Edwina, List: Your response is based entirely on something that Peirce wrote in 1871, as if his thought on this subject did not evolve any further in the remaining 43 years of his life. In fact, 21 years later (1892), in "Man's Glassy Essence" (1892), he specifically referred to "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," written only three years earlier (1868), and stated, "my views were, then, too nominalistic" (CP 6.270). According to Max Fisch (see W5.xlv), he was a one-category (Thirdness) realist until about 1890, when he acknowledged the reality of actualities (Secondness); and he did not become a three-category realist until about 1897, when he finally accepted the reality of possibilities (Firstness).
In any case, since this thread was prompted by "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," I primarily had in mind what he wrote in that work--37 years later, in 1908. CSP: "Real" is a word invented in the thirteenth century to signify having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not ... The "Actual" is that which is met with in the past, present, or future. (CP 6.453) CSP: Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another might give local habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their Reality. The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable until they are closely and fairly examined. The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects, especially between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially a Sign--not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. (CP 6.455) Ideas are Real by virtue of their "mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them." A Sign is Real by virtue of its "active power to establish connections between different objects, especially objects in different Universes," not its mere embodiment, which is not essential to its Being. Things and facts are Real because "their Being consists in reactions against Brute forces"; i.e., they *exist*. Regards, Jon On Thu, Sep 8, 2016 at 8:18 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > I think the outline of the difference between reality and existence, as > provided below, is only a partial outline and even, suggests nominalism > rather than realism. It suggests that 'the real' can be a > 'thing-in-itself', i.e., "a thing existing independent of all relation to > the mind's conception of it' 8.13. And, it suggests that our thoughts, > which are 'caused by sensations'...can be derived by "something out of the > mind" 8.12...This is nominalism. > > What Peirce [and others] refer to when using the term 'realism' is the > concept of the *universal*. Now, he writes "The real is that which is not > whatever we happen to think of it, but is unaffected by what we may think > of it" 8.12. What is this 'real'? It is not a particular thing nor is it > the result of a 'possible stimuli' (Firstness or Thirdness]. It is, > instead, a ' final conclusion', "to which the opinion of every man is > constantly gravitating" 8.12...."This final opinion then, is independent, > not indeed of thought in general, but of all that is arbitrary and > individual in thought" 8.12. This final truth, regardless of its > instantiations, is a 'universal'. > > And "is the present existence of a power anything in the world but a > regularity in future events relating to a certain thing regarded as an > element which is to be taken account of beforehand, in the conception of > that thing" 8.12 > > So, the *reality* that we experience, when we experience individual > things in their existentiality...are not, according to my reading of Peirce > "the unknowable cause of sensation, but *noumena*, or intelligible > conceptions which are the last products of the mental action which is set > in motion by sensation." 8.13 > > Therefore, to Peirce, reality is an expression of a universal Mind - and > refers to the universals... > > "The matter of sensation is altogether accidental; ....'the catholic > consent which constitutes the truth is by no means to be limited to men in > this earthly life or to the human race, but extends to the whole communion > of minds to which we belong, including some probably whose senses are very > different from ours"....This theory is also highly favorable to a belief in > external realities. It will, to be sure, deny that there is any reality > which is absolutely incognizable in itself, so that it cannot be taken into > the mind. But observing that the 'external' means simply that which is > independent of what phenomenon is immediately present, that is of how we > may think or feel; just as 'the real' means that which is independent of > how we may think or feel *about it*"......8.13. > > This may sound confusing, but I think that Peirce's view of realism refers > not to current potential or habitual attributes which CAUSE our immediate > sensations [Secondness], but to 'the universal'; the 'general'...and one > gains knowledge of this as a 'final truth'. So- reality is the PRODUCT of > mental action and is not the CAUSE of it [8.15 > > "A consensus or common confession ...constitutes reality'. 8.16 > > ...."Consequently a thing in the general is as real as in the concrete" > 8.14..."It is a real which only exists by virtue of an act of thought > knowing it, but that thought is not an arbitrary or accidental one > dependent on idiosyncracies but one which will hold in the final opinion" > 8.14 > > BUT Peirce goes on, to declare that these universals does not need to be > 'thought about' to be real - we, or some other Mind, might come to know > them at some future time. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> > *Cc:* kirst...@saunalahti.fi ; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Wednesday, September 07, 2016 9:41 PM > *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > Helmut, List: > > HR: (What I have not yet got, is the difference between reality and > existence: No idea) > > > Briefly, my understanding of Peirce's use of terminology is that existence > is a subset of reality--everything that exists is real, but not everything > that is real exists. All three Universes of Experience are real; only the > Universe of Brute Actuality exists. Reality consists of that which has > whatever characters it has, regardless of whether anyone thinks or believes > that it has those characters; existence consists of that which interacts or > reacts with other things. Examples of what can be real without existing > include possibilities and qualities (Firstness), as well as laws and habits > (Thirdness); examples of what exists include actual individuals and > occurrences (Secondness). > > Hope that helps, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Wed, Sep 7, 2016 at 4:14 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > >> Kirstima, list, >> I guess that is for a reason: Ontology is the theory of what is, and >> "is", being, is caused by a predicate, which is something percieved, so >> something known (epistemology), added to a thing, that otherwise would lack >> reality (or was it existence?), would not even be a thing? I have >> understood this from this list a few weeks ago, when it went about "being". >> (I hope Ive got it right. What I have not yet got, is the difference >> between reality and existence: No idea) What this view comes down to is >> some sort of constructivism, in the sense, that "thing" is not something >> that can exist "in itself", but only as something percieved. Perception >> though is a capability merely of some person, so all this suits somehow to >> what I had written before, and corrobates the God-argument too, I think: We >> know that there was a world before organisms have existed. So there were >> things. But by whom might they have been percieved and thus turned into >> beings, "things" at all, when there were no organisms? Must be by God, who >> else, when there has not been anybody else at that time. Or so. >> Best, >> Helmut >> >
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