List: As just mentioned in my reply to Gary F., in case anyone missed it, here is what I posted a few days ago about the drafts of "A Neglected Argument."
To what was Peirce specifically referring as "a theory of the nature of thinking" or "this theory of thinking"? These were both unusual expressions for him to use; neither appears anywhere else in the Collected Papers. By contrast, "theory of logic" and "science of logic" each occur 20 times, while "theory of reasoning" occurs 18 times and "science of reasoning" occurs five times. Even "theory of thought" and "science of thought" show up only once each, and one of those occasions is in the cited title of a work by someone else. However, in CP 1.573 (also EP 2.376; 1906), Peirce does state that "Logic, regarded from one instructive, though partial and narrow, point of view, is the theory of deliberate thinking." Furthermore, in manuscript R 634 (1909), a draft preface for a book whose working title was Meaning, he wrote that "logic is the theory of thinking, so far as thinking conduces to the attainment of truth." He went on to say, later in the same paragraph, that "logic should be regarded as coextensive with General Semeiotic, the a priori theory of signs." So it seems plausible, and perhaps likely, that Peirce had his entire theory of "Logic, Considered as Semeiotic" in mind when he wrote "A Neglected Argument." I have now discovered further clues, which pertain to all four of my "interesting questions," in the manuscripts that contain various drafts of that article (R 841-844). The final version, as published in The Hibbert Journal, contains a somewhat lengthy description of the "hidden argument," followed by a relatively brief discussion of the Three Stages of Inquiry and their logical validity. What appears to be the very first draft (R 842) has it the other way around, as the following introductory comments anticipate. CSP: Yet this [humble] argument has seldom been much insisted upon by theologians for the reason that, persuasive as it is, it has not seemed to them to be logical. This I conceive has been due to a false theory of logic; and consequently the main substance of the present paper must be a brief abstract of a defence of a theory of logic according to which the theological argument in question is as logically sound as it certainly is persuasive. Thus, I am to outline two arguments, one supporting the other. The latter, which I will designate as the humble argument, although every mind can feel its force, rests on far too many premisses to be stated in full. Taking the general description of it as a minor premiss, and a certain theory of logic as a major premiss, it will follow by a simple syllogism that the humble argument is logical and that consequently whoever acknowledges its premisses need have no scruple in accepting its conclusion. What Peirce here called "a certain theory of logic" seems to be precisely what he later characterized in the first additament as "a theory of the nature of thinking" and "this theory of thinking." It is the major premiss, and "a general description of the humble argument" is the minor premiss, of "a simple syllogism" whose conclusion is "that the humble argument is logical." Notice the modesty of this claim--Peirce was not so much trying to "prove" the Reality of God as merely assert that anyone who embraces his theory of logic and recognizes that the humble argument is consistent with it "need have no scruple in accepting its conclusion." He continued ... CSP: Only, of course, it becomes necessary to establish the major premiss, which is the theory of logic; and it is sufficiently clear that to do this in a thoroughly satisfactory manner would involve going over the whole of the critical branch of logic and showing that the theory in question satisfactorily explains every variety of argument. Now I cannot, within reasonable limits, consider more than the main genera of arguments. So much, I will do. The subsidiary arguments of a mixed character, although highly important in actual reasonings, cannot, within my limits, be considered. Moreover, the critical branch of logic really, even more than apparently, depends upon the very difficult and still vexed analytical branch, whose problems could not easily be brought to the apprehension of ordinary readers, to say nothing of the task of laying the foundations for their scientific solutions. But fortunately, we have an instinct for that which is rational, and upon that ordinary readers ought to rely. Accordingly, while I cannot here present a thoroughly scientific defence of my theory of logic, I shall hope to make it appear reasonable. I find it fascinating, and perhaps relevant in this context, that Peirce appealed to his readers' "instinct for that which is rational" in an effort to make up for his inability to lay out his theory of logic "in a thoroughly satisfactory manner." He then proceeded to offer only a single paragraph outlining the "hidden argument," followed by many pages about Retroduction, Deduction, and (especially) Induction, before (apparently) realizing that he had far exceeded the allotted length and had to start over, almost from scratch. In fact, some of this content was published as CP 2.755-772 under the heading, "The Varieties and Validity of Induction," with no indication that it is connected with "A Neglected Argument"; instead, it is referenced simply as manuscript "G" and incorrectly dated c.1905. Two different versions of the text end with equal abruptness. A later fragment (in R 843) includes this alternative summary. CSP: My main concern is to show that that line of reflexion which I call the Neglected Argument is an argument, and a particularly strong one, of the kind with which every positive scientific inquisition must begin. The lowliest minds will rest content with this without any fault in their conclusion or their logic; while the more critical, may still their lingering doubts, by completing the line of inquiry which the Neglected Argument opens; while on its concomitants they may base another Argument supporting the former, and so be led on to further reflections, remarks, and experiences which attain all the force of sound induction, the highest grade of certainty to which the human mind can attain in any Real subject. For many (most?), the NA is sufficient by itself--and Peirce is fine with that! For those not fully satisfied by the NA, it serves instead as the initial step of a more rigorous investigation. Both outcomes are fully consistent with Peirce's "theory of the nature of thinking," as captured in this structural engineering metaphor from the published article. CSP: Over the chasm that yawns between the ultimate goal of science and such ideas of Man's environment as, coming over him during his primeval wanderings in the forest, while yet his very notion of error was of the vaguest, he managed to communicate to some fellow, we are building a cantilever bridge of induction, held together by scientific struts and ties. Yet every plank of its advance is first laid by Retroduction alone, that is to say, by the spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason; and neither Deduction nor Induction contributes a single new concept to the structure. (CP 4.475) I am still digesting all of the contents of the manuscripts, but those are some thoughts so far. I am very grateful to Jeffrey Downard for calling to my attention the Scalable Peirce Interpretation Network (SPIN), which is making images of Peirce's manuscripts available for transcribing ( http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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