Jon- you and I have basic disagreements on our interpretations of Peirce. I 
won't get into a discussion with you if you - rather than acknowledging our 
disagreements - insist that your view and your interpretation is the only valid 
one - an action which you constantly do insist on. After all, that is no longer 
a discussion but merely your preaching. I'm not interested in being 'preached 
at'. 

There is,  as I said before, a difference between the singular 
sign/representamen which acts as mediation and the triadic Sign. The latter 
includes all three Relations; that between the Representamen-Object; the 
Representamen in itself; and that between the Representamen- Interpretant. The 
triad is the Sign, it is a semiosic process and is an action of Mind. All three 
categories can be expressed in this triad - and their expression has nothing to 
do with our human thinking about Firstness or Secondness.

Thought, as I read Peirce, is a triadic or semiosic process, and can't be 
reduced to only one modal category of Thirdness. Thirdness is the category of 
developing habits of form, or commonalities or generalization.  This is done BY 
THOUGHT but thought cannot be, in my view, reduced to merely habits-of-form -so 
I reject defining thought as Thirdness. This thought is a process that requires 
that full semiosic triad. Both the generation of these habits and the resultant 
further triad....requires all three categories to develop both. 

Therefore, I disagree with your interpretation of Peirce that 'all thought is 
only Thirdness'. Again, I see Thirdness as the habits-of-form, the development 
of generalities - but, again, these habits are 'alive'' they emerge within the 
active-actions of the other two modal categories. Therefore, Mind and its 
thought-processes, as I read Peirce, requires ALL three categories.

And, as well, I'm uncertain of your comment, where you seem to suggest that 
Interpretants must be in the mode of Thirdness. Since I'm sure you know there 
is only one of the ten classes where the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness 
- then, I'm not sure of your meaning. 

Now- if you are going to insist that your view alone is The Right View of 
Peirce - and my view is a deranged, degenerate personal one - may I suggest 
that we end this exchange right now. I'll engage in a debate that acknowledges 
that we may each have a very different perspective on Peirce - but I won't get 
into a situation where you Inform Me that you alone have The Right View.

Edwina






  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, September 09, 2016 7:52 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Edwina, List:


  One of the ways in which Peirce derived his categories was by means of 
phenomenology; or as he called it, phaneroscopy, because it involves examining 
the phaneron--"the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever" (EP 2.362).  
(By the way--is this what you mean by "the analysis of reality"?)  Thus, in 
that specific sense, we can loosely say that all three categories pertain to 
mind or thought; after all, we can and do routinely think about Firstness and 
Secondness, as well as Thirdness.  But that is obviously not what I mean when I 
say that mind itself or thought itself IS Thirdness. I trust that no one will 
dispute that Peirce clearly and consistently affirmed all three of the 
following propositions.
    a.. All thought takes place by means of signs.
    b.. Every sign represents an object to an interpretant.

    c.. Representation is (only) Thirdness.
  It follows deductively that all thought is (only) Thirdness.  Note that in 
the third bullet, I use the word representation as distinguished by Peirce from 
quality (Firstness) and relation or reaction (Secondness)--not 
"representations," which could just be a synonym for "signs."  I am well aware 
that a sign, both in itself and in its relations, can be classified in any of 
the three categories.  However, when it comes to the interpretants, only those 
that are classified under Thirdness are possible, actual, or habitual thoughts; 
feelings correspond to Firstness, and actions correspond to Secondness.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Fri, Sep 9, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

    Clark, list: yes, that's my point. I disagree with Jon with his confinement 
of Thought to Thirdness. I consider that Mind, which is 'thought', is an action 
of all three categories. To focus on Thirdness as Thought, which, again, to my 
understanding, is Jon's view - is more akin to Hegel. All three cognitive modes 
are 'the semiosic process', i.e., the action of reason, of thought.

    Thirdness is an action of habit formation, i.e., of generalization, of 
'predicate formation' 5.102. Obviously, it is a necessary action in the 
formation of an actualization, a discrete unit, but I consider that thought 
requires all three modes.

    Edwina
      ----- Original Message ----- 
      From: Clark Goble 
      To: Peirce-L 
      Sent: Friday, September 09, 2016 4:52 PM
      Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
        On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


        My use of the term 'universal' refers to its use in the analysis of 
reality. 

        i frequently refer to that 4.551 quote about Mind - but, in my view, 
Mind is not the same as Thirdness. Thirdness is a semiosic process, one of the 
three categorical actions  of the actions of Mind - but the two are not 
identical. 
      I remain convinced that some terms are used in such a variety of 
incompatible ways in philosophical history that they come to have a baggage 
that makes them perfect tools of confusion. I suspect mind is one of those 
terms. Quite frequently I wish we could do away with the term entirely. For all 
the problem of neologisms in philosophy (including Peirce’s own use of them at 
times) they do avoid that baggage.


      Your point is very important. I can’t recall if someone quoted it already 
but this quote of Peirce’s is useful. “I desire to defend the three Categories 
as the three irreducible and only constituents of thought.” (EP 2.165 “The 
Categories Defended”) 


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