Jon A., Jon S., Gary R., Edwina,
Jon A., I see a problem with your criticism, in that it seems precise in
itself yet too vague in application.
It's not apparent to me that Gary R. or Jon S. or I have been treating
categories as non-relational essences, at least in any way that you would
not also be accusing Peirce of doing. If you think that Peirce went too far
in that direction, please say so.
There is not only the quote from CP 2.711 which I gave recently
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-05/msg00002.html but also
another passage, in the third-to-last paragraph (EP 1:198-9, W 3:337-8, CP
2.643, CLL 151-2) of "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis" (1878)
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Popular_Science_Monthly/Volume_13/August_1878/Illustrations_of_the_Logic_of_Science_VI
in which Peirce associates the three modes of inference with categories on
the basis of the categorial nature of their respective conclusions. Once
again, the deductive conclusion (result) is volitional (Second), the
inductive conclusion (rule) is habitual (Third), and the abductive
conclusion (case) is sensuous (First). In these discussions, a lot of the
relational aspects are left implicit; Peirce doesn't in those places
exposit the whole theory of the categories complete with tuples.
As we know, in later years Peirce instead associated deduction with
thirdness and induction with secondness, this time at least partly because
of the modalities of the conclusions that they produce: "Deduction proves
that something _*must be*_; Induction shows that something _*actually is*_
operative; Abduction merely suggests that something _*may be*_." (CP
5.171) http://www.textlog.de/7658.html .
If you think that Peirce went too far in such direction, please say so. It
would clarify at least a little your criticism of the rest of us here.
You're allowed to criticize us and Peirce too. We know that I don't share
Peirce's view of the categories, and I seem to recall from misty years ago
that you don't regard them as basic, the integers, if anything, were your
basics, and you have been interested first of all in the tuples and the
irreducibility of some dyads, some triads, and no higher-ads, in which
regard you do agree with Peirce.
Best, Ben
On 5/2/2016 11:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Jon A., List:
I gather that you believe this whole discussion to be misguided, but does
that warrant blocking the way of inquiry for those of us who are still
interested in exploring it? Perhaps the outcome will be a consensus that
it is indeed a mistake to assign categories to rule/case/result at all
... or that it makes no practical difference what assignments we make
... or that the "correct" assignments depend on which aspect of the
categories is in focus. Or maybe the outcome will be no consensus at all;
the attempt might still be worthwhile anyway.
I tend to "default" to the categories as possibility/actuality/necessity,
and that guides where I stand currently on this particular matter. Others
might lean more toward quality/relation/representation, or
feeling/action/thought, or chance/law/habit. How do we resolve situations
when these different characterizations of Peirce's three categories suggest
different answers? Per your latest message, what exactly is the "critical
question that has to be asked," and at which "step of analysis" should we
be asking it?
Regards,
Jon S.
On Mon, May 2, 2016 at 8:24 AM, Jon Awbrey < <jawb...@att.net>
jawb...@att.net > wrote:
Jon S.,
Most of the old timers on this List have already heard
and ignored this advice more times than I could care to
enumerate but since you and maybe a few other onlookers
may not have heard it before, I will give it another try.
Peirce's categories are best viewed as categories of relations.
To a first approximation, firstness, secondness, thirdness are
simply what all monadic, dyadic, triadic relations, respectively,
have in common. (At a second approximation, we may take up the
issues of generic versus degenerate cases of 1-, 2-, 3-adicity,
but it is critical to take the first approximation first before
attempting to deal with the second.)
In that light, thirdness is a global property of the whole triadic
relation in view and it is a category error to attribute thirdness
to any local domain or any given element that participates in that
relation.
As it happens, we often approach a complex relation by picking one of
its elements, that is, a single tuple as exemplary of the whole set of
tuples that make up the relation, and then we take up the components of
that tuple in one convenient order or another. That method lends itself
to the impression that k-ness abides in the k-th component we happen to
take up, but that impression begs the question of whether that order is
a property of the relation itself, or merely an artifact of our choice.
Failing to examine that question puts us at risk for a type of error
that I've rubricized as the “Fallacy Of Misplaced Abstraction” (FOMA).
As I see it, there is a lot of that going on in the present discussion,
arising from a tendency to assign Peircean categories to everything in
sight, despite the fact that Peirce's categories apply only to certain
levels of structure.
Regards,
Jon
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