Jerry R., List: JR: *Is CP 5.189 his lanterna pedibus, the light to guide our researches? *
JR: Should we adopt it more consciously at the outset for discussion of dark questions, despite its characterization as heuristic: JR: “This is an *imperfect view* of the application which the conceptions which, according to our analysis, are the most fundamental ones find in the sphere of logic. It is believed, however, that it is sufficient to show that at least something may be usefully suggested by considering this science in this *light*.” ~Peirce The connection suggested here seems tenuous at best. Peirce wrote the quoted text in 1868, as the conclusion of "On a New List of Categories"--35 years *before* presenting CP 5.189 in the last 1903 Harvard lecture. JR: It is a question about whether we, as *all who investigate*, are willing to take seriously CP 5.189, “the form abduction ought to take”, This is also a bit misleading. Peirce does not say that CP 5.189 is "the form abduction ought to take"; he begins setting forth one of the anticipated objections to it by saying, "even if this be the normative form of abduction, the form to which abduction ought to conform ..." Granted, he does call this "the form of inference" for abduction, which he describes as having "a perfectly definite logical form." Still, I wonder--is it proper to treat CP 5.189 as THE definitive statement of how abduction works? Or does that risk becoming the kind of dogmatism that Peirce typically decried? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 2:03 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi Clark, list: > > > > Thank you for that earnest answer. The reason why I asked whether you > thought what I said was religious or theological was to ask about your > reaction to its systematicity. Whichever word stands for more > systematic, that’s what I meant. > > > > Here is my attitude: > > “The gods do not approve of man’s trying to seek out what they did not > wish to reveal, the things in heaven and beneath the earth. > > A pious man will therefore not investigate the divine things but only the > human things, *the things left to man’s investigation*.” ~Strauss > > Which is not to ignore the divine things, should they be available to > man’s inspection, and: > > “I hold that the method of interpreting Scripture is no different from > the method of interpreting Nature, and is in fact in complete accord with > it. For the method of interpreting Nature consists essentially in composing > a detailed study of Nature from which, as being the source of our assured > data, we can deduce the definitions of the things of Nature. “ ~Spinoza > > _____________ > > > > I’ve said previously, and it is understood by Peirceans (not all > Peirceans) that pragmatism is an old way of thinking; the river of > pragmatism; something about which one considers oneself a link in an old, > venerable tradition. So, the question of God ought to be interpreted in > that vein and not in the many diverse ways it can be handled. We are > talking philosophy and that is how I intend the question. (I must admit, > despite the advantages, it is a bit strange that we should be talking > philosophically about the Reality of God, which can never be proved. Then > again, there are also religious philosophers. There must be room for a > God.) > > But there are a variety of past pragmatists with different opinions. Things > are further complicated because new inquirers want to know things of which > they do not already know, things they ought to know…but there is so much to > know. Yet, this is our repeating, natural condition as a community. > > I will not talk here about the many things one ought to know, in > particular the place of God and the Beautiful in moral inquiry because > ethics follows esthetics. Instead, I wish to poll the Peircean community > with a question about their belief regarding something that ought to be > obvious: > > *Is CP 5.189 his lanterna pedibus, the light to guide our researches? * > > Should we adopt it more consciously at the outset for discussion of dark > questions, despite its characterization as heuristic: > > “This is an *imperfect view* of the application which the conceptions > which, according to our analysis, are the most fundamental ones find in the > sphere of logic. It is believed, however, that it is sufficient to show > that at least something may be usefully suggested by considering this > science in this *light*.” ~Peirce > > > > That is, if not this, *which*? > > ________ > > The questions deal with copula and being because they participate in the > path from multiplicity to unity. It is a question about whether we, as *all > who investigate*, are willing to take seriously CP 5.189, “the form > abduction ought to take”, or treat the insinuation like Plato’s “without > geometry, enter not”, a matter to be ignored, something not seen or > recognized by those who don’t find the suggestion immediately useful. > > one, two, three…chance, law, habit-taking… > > With best wishes, > Jerry Rhee > > On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 at 12:40 PM, Martin Kettelhut <mkettel...@msn.com> > wrote: > >> Dear Peirce List, >> >> Altho the distinction between immediate and dynamic object, as well as >> the theological implications (Peirce abstained from), both enrich the >> conversation, I see Peirce’s observations about the copula as >> iconoclastic. That is, they bring closure to all of the old-school >> empiricist and phenomenological metaphysical and ontological debates, >> and—despite the fact that most of twentieth century philosophy wallowed in >> the oblivion of linguistics—Peirce set the stage for us to return to the >> ancients and sort out the cosmological implications of observing that (I’m >> summarizing CP1.545-9): >> >> Our (phenomenal) claims about the (noumenal) world as it is independent >> of what any finite group of subjects may allege, exhibit an analytically >> irreducible, and hence propositional, form, viz. the copula. That is, they >> relate an at least supposable substance (subject) to a general character >> (predicate) in such a way that the subject and the general concept of its >> being can be thought of neither as determinately identical nor as >> determinately distinct. >> >> From this point on, we can only talk about Erfahrung and Wirklichkeit as >> Zeichenprozess (to use Helmut Pape’s terms). This means—among other >> things--that matter and Geist are also neither determinately identical nor >> distinct, that there must (of a priori synthetic necessity) be a third >> element (besides subject and predicate) in every phenomenon, and that >> space, time, ideas and feelings are real continua. (The definition of a >> continuum changed in Peirce’s development, but seems to have always meant >> that of which there are no ultimate parts; see Jerome Havenel’s “Peirce’s >> Clarifications of Continuity.") >> >> Martin Kettelhut, PhD >> www.listeningisthekey.com >> 303 747 4449 >> >> >> On Jul 1, 2016, at 9:23 AM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: >> >> >> On Jun 30, 2016, at 8:35 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Do you find my previous writing to be religious or theological? >> >> For instance, if I were to ask "what would God be?", >> would that question not fit neatly into the previous argumentation? >> >> >> When you start talking God or Trinity there’s a lot of theological and >> philosophical assumptions one brings in. Add in that Peirce’s religious >> views were rather idiosyncratic - much more on the deist side of things but >> maintaining a significance of the Trinity but with an odd pseudo-Buddhist >> like twist - and I just don’t feel I know enough about the assumptions to >> say much. I’m religious myself but my own religious views are rather unlike >> Peirce’s. By and large from what I could see Peirce couldn’t bring himself >> to believe in anything like an interventionist God. (For quite reasonable >> epistemological reasons I might add - he just didn’t appear to have much by >> way of religious experience and distrusted the ability of the masses to >> interpret their religious experiences) >> >> When you raise the question of God it inevitably gets into whether you >> see the very sense of God determined primarily by the Greek philosophical >> tradition - where God is ultimate cause or even Being itself. However >> there’s a strong opposing view as well that sees God much more as a person >> and therefor much more at odds with Greek absolutism tendencies. At a >> minimum this opposing view is driven more by religious experience, however >> naively interpreted it may often be. This tension can be found throughout >> Christian history as well as Jewish history. And certainly prior to the >> rise of philosophy both Greek religion and Jewish religion was far more >> anthropomorphic in religious beliefs. (Zeus or Jehovah are more like >> people, with emotions and involvement in various ways with humanity rather >> than absolutely Other — arguably Judaism started picking up the more >> absolutist conceptions during the Hellenistic conquest of the near east by >> Alexander and then more so with Roman control of the region) >> >> So the question “what would God be” brings with it a slew of historical >> and theological questions and presuppositions. In Peirce’s intellectual >> class of the 19th century deism, platonism (Emerson) and Hegelianism tended >> to define respectable intellectual religion. Peirce, to my admitted limited >> eyes, seems largely caught up with the religious views of his peers. In the >> 20th century this shifts although much of the shift is nominalistic. That >> is people still tend to believe the same sorts of things about >> interventionist deities, miracles, and grounds of existence but over time >> divorce it from religious language. Often the distinction between a deist >> and an atheist is purely over language and how much they dislike being >> connected rhetorically with organized religion. This continues until the >> 1980’s when there was a somewhat countermove in Continental philosophy >> where typically self-avowed atheists return to religious language. But the >> influence of that culturally seems minor. And there always were religious >> thinkers such as Levinas or Marion but the fact they can enter into dialog >> so well with atheists in their own traditions shows their religion is still >> compatible with that fuzzy deist/atheist distinction. >> >> I’ll confess my own views see tying grounds of being (in any of its >> guises or meanings) with God to not be terribly fruitful. So it’s just not >> a topic I’m interested in unless it relates to specific philosophical >> questions (say with understanding Spinoza or Hegel). Outside of how the >> Neglected Argument helps illuminate abduction and Peirce’s notion of >> reality, I’m just not aware of the significance of his religious beliefs. >> I’m not even convinced his ontological beliefs (a fairly neoplatonic >> cosmological origin, the ontology of swerve as tied to consciousness, etc.) >> necessarily affect his other beliefs such as the pragmatic maxim or his >> semiotics. >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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