Jeff, list - Hmm - Perhaps I'm digging deeper into misunderstanding you ..but
it seems to me that you are indeed referring to the separation of mind and
matter - after all, the 'sharp distinction between subject and object' and
'self and other' in our thought does seem, to me at least, a situation where
the Subject Agent thinks of itself, never mind experiences itself, as
differentiated from the external [material] Object. So, you are also referring
to, I think [?], the reality of Secondness, but more, to the awareness of this
reality.
I'm not sure that such a differentation between subject and object is an action
of being 'torn asunder' - after all, material particulate reality does
necessarily 'instantiate' matter into discrete units. No Big Bad Agent did
this! And - This isn't a figment of our imagination! Energy couldn't exist as
matter in our universe if we denied the differentiation of Secondness; it would
entropically dissipate to the lowest common denominator. Chemical compounds
would be impossible without such differentiation; cellular development would be
impossible without such differentiation between self and other. And most
certainly, thought is involved in such differentiation. [see 4.551].
I'm not sure that we humans should try to overcome this basic material reality.
I can't, and don't see why, I should imagine the rejection of Secondness. [as
Hegel did]. Again- perhaps I'm misreading you.
The problem that our species has, I think, is due to the fact that we 'live in
two worlds, fact and fiction' - and can have a very difficult time separating
the two. So- when we acknowledge the fact of a disease, we can come up with the
fiction that it is due to that old witch on the hill. Or to our own 'being
sinful' . Or..... Other species without this rampant capacity for imagination
don't fall into such traps - which, considering the various wars of our
species, can indeed by apocalyptic. BUT - at the same time, this imaginative
capacity enables us to eventually deny that it's 'due to the witch', and
develop a vaccine or whatever. It's a difficult burden - to have the
capacity-to-imagine.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
To: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 11:01 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Edwina,
Yes, you are misreading what I wrote. I am not referring, in general, to the
metaphysical separation of mind and matter.
Take Emerson's "The Poet" as a nice phrasing of the question. For the sake of
clarity (but at the price of some richness) let me try to put the point in less
poetic terms than Emerson does. Here is a shot at a literal statement of the
question: what was necessary for creatures like us to gain some higher degrees
of self control over the conduct of our feelings, practice and thought? It
appears that one necessary requirement for gaining higher degrees of logical
self control was the development of a rather sharp distinction between subject
& object and self & other in our thought. This cleaving of what was once better
unified came at a certain price. Like Emerson, I tend to think the price was
rather high. Gary F. agrees. See the link to Turning Signs in the postscript to
the quote.
For some time, the question has been: how might we achieve a healthy
re-unification between those parts that have, in our thoughts, actions and
feeling, been torn asunder? Gary F suggests that the "tearing apart" was a
rather apocalyptic event in our evolution as human beings. I suspect it was
also traumatic for any other creatures in this great cosmos who, like us, seem
to have evolved higher--but still markedly limited--degrees of self control.
Like Emerson and Schiller, I am putting my trust in the capacity of the more
poetic and emotional parts of our selves help us find a new place in this great
world of ideas and things that we might be able to call our "home." Peirce, I
think, has wielded a mighty philosophical axe and has cleared a spot in the
woods. The task before us is to construct a new--perhaps more modern--house in
the clearing and see if the structure that we're trying to build can carry the
weight that our rather modern way of life (some would say overly post-modern
way of life) is placing on it and still have the features are needed for us to
feel that we are, once again, at home in this world.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
P.S. If your poetic tastes are more 20th than 19th century in character, then
take a look at T.S Eliot and Wallace Stevens and see how they have framed the
central questions at hand.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 7:23 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Jeff, list:
Perhaps I am misreading you, but, your reference to the 'separation' of mind
and matter, suggests a traumatic situation! You write:
"The expense, considered in terms of the price that human beings have had to
pay thus far in order gain the capacities of self-control needed to make use of
the separation appear to have been quite high. You might even say that the
price was apocalyptic in character. On the other hand, it seems clear to me
that the worth of this "separation and combination" is beyond all measure."
Wow - what price did humans 'pay'? And apocalyptic?? What about other systems
in the physico-chemical and biological realms. I acknowledge the serious
problems - and advantages - the human species has in this differentation - but
..apocalyptic?
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
To: 'Peirce-L'
Sent: Thursday, August 25, 2016 10:00 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Gary F., List,
You make an interesting point that I will need to think about more. The
interpretative question is: where is the need for the division between the
immediate and dynamical objects most clearly expressed? We agree, I take it,
that the need we are talking about is an explanatory need--although the need
might also take other forms (e.g., emotional and practical). The question is,
what kinds of signs--where the types are classified based the relations that
hold between the objects, signs and interpretants--are essential in a theory of
speculative grammar for the purpose of providing philosophical explanations of
the nature and validity of the principles of inference laid out in the critical
logic?
You are making a claim that Peirce comes to see--with greater
clarity--something that he didn't see very well until about 1906, which is the
need to resolve a particular kind of paradox about the object and the relations
that objects can bear to both signs and interpretants. In support of the point,
you refer to the really interesting quote from the 1906 and the point that
Peirce quotes from Stokes in the 1884 definition.
I'm wondering how much (or how little) of the paradox Peirce seems to
appreciate in the passages I've pointed to from 1859 and 1866. Let's take
another look at earlier of the two. There, Peirce stresses the differences
between: 1st the thing regarded simply, 2nd the object or thing regarded as
thought of, 3rd the act of thinking, 4th the phenomenon or thought, and 5th the
thinker. (W, 42) My question is: why did Peirce sense the need to make the
distinction between these five aspects of the thing that one can think and the
thoughts one can have of those things? The explanation is, I suspect, fairly
complicated--even at this rather juvenile stage in the development of his
philosophical views. Leaving many of those complications to the side, let's
start by considering two important sets of philosophical arguments that Peirce
refers to in his work--both at this time and later. One the one hand, we have
Berkeley's arguments against two forms of materialism and for his own version
of idealism. On the other hand, we have Kant's arguments in the 1st Critique
against Berkeley's form of idealism and for his own version of transcendental
idealism. Kant's arguments are designed to show how it is possible to validate
cognitive claims to knowledge in common sense and science that we can discover
the truth about material objects--where those facts are independent of what you
or I might happen to think.
In 1861, Peirce makes some interesting remarks pertaining to his "Views on
Chemistry." Here is one remark that I find particularly interesting. It appears
to be a direct response to Berkeley: "Thus it appears that the Science of the
Kinds of Matter through treating of matter belongs to Natural Philosophy;
through treating of kinds belongs to Natural History, and thus unlike the other
sciences treats alike of form and force,--of the worth and expense of the
spiritual manifestations of nature. Indeed, as that very expression shows, the
form and the force are but the same thing from different points of view." This
point about the science of Chemistry seems, I think, to inform the way that he
is working as a philosopher in the science of speculative grammar. That is, he
is modeling the development of the key semiotic conceptions on the way
analogous conceptions have been developed in chemistry. We know that this
analogy served as a guiding light in his ongoing work in speculative grammar
throughout his career.
What does it tell us about the distinction he had already made between the
"1st the thing regarded simply, 2nd the object or thing regarded as thought of,
3rd the act of thinking, 4th the phenomenon or thought" and his account of the
relations that hold between those things? What stands out to me is the first
sort of thing appears to be the kind of object that can have a material nature.
That is, it is the kind of thing that is capable of providing instruction as to
the real nature of things--and we learn those lessons by so many blows.
Peirce's point, it would seem, is that a philosophical explanation of the
nature of and relations between things and thoughts requires that we bring
together--as we have learned to do in the science of chemistry--form and force.
The key, he suggests, is that we come to recognize both the worth and expense
of these manifestations of nature.
So, as I reflect on the paradox that you find so compelling, what is the
worth and expense of having both this separation and this combination of object
that is independent of thought-sign and object that is internal to
thought-sign? The expense, considered in terms of the price that human beings
have had to pay thus far in order gain the capacities of self-control needed to
make use of the separation appear to have been quite high. You might even say
that the price was apocalyptic in character. On the other hand, it seems clear
to me that the worth of this "separation and combination" is beyond all measure.
So, I think that certain aspects of the need for reflecting on and sorting
through this paradox was felt quite early--just as Kant, Schiller and Schelling
felt a similar need to sort it out. What is interesting is that the bacillus of
transcendentalism that Peirce might have caught from Emerson seemed to have
been contracted quite early--and it could very well have provided some of the
insight that was needed to gain a better intuitive grasp of how we might gain
some traction in our efforts to make sense of the significance of the paradox.
As such, I find myself looking to Emerson's reflections in essays such as "The
Poet" about what it really means to take a transcendental approach to questions
concerning the worth and expense of engaging in philosophical reflections on
these sorts of questions about the origins of the separation that was made in
the development of human thought between subject and object, self and other.
--Jeff
P.S. For those who might like to read and think more about the high price
of this separation and combination of object and sign-thought, I recommend an
innovative online book called Turning Signs. You can find it here:
http://gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2016 7:53 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and
Determination/Causation
Jeff, list,
I agree that Peirce’s post-1903 distinctions are semeiotic developments of
more basic logical (or ontological) distinctions, or as you put it, “at root,
the same basic conceptual distinctions worked out in more refined ways. The new
terminology of immediate and dynamical for objects and interpretants is used to
capture finer distinctions involving much finer grained explanations …” But in
the case of the objects, I don’t think that any of his earlier expressions of
the basic distinction express the need for it more clearly than the 1906 text I
quoted: the distinction is needed to resolve the seeming paradox that the real
Object of a thought-sign has to be both independent of and internal to the
sign. The cognitive paradox is well expressed in this quotation which Peirce
cited in his Century Dictionary definition of “thought”:
[[ Thought is, in every case, the cognition of an object, which really,
actually, existentially out of thought, is ideally, intellectually,
intelligibly within it; and just because within in the latter sense, is it
known as actually without in the former.
— G.J. Stokes, The Objectivity of Truth (1884), p. 53 ]]
A similar paradox applies to any cognitive sign which has a dynamic
interpretant, i.e. an effect on the reality external to the sign.
Gary f.
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: 23-Aug-16 13:18
To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Gary F, List,
On your suggestions, let's make some smaller steps. You say: "Now, as
others have pointed out, Peirce did not introduce the distinction between
immediate and dynamic object until around 1904, and I think his clearest
explanation of the need for this distinction comes at the end of this paragraph
from a 1906 draft letter to Welby."
I would put the point differently. It may be the case that Peirce
introduced the terms "immediate object" and "dynamic object" in 1904 and laid
out a relatively clear explanation of how those terms should be used in the
larger classificatory scheme of signs in the 1906 letter. Having said that, I
don't believe that Peirce introduced the conceptual distinction into his
philosophical framework at that time.
In fact, Peirce used different terms earlier (i.e., primary object and
secondary object) in 1902 (CP 3.11) in an attempt to work through the same
sorts of conceptual distinctions. I believe he was already, in 1959, trying to
refine a Kantian distinction in opposition to Berkeley when made a deliberate
decision to make use of these concepts. He stresses the differences between 1st
the thing regarded simply, 2nd the object or thing regarded as thought of, 3rd
the act of thinking, 4th the phenomenon or thought, and 5th the thinker. (W,
42). Then, as he beings to work out his account of the categories and the
fundamental relations between signs, objects and interpretants, he is putting
the conceptual distinction to good use in 1866 in his account of the double and
triple reference to both correlates and objects (W, 524-8). The clarification
of the need for making the conceptual distinction (i.e., within the context of
his account of the fundamental categories that are needed for the theory of
logic) is made at about this time.
On my reading of the development of his thought, he already has many of the
basic points in place that he needs to make a fairly clear conceptual
distinction between different kinds of interpretants. There are three
unprescindible references to interpretants: reference of the likeness to its
interpretant; reference of the index to its interpretant, and reference of the
symbol to its interpretant. Each of these is, of course, understood in terms of
the reference of the likeness, index and symbol to their grounds and/or
objects. Peirce seems to affirm these interpretative points about the
development of his thought when he reflects, time and again in the 1890's and
1900's, and is surprised to see just how little was really needed in the way of
changes in these basic ideas. He attributes this surprising fact to the great
fortune of having landed on an apt method for conducting these logical
inquiries.
One might suggest that these earlier conceptual distinctions are very
different in character from those being used 40 year later in the 66-fold
classification of signs. I, on the other hand, believe that they are at root,
the same basic conceptual distinctions worked out in more refined ways. The new
terminology of immediate and dynamical for objects and interpretants is used to
capture finer distinctions involving much finer grained explanations of the
different kinds of relations that are involved and that can evolve, but the
basic structure of reference to ground, reference to correlate and reference to
interpretant along with single, double and triple reference are still
there--providing a relatively secure anchor for the evolving semiotic theory.
I am not the first to make such a suggestion. In Masato Ishida's
Dissertation, A PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY ON C. S. PEIRCE’S “ON A NEW LIST OF
CATEGORIES”: EXHIBITING LOGICAL STRUCTURE AND ABIDING RELEVANCE, he argues in
chapters 6 and 7 for the same general theses. If you've not seen this work, let
me know and I provide a copy. For those who are interested in Peirce's
arguments in the "New List," it is worth a careful read.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Sent: Monday, August 22, 2016 11:17 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and
Determination/Causation
Jeff, this is quite an elaborate project you’ve laid out for us! I’m eager
to see what comes out of it, but at the same time I feel the need to take it in
small steps (anyway that’s all I will have time to do).
It seems to me that a pragmatic classification system always begins with a
perceived need to make distinctions (or “divisions”) — which then proliferate
as new needs arise. Now, as others have pointed out, Peirce did not introduce
the distinction between immediate and dynamic object until around 1904, and I
think his clearest explanation of the need for this distinction comes at the
end of this paragraph from a 1906 draft letter to Welby:
[[ I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the
communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is
determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, called
its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in
mind in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Object and by the
Interpretant. In order that a Form may be extended or communicated, it is
necessary that it should have been really embodied in a Subject independently
of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another subject
in which the same form is embodied only in consequence of the communication.
The Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the
former Subject, is quite independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must
say that the object of a sign can be nothing but what that sign represents it
to be. Therefore, in order to reconcile these apparently conflicting truths, it
is indispensable to distinguish the immediate object from the dynamical object.
] SS 196, EP2:477]
I think we often use the term “dynamic object” when what we have in mind is
the “Subject” in which the Form “is really embodied independently of the
communication,” i.e. external to the sign. But if we regard the Form as the
Object, as Peirce does here, then it becomes clear that the immediate object is
that Form as embodied in the other subject, the one affected by the sign so
that communication is effected; and this embodiment is not “independent of the
communication” but is internal to the sign, i.e. to the medium of communication.
There’s also a very similar passage in EP2:544n22, which adds a bit more
explanatory detail:
[[ For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for
the communication of a Form. It is not logically necessary that anything
possessing consciousness, that is, feeling of the peculiar common quality of
all our feeling, should be concerned. But it is necessary that there should be
two, if not three, quasi-minds, meaning things capable of varied determination
as to forms of the kind communicated.
As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object
which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its
relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; that is to say, its correspondence
to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining
unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is
active, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby affected.
But at this point certain distinctions are called for. That which is
communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form. It
is not a singular thing; for if a singular thing were first in the Object and
afterward in the Interpretant outside the Object, it must thereby cease to be
in the Object. The Form that is communicated does not necessarily cease to be
in one thing when it comes to be in a different thing, because its being is a
being of the predicate. The Being of a Form consists in the truth of a
conditional proposition. Under given circumstances, something would be true.
The Form is in the Object, entitatively we may say, meaning that that
conditional relation, or following of consequent upon reason, which constitutes
the Form, is literally true of the Object. In the Sign the Form may or may not
be embodied entitatively, but it must be embodied representatively, that is, in
respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the Interpretant an
effect similar to that which the Object itself would under favorable
circumstances. ]]
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