that is, they are all about making our ideas clear. To what I was referring regards CP 5.189 is; C (1ns), A (2ns), B (3ns). C is first and not second. It's first because it is the thing that interrupts the habit of expectation of the inquisiturus. The surprising fact, C (the object, icon, 1ns), is observed. But if A (sign, representamen, index, computer model) were true… As for computer models related to Peirce, I'd suggest you take a look at some of John Sowa's work, for example http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/ontometa.htm especially since your triad "index, representamen, sign" offers duplicates of 'sign' ('representamen'), but omits the interpretant. The (index, representamen, sign) were not intended to refer to a triad. They are grouped as different labels for the same category of secondness. Interpretant, of course, is 3ns. Best, Jerry R On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 10:14 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jerry, > > I'm not sure what you're saying here. CP 5.189, as I recall, concerns > abduction. But I was speaking not about the inquiry process (whereas > abduction, 1ns, is 1st, deduction, 3ns, is 2nd, and inductive testing, 2ns, > is 3rd), but about semiotic determination. Inquiry is an entirely different > vector than semiosis, and is follows what I've called the order or vector > of process, namely, 1ns -> 3ns -> 2ns (which Peirce also offers as the > order of biological evolution). > > As for computer models related to Peirce, I'd suggest you take a look at > some of John Sowa's work, for example > http://www.jfsowa.com/ontology/ontometa.htm > especially since your triad "index, representamen, sign" offers duplicates > of 'sign' ('representamen'), but omits the interpretant. > > Best, > > Gary R. > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 10:57 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary, >> >> btw, you associate the object with 2ns...and >> the "sign (that is, a representamen, associated with possibility)" with >> 1ns >> >> But when one works with computer models (index, representamen, sign) to >> say something relevant about the object (icon, problem), it is the object >> that has the quality of possibilities (1ns, noetic heterogeneity) and the >> model that has the quality of 2ns, the "No" (of "Yes and No", Guess at the >> Riddle). >> >> So, the matter can depend on the context. Again, the question ends up in >> where do we look for proof for correctness of the matter if not in CP >> 5.189? Or, perhaps we'll need to look at external sources, like the >> Socratic "What is?" problem. >> >> Best, >> Jerry R >> >> On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 9:00 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Jerry, >>> >>> You're welcome. One of the reasons I use the abbreviations 1ns, 2ns, 3ns >>> (firstness, secondness, thirdness) is to distinguish the categories from >>> 1st, 2nd, 3rd (in order, first, second, third). >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R. >>> >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *C 745* >>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>> >>> On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 9:52 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Thanks Gary! >>>> >>>> I suspect we'll end up talking about whether it's 2, 1, 3 for the >>>> student and >>>> 1, 2, 3 for the philosopher, eventually... >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> Jerry R >>>> >>>> On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 7:46 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com >>>> > wrote: >>>> >>>>> Jerry, Jeff, list, >>>>> >>>>> As I read him, Peirce holds firstly (that is, 1st in semiosic order) >>>>> that the object (associated with 2ns; whether the dynamic object is >>>>> 'existential' or not--its 'ground' in any case will *not* be so) >>>>> determines a sign (that is, a representamen, associated with possibility, >>>>> 1ns), which in turn determines the interpretant (associated with 3ns, >>>>> whatever 'interprets' the sign (in human semiosis, a mind; in biosemiosis, >>>>> etc. a quasi-mind) to mean whatever it does mean to that mind or >>>>> quasi-mind, the interpretant standing in the same (or, in the case of a >>>>> slightly more developed sign, in similar) relation to the object as the >>>>> sign itself stands to its object. And, as has been repeatedly discussed >>>>> here, one errs if one thinks of semiosic determination in a physical >>>>> sense. >>>>> >>>>> I think that it is important, therefore, to carefully distinguish the >>>>> order of semiosis , what I've called the vector or order of determination >>>>> (== 2ns -> 1ns -> 3ns) from the categories themselves, for there are 6 >>>>> possible vectors involving the 3 categories, so that, for example, 1ns is >>>>> not 1st in 4 of these vectors. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> Gary R. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>>>> >>>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>>> *Communication Studies* >>>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>>> *C 745* >>>>> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 7:40 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Jeff, list: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> In various writings by Peirce and by interpreters of Peirce, >>>>>> >>>>>> it is one, two, three; sign, object, interpretant. (c.f., Brent, >>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/brent/PURSUING.HTM >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Yet, your interpretation of determination from the quote above says, >>>>>> >>>>>> object (one), sign (two), interpretant (three). >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Where’s the proof for which is *correct* or can *both be correct*? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> That is, how should we enter inquiry when we are received the finger >>>>>> (as the moon) and not the moon, itself? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> c.f., at 1:15 of >>>>>> >>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDW6vkuqGLg >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Best, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jerry Rhee >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 1:28 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < >>>>>> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Apr 20, 2016, at 12:31 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >>>>>>> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> First, an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word >>>>>>> to its widest limits, as *anything which, being determined by an >>>>>>> object, determines an interpretation to determination, through it, by >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> same object*), leads to a proof that every sign is determined by >>>>>>> its object, either first, by partaking in the characters of the object, >>>>>>> when I call the sign an *Icon*; secondly, by being really and in >>>>>>> its individual existence connected with the individual object, when I >>>>>>> call >>>>>>> the sign an*Index*; thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty >>>>>>> that it will be interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a >>>>>>> habit (which term I use as including a natural disposition), when I call >>>>>>> the sign a *Symbol*. (CP, 4.531) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Peirce makes the following claim: All determination is by negation; >>>>>>> we can first recognize any character only by putting an object which >>>>>>> possesses it into comparison with an object which possesses it not. (CP >>>>>>> 5.294) Having examined a number of places where Peirce describes >>>>>>> different sorts of determination, one of the clearest sets of >>>>>>> definitions >>>>>>> and explanations are found in an unpublished set of manuscript. In >>>>>>> particular, MS 612 contains a detailed analysis of the meaning of >>>>>>> “determination,” “determined to accord,” and “determined after.” Here >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> links to the manuscript pages and (as yet unedited) transcriptions of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> relevant passages in FromThePage: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> List, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It may be helpful to recognize that these writings are simply >>>>>>> re-statements and generalizations of the methods of chemical >>>>>>> determination >>>>>>> as they stood in the latter part of the 19 th Century. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In particular, the sentence: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> All determination is by negation; we can first recognize any >>>>>>> character only by putting an object which possesses it into comparison >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> an object which possesses it not. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> is absolutely essential as the first phase of erotetic logic. >>>>>>> (What is it?) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Logically, many chemical elements are known to exist and are >>>>>>> potential precedences for the material at hand. >>>>>>> If you want to determine what is in a thing, one must eliminate >>>>>>> everything else. >>>>>>> The antecedent of the determination must be an object. Otherwise, >>>>>>> no sign exists. >>>>>>> And, no determination is possible. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In the habits of chemists, various methods are given names. These >>>>>>> methods were not necessary specific and often inconsistent with one >>>>>>> another >>>>>>> so that double and triple checking of questionable tests were necessary. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The specific goal of determination was to reach a conclusion with >>>>>>> regard to the molecular formula (ratios of small whole numbers by >>>>>>> weight of >>>>>>> each element that appears in the determination. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The broad goal of the chemist must be constrained for application of >>>>>>> the semantics to non-material phenomena. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hope this is helpful >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Cheers >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Jerry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>>>>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>>>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>>>>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY >>>>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>>>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>>>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
