Jon, list, see my replies  below

  1) JON: It sounds like you take the view that the immediate/dynamic/final 
interpretants are the same as the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants.  I 
have not definitively made up my mind about that, but lean more toward seeing 
them as distinct trichotomies.

  EDWINA: Yes, I consider the two sets of terms to refer to the same actions. I 
disagree with adding more Interpretants to the process.

  2) JON: The English word "man" is a Symbol, which makes it a Legisign or 
Type, which means that its Being is general.  While it indeed only "exists" in 
its instantiations--Replicas, which are Sinsigns or Tokens--it is Real 
independently of them.  This is NOT Platonism, it is Peircean three-category 
Realism.

  EDWINA: Yes, the word man is a symbol. But the symbol exists only within the 
triadic semiosis; that is, the Legisign doesn't exist 'per se'. It is REAL as a 
general but generals only exist within instantiation. So, the word 'man' only 
functions as a symbol when it is instantiated in a particular triad - whether 
it be the single man or the Argument referring to Man. 

  3) JON: One thing on which we do agree is that "the full range of meaning 
falls within the purview of Thirdness."  But this says nothing more than that 
meaning is a matter of the Interpretants--all three of them--rather than the 
Sign or the Objects.  I am not aware of anything in Peirce's writings that 
warrants characterizing the Immediate Interpretant as internal to the 
individual, rather than internal to the Sign.

  EDWINA: But the Sign operates only within individuals! The semiosic triad 
doesn't operate outside of matter - whether that matter be a man, a tree, an 
insect....Mind is not separate from matter. That's Cartesian and Peirce is not 
a Cartesian. 

  And I consider that meaning is embodied within the Object - after all, as 
Peirce wrote, 'matter is effete Mind'. 6.25; and 'matter is mind hidebound with 
habits' 6.158. Meaning is embodied within Thirdness. The object is a Form of 
Meaning..and makes more meaning in its interactions with other Signs 
[instantiations of matter]...and these develop the Habits even more.

  4) JON: Regarding determination, as I said before, I understand it mainly as 
constraint, not causation.  The Dynamic Object can only generate certain 
Immediate Objects, and each of those can only be represented by certain Signs.  
The Final Interpretant will be one or more of the Dynamic Interpretants, which 
will all fall within the range of the Immediate Interpretant, which is dictated 
by the Sign.

  EDWINA: I consider that the semiosic process is more complex than you 
outline. The DO may indeed, in its own nature, have a limited range of data 
output that can become an IO - IF THAT DO were singularly causal of that IO. 
But it isn't. For example, when I, who am processing input data from an 
external DO, arrive at my own IO [and I maintain it is internal to me]...that 
same input data is merged with other input data. How do I separate them?

  And I don't agree that the IO 'can only be represented by certain Signs' [I 
presume you mean the Representamen]. If I am receiving input data, a noise and 
a visual image, then, my ability to process this sensual input....is 
transformed by my habits/knowledge [Representamen]...and I can come up with 
various Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants. 'It's just noise; it's a bird; 
it's a plane; it's Superman. The Final Interpretant involves a community. 

  5) JON: I am not sure what you mean when you say, "But a Sign operates within 
matter!"  Are you suggesting that Signs ONLY operate within matter?  I am 
pretty sure that Peirce would never condone such a statement.

  EDWINA: Yes - I do suggest that Signs [by which I mean the triadic semiosic 
process as well as the category of Thirdness]...only operates within 
instantiations. And instantiations are existential in time and space.  That 
means that they are material. That includes mental concepts which operate 
within the frog's leg as well as the human mind. I simply don't see Signs, both 
the triad and the Thirdness...operating outside of such particularization.

  6) JON: Again, the Immediate
  Object is internal to the Sign itself.  I took "individual site-of-semeiosis" 
as a substitute for "human mind"; if this is not how you are using that term, 
then I guess that I need you to explain it.

  EDWINA: No- I don't separate Mind and Matter. Nor does Peirce. See his The 
Law of Mind, 6.150 and on; 6.255 and on. 6.277 and on.....

  Regards,

  Jon



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