Supplement: But this "synchronical singularity happening" might just be that, what is meant by "irreducibility", or that the representamen does not exist alone, but only in mediation.
Edwina, list,
I dont want to argue, just tell what my temporal understanding is, which may change anytime:
3. What I have meant by saying that the sign is an interpreted representamen, is just my understanding of "sign" and "representamen" more or less being synonymous, but one might also call some not-yet-interpreted possible-sign-event "representamen", but a sign is always something yet interpreted.
The triad ROI is not the sign. The sign is the triad RR,RO,RI, which is a projectional reduction, into three dyads, of the triad ROI onto the representamen. But all this is hard to understand: If the representamen is this projection, then how could it ever have before undergone three relations of which it later is a projection? Either it is a kind of synchronical singularity happening, or my understanding is indeed not perfect. This has happened before.
Best,
Helmut
18. August 2016 um 22:04 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Helmet, list.
Again, I have a different understanding of these terms than you do.
!. No, in my view, the Representamen is not in itself triadic and does not consist of three Relations. In my view, the Sign [capital S] is triadic and consists of three Relations: RO-RR-RI. Notice that the Representamen plays a role in these three Relations. But it is not the Representamen that is triadic but that it operates within Three Relations..
2. The Representamen, or lower case sign, is the mediate Relation. The RR relation or Representamen-in-itself. And as a mediation, it links up with the Object and the Interpretant.
3. I don't know what you mean by " This is only so, if the representamen is interpreted, and then it is a sign, but still only the representamen.". Perhaps you mean that the Representamen operates within the semiosic triadic process of O-R-I?
4. With reference to the term of rhematic symbolic legisign - this is, as a Set of Words, a Dynamic Object. The whole thing is the Name of a particular type of Sign [just as your name is Helmut]. ...and when you hear it, you process this Name/Dynamic Object...and end up with an Interpretant/meaning of a description of a particular class of Signs. I don't think that breaking the term down into linguistic 'bits' is of much use. - but - that's just my view.
i don't think that the term of 'rhematic and symbolic are adjectives. They refer to the three Relations. There is the Relation that the Representamen, in a mode of Thirdness in itself [Legisign] has with the Interpretant in a mode of Firstness [rheme] and the Relation the Representamen has with the Object in a mode of Thirdness [symbolic].
Edwina
----- Original Message -----From: Helmut RaulienTo: Edwina TaborskySent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 3:43 PMSubject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/CausationEdwina, list,some days ago, due to a post by Gary f., I have come to the understanding of "sign", that it is both at the same time: The (interpreted) representamen alone, but this representamen is triadic and consists of three relations. Meaning: The triad of the relations RR, RO, RI are the representamen, or sign. This is only so, if the representamen is interpreted, and then it is a sign, but still only the representamen. Is that so? I mean, linguistically for example, a "rhematic symbolic legisign": "rhematic" and "symbolic" are adjectives, and "legi" is the pre-syllable of the noun "sign", so a kind of sign aka a kind of (interpreted) representamen. "Legisign" is the relation RR or representamen in itself, which is the noun. Pre-syllables and adjectives show treats of nouns, but do not make the nouns something else than what the meaning of the noun is- so, if the meaning is "so-and-so-kind of representamen-in-itself with two other special treats, namely so-and-so", it is the representamen alone, but a special kind of. Well, that is at least the understanding I had achieved, and now I hope, that it is ok, because it has made a lot clear for me, eg. the question about Peirces use of the term "sign".Best,Helmut18. August 2016 um 21:08 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Helmut, list:Part of the problem, Helmut, is that you and I are using a completely different meaning of the term 'sign'. I use the term Sign [capital letter] to refer to the whole triadic process of the three Relations of: Object-Representamen; Representamen-in-itself; and Representamen-Interpretant'. To me - this triad is irreducible and is the 'whole semiosic entity' - whether it be a word, an image, a thought, a plant, an atom, a molecule.....You seem to use the term 'sign' [lower case] as Peirce also often used it, to refer only to the Representamen. I don't think that the Representamen 'exists' per se, by itself. That would be a movement into Platonism. It operates within the triad - in any one of the three modal categories.No, the immediate object, to my understanding, does not function as the common understanding of the sign. It functions as the internal, subjective experience of the external Dynamic Object. A common understanding of the 'sign' [I am assuming that you are referring to the Representamen] - would be...the Representamen, which functions as a generalizing action.Now- if your two individuals hear two different things from the same sentence: My culture is contaminated' - then, there are TWO existent dynamic objects. One is the sentence as spoken by the biologist. The other is the sentence as heard by the listener. And there are two Immediate objects; one = the internal sounds as spoken by the biologist; the other, the internalization of the words as heard by the listener. Then, each of them mediates/transforms these sounds via their Representamen...and ends up with two different Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants!Edwina----- Original Message -----From: Helmut RaulienSent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 2:54 PMSubject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/CausationEdwina, Jon, list,first, thank you, Edwina, for clearing the determination thing. Before I had never understood, why the object should determine the sign. But that the immediate object does so, I see.Discrete existence, I would say, is being there in the world, like the dynamical object. The immediate object exists in the semiosic process alone, that is, I guess I might say, in a communication it exists as the common understanding of the sign. Is this common understanding the subset of the concepts of eg. a term, both the speaker and the hearer have of a term? "Subset" in case these concepts differ. And if there is a complete misunderstanding (eg. a biologist says: "My culture is contaminated", meaning something that has happened in his Petri-dish, but the hearer thinks that he is talking about the country he was born in), then there is no immediate object, and neither a dynamical, I guess. Is that so?Best,Helmut18. August 2016 um 20:22 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Jon , ListI understand existence to mean particular, individual, discrete spatiotemporal existentiality; i.e., it has an objective or external reality. I consider that the Immediate Object is internal to the semiosic process, and has no discrete existence.Edwina----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .----- Original Message -----From: Jon Alan SchmidtTo: Edwina TaborskySent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 12:12 PMSubject: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/CausationEdwina, Helmut, List:Just wondering--is it right to say that the immediate object exists? As object, it falls under Secondness (actuality); but as immediate, it falls under Firstness (possibility).Thanks,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran LaymanOn Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 10:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:Helmut, list - the dynamic object, i.e., an objective existentiality, doesn't determine the immediate object [which exists only within the semiosic interaction] ONLY via efficient causality [which does operate within a linear temporality in that semiosic interaction] , but via final causality - which operates as a continuity of the process of Mind.Edwina----- Original Message -----From: Helmut RaulienCc: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-LSent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 10:20 AMSubject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abductive Form of Inference - CP 5.189 vs. CP 6.469Jerry, Jon, list,I think that this example shows, that ordinality is not necessarily in accord with categoriality, because categorically induction is secondness and deduction thirdness.So, what is ordinality? Does it merely mean the sequence in time, or does it mean the causation / determination sequence? This question would be irrelevant, if both causation and temporality always were in accord with each other. But: There is a temporality possible, which is not based on causation: The temporal sequence of contingent events. And: May there be a causation backwards in time, like with an anticipation? Is it so, that with an anticipation, though the immediate object yet is existing, the dynamical object is anticipated, i.e. exists in the future merely, so if you say, that the dynamical object too determines the sign, this would be a causation backwards in time?Best,Helmut
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