Edwina, list:

Yes, what you say is correct.

This is why I disdain the lawn example so much, and for many other reasons
besides.

As per the community and experience...there's also that!

So, quid sit deus?  What would God be?

:)

Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 2:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Not sure of your point ,Jerry. Since I am sure you know that your example
> is a fallacy [fallacy of affirming the consequent]...After all, we all know
> that your grass is wet because you left the sprinkler on all night.....
>
> The problem I have with a truth defined as the I-O being similar to the
> R-O, is ..well....it requires that the Representamen be somehow 'untouched'
> or unaffected by experience. That is, can we trust the Representamen?  I
> think the community-of-scholars is necessary in this situation, but even
> so..wasn't it Tolstoy who said that 'wrong does not cease to be wrong just
> because the majority shares in it'...
>
> Edwina
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Monday, September 19, 2016 2:52 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Dear list:
>
>
>
> What you say sounds all well and good but I’m confused.
>
>
>
> In a description for the abductive process, an inadequate version can be
> given:
>
>
>
> “The grass is wet, therefore, it must have rained last night.
>
> For *if *it rained last night, *then* the grass ought to be wet.”
>
>
>
> So, if
>
> “Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a
> thing till they have grasped the 'why' of it (which is to grasp its primary
> cause);”
>
>
>
> then my question is ‘Why the Reality of God’ and not “lawn is wet”?
>
> Also, what does this have to do with not only Truth-searching, but
> Truth-finding?
>
>
>
> That is, if Truth is, as Edwina says:
>
> “…is it rather the case that this semiosis activity must continue on, for
> some time *until that I-O relation does indeed correlate with the R-O
> Relation?  Isn't this what Peirce meant by eventually arriving at the
> truth?”*
>
>
>
> then as Jon says, the hypothesis or the proposition should matter.
>
>
>
> So, what is O?  What is R?  What is I?
>
> That is, how can the R-O relation meet the I-O without the premisses?
>
>
>
> I think without this, there is no getting at the Truth or Reality of
> things, since
>
> “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
> investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in
> this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality”.
>
>
>
> I believe this, irrespective of the attitude I adopt, since it is the
> method, which also must be adopted.  For without a method, then we’re right
> back to arguing with no course for how to determine a good hypothesis from
> a bad one.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Jerry Rhee
>
> On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 12:33 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Sep 19, 2016, at 9:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
>>
>> Clark- thanks for your very nice outline of the NA - I certainly agree
>> with your view, that as Chiasson says, it's not just about a 'belief in
>> God', because it's not deductive but is, as noted, abductive. Abduction
>> inserts freedom and spontaneity - attributes outside of the range of a God.
>> And agreed - the NA doesn't offer 'compelling reasons for why we should
>> call this *ens necessarium* as god. I, as an atheist, prefer his outline
>> of Mind as the *ens necessarium*.
>>
>> As Mind is an action of Reasoning [within all three modes], then, I think
>> that ethics is grounded within it. You don't, in my reading, require a God,
>> for ethics.
>>
>>
>> It’s worth noting the connection here between Peirce and Spinoza. Of
>> course that could be indirect since many of the early German idealists like
>> Hegel were highly influenced by Spinoza. But I’ve long thought the direct
>> influence was significant.
>>
>> For a good paper on the influence see
>>
>> http://www.commens.org/sites/default/files/biblio_attachment
>> s/peirce_and_spinozas_pragmaticist_metaphysics.pdf
>>
>> Spinoza of course explicitly calls his unity God and ties it to ethics.
>> However the Jewish rabbis disagreed and thought him an atheists leading to
>> his excommunication.
>>
>> That gets again to my point that the *name* God seems to be the dispute
>> rather than the content. That said though many post Peircean figures
>> strongly want to call God as God while giving his nature freedom and
>> spontaneity. The process theology movement that started with Whitehead
>> being the most obvious philosophical example although there were others.
>> Later process theologians were explicitly influenced by Peirce despite many
>> of Peirce’s writings being difficult to find at the time.
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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