Jon - the requirement for a community in the analysis of reality [see 5.311] is
hardly a nominalistic outline. Indeed, Peirce explains this requirement
repeatedly throughout his works.
I wrote: "And i also consider that we should clarify the terms of 'real',
'reality' and 'realism'. You chastized me for such a request - telling me that
I thereby 'disagree with Peirce'. How is asking for clarification of
terminology a 'disagreement with Peirce'???"...Again - how is asking for
clarification of terminology a 'disagreement with Peirce'?
I think that, based on the obvious differences of our use of the terms on this
list, that we should clarify what we - and Peirce - meant by those terms. After
all - you disagree with my interpretation of them [ telling me that my quoted
references are from an 'old text of Peirce's] and I disagree with your
interpretation of them [i.e., your aligning them with Firstness and Thirdness].
So- I think the clarification of terms is important. Plus, I don't think that
all three terms of 'real, realism and reality' mean the same thing...
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2016 1:24 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Edwina, List:
In accordance with Stephen's gentle admonition, I will attempt to refrain
from engaging in an "exegetical contest" with you. I provided links to
Peirce's various (but largely consistent) definitions of "real" and
"existence"; did you even read through them before replying? He evidently
tightened up his usage of those terms over time to maintain the distinction
that I have summarized; of what part of those definitions are you still "asking
for clarification"? Your latest citations for Peirce's "view of reality" are
from an 1868 paper, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities"; as I already
pointed out, Peirce referenced that very paper in 1892, and explicitly
characterized it as "too nominalistic." Perhaps our disagreement is more over
which writings of Peirce, earlier or later, we give more weight in attempting
to ascertain what his views were.
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 11:46 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Jon- you've done it again. The opinions you express on the issues are your
analysis of Peirce; the opinions on these same issues are my analysis of Peirce
- and are not, as you insist, 'my own system of thought' which you declare that
I 'ought to acknowledge'. They are, I repeat, my analysis of Peirce - and I
disagree with YOUR analysis of Peirce on those same issues. But - you insist
that yours alone are right!!
Again, in my view, Firstness and Thirdness are not examples of 'the real' -
but are modes of organization of thought and the semiosic process [which is
thought]. I consider that your use of them to define reality moves this reality
into 'sensations' - and Peirce rejected this definition of reality as
'nominalism'.
His view of reality, to my understanding was "the very origin of the
conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the
notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite
increase in knowledge" 5.311....and this knowledge of the truth or the
universal is attainable in the future.
As well, he writes, 'generals must have a real existence' 5.312. That
'reality' of the universal or general - is what, in my view, Peirce is talking
about when he discusses the term of reality. Again - it has nothing to do with
the three categories - which refer to 'representation'.
And i also consider that we should clarify the terms of 'real', 'reality'
and 'realism'. You chastized me for such a request - telling me that I thereby
'disagree with Peirce'. How is asking for clarification of terminology a
'disagreement with Peirce'???
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2016 12:11 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Edwina, List:
I trust our fellow List participants to judge for themselves, but I think
that a fair reading of my posts would not come close to suggesting that I "hold
[my]self up as The Master-Guru-of-Peirce," or have been "arrogant," or have
behaved as if I were "the Ultimate-Master of Peirce." In this thread, I was
even careful to state more than once that I was expressing "my understanding of
Peirce," although that should really go without saying. The fact that you have
a different "reading and analysis of Peirce" does not entail that your
resulting views are entirely consistent with HIS views, which are quite clear
on these matters as expressed in his voluminous writings. It seems
incontrovertible to me that Peirce DID NOT confine the three Categories to
"processes of semiosis," DID consider Firstness (after about 1890) and
Thirdness (his whole adult life) to be examples of "the real," and DID
(repeatedly) define "the real" in precisely the way that I have summarized it
(see http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/real and, for good measure,
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/existence). Your disagreements on these
three points are not merely disagreements with my interpretation of Peirce,
they are disagreements with Peirce himself, plain and simple--not that there is
anything wrong with that! You have taken some ideas from Peirce and developed
your own system of thought, which is obviously not identical to his. Why not
simply acknowledge this and move on, rather than being so defensive about it
and resorting to name-calling?
Regards,
Jon
On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 10:42 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
Jon- I consider that you should not hold yourself up as The
Master-Guru-of-Peirce. You are one person, with your own reading and analysis
of Peirce. I am also one person, with my reading and analysis of Peirce. We
have the right and ability to disagree with our interpretations of Peirce.
Therefore, I object to your declaration, when I disagree with you - that I
therefore ALSO disagree with Peirce. That is merely your view; it is not
necessarily The Truth.
And your statement that I am 'more than welcome to disagree with
Peirce' is really quite arrogant on your part. You, again, are not the
Ultimate-Master of Peirce.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, September 08, 2016 11:17 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
Edwina, List:
ET: Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no
evidence that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and
there are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it.
I never claimed that Peirce "discarded the Scotus view of realism."
In fact, Peirce still calls himself a "scholastic realist" in drafts of "A
Neglected Argument." However, he did write the following in about 1905.
CSP: Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic when he says that
universals are contracted to the mode of individuality in singulars, meaning,
as he does, by singulars, ordinary existing things. The pragmaticist cannot
admit that. I myself went too far in the direction of nominalism when I said
that it was a mere question of the convenience of speech whether we say that a
diamond is hard when it is not pressed upon, or whether we say that it is soft
until it is pressed upon. I now say that experiment will prove that the
diamond is hard, as a positive fact. That is, it is a real fact that it would
resist pressure, which amounts to extreme scholastic realism. (CP 8.208)
He basically says here that his own realism goes beyond that of
Scotus, and calls it "extreme scholastic realism"! Both "may-bes" and
"would-bes" are real, as well as actual facts.
ET: Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the
terms of 'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them that
way.
Where have I ever used the words "universal" and "particular"? I try
to follow Peirce's lead by using "general" for Thirdness and "individual" or
"singular" for Secondness, as well as possible/actual/habitual for the
modalities of Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness.
ET: I consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis
- period.
Then you disagree with Peirce.
ET: I disagree with your outline that 'Firstness' and 'Thirdness'
are examples of 'the real'.
Then you disagree with Peirce.
ET: I think that a great problem is with the definition of the
terms of 'real', 'reality', 'realism'.
Then you disagree with Peirce.
As I have said before, you are more than welcome to disagree with
Peirce; but then, please do not pretend that your views and terminology are
consistent with his.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 9:57 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
Jon, list
Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no
evidence that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and
there are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it.
Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the terms
of 'universal' and 'particular' - even though you seem to use them that way. I
consider that the three Categories are processes of semiosis - period. The
concept of 'the universal' as the definition of 'reality' is quite another
outline and analysis. Therefore, I disagree with your outline that 'Firstness'
and 'Thirdness' are examples of 'the real' . Helmut's question, after all, was
on the difference between reality and existence. And a universal is not a
possibility or a habit.
I think that a great problem is with the definition of the terms of
'real', 'reality', 'realism'.
Edwina
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