Jon, list:
By 'pantheist' - I do not mean 'God' but 'Mind'; Mind is immanent in Nature.
I have seen before, on this list, discussion that the NA is about the three
modes of argument. i hope those who wrote this will reply- as I don't recall
who it was.
Yes, I can see that Idea, capitalized, is a 'wholeness' and Platonic. I don't
see this as Firstness.
I think the three universes of qualities, matter and mind are NOT the same as
the Categorical Modes of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. YES - there are
comparisons, but after all, a quality [eg redness] is an aspect of matter; and
matter, to exist, must have habits or mind as part of it. So- these three
universes are not the same as the three categories and can't be reduced to them.
Certainly, in 4.551, Mind is immanent in Nature.
And- I do not agree with your view that my interpretations are discrepancies
with Peirce's writings. I maintain that you and I interpret Peirce's writings
very differently.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Monday, October 10, 2016 1:14 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Edwina, List:
ET: I reject also your linear outline of Peirce, where you reject an
earlier description as inaccurate and rely instead, only on the later
description.
Perhaps I gave you the wrong impression. I do not reject Peirce's earlier
writings, I just tend to give more weight to his later writings, on the
supposition that they likely reflect further careful contemplation and
refinement. For this very reason, I find that chronological arrangements (such
as W and EP) are generally preferable to topical arrangements (such as
CP)--they facilitate tracing out the development of Peirce's thought over time,
which is not necessarily linear, but is certainly dynamic rather than static.
ET: I disagree with your reading of Peirce that a categorical mode of
Firstness is an Idea. An idea is a mental aspect.
Lowercase, yes; capitalized, no. Again, Peirce is explicit about this in "A
Neglected Argument," right from the beginning--"Some words shall herein be
capitalized when used, not as vernacular, but as terms defined. Thus an 'idea'
is the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy; but 'Idea,' nearer
Plato's idea of ἰδέα, denotes anything whose Being consists in its mere
capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or
impotence to represent it." (CP 6.452) In other words, "Idea" (capitalized) is
closer in meaning to "quality" and (especially) "possibility" than "idea"
(lowercase).
ET: I don't see the term 'god' as a synonym of Mind - and Mind is immanent
in Nature ...
As I quoted previously, Peirce defines "God" as "pure mind," and states quite
clearly that God is not "immanent in Nature."
ET: I continue to read the NA as a metaphoric argument for the three modes
of argumentation of Abduction, Induction, Deduction.
That is interesting, but I have not come across such an interpretation in my
research to date. Is it explicated and defended anywhere in the literature, so
that I can read up on it? Why did Peirce title the article "A Neglected
Argument for the Reality of God" if his true objective was to offer a
metaphoric argument for the three modes of argumentation?
ET: What was before our universe: As Peirce wrote - nothing. [1.274
I am not sure how that particular citation supports your assertion. In any
case, Peirce's cosmological diagram obviously has the blackboard in place
"before" anything at all is drawn on it. Of course, a word like "before" is
inherently problematic when we are talking about something that "happened"
outside of time as we know it.
If you are willing, I would still be genuinely interested in understanding
how you reconcile each of the following.
a.. You consider Peirce a pantheist; but he stated that God is not immanent
in nature.
b.. You take the three Universes of Experience to be "intellectual concepts
of argumentation," rather than the categories; but Peirce stated that God is
the independent Creator of the three Universes, and that those consist of Ideas
or ideal possibilities, Matter or physical facts, and Mind.
c.. You reject Platonism and resist any attribution of it to Peirce; but he
stated that there are many "Platonic worlds," only one of which led to "the
particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be."
I am not here insisting that my reading of Peirce is "right" and yours is
"wrong"; I am simply requesting fuller explanations of these apparent
discrepancies between your views and his writings.
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Mon, Oct 10, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
Jon, list
1) I don't deal with 'draft' vs 'final' version. I don't think that
Peirce's thought was ever, in a way, a 'final complete statement'. So, I reject
also your linear outline of Peirce, where you reject an earlier description as
inaccurate and rely instead, only on the later description. I think he knew
what he was talking about in much of the early as well as the later writings.
So, I don't focus on the dates - early or late - while you do.
2) With regard to Firstness, and indeed, all the categories - I think we
read Peirce very differently on them. I repeat my reading of Peirce that
Firstness as experienced is a 'sensation', a holistic quality-of-feeling', [and
no- sensation is NOT Secondness until it is experienced as 'other; its first
stage is just and only the pure intellectually unaware feeling of the senses].
I don't use the term 'feeling' and 'sensation' on my own; Peirce uses those
terms to describe FIrstness. As soon as we be come aware of that feeling - it
becomes SECONDNESS; that brute awareness of 'otherness'. And then, analytic
awareness of it - is within the mode of Thirdness. So- I reverse your outline.
The quality of, eg, red, or hardness, in 1.422, is a sensual aspect of the
material continuity of the red body or the piece of iron; i.e, it is, as
continuity, in a mode of Thirdness. But -the experience of this quality- within
the red body or the piece of iron [never mind within an external interaction] -
is in a mode of Firstness. It remains there, as a possibility of experience.
I disagree with your reading of Peirce that a categorical mode of Firstness
is an Idea. An idea is a mental aspect. Certainly some STATE that is in a mode
of Firstness is independent of thought and is 'existential' [you can't deny
that feeling of heat!]..but - that feeling could be known, intellectually, at
some later time. I can certainly see that the Relation of a Representamen, in
a mode of Thirdness, to an Object -can be in a mode of Firstness, an iconic
idea. But a pure mode of Firstness - a rhematic iconic qualisign? That's not
an idea.
Now- does the capacity-to-produce this feeling in an other [let's say the
feeling of heat from a volcano] only exist in the interaction of the volcano
with its envt? Of course not - the capacity-to-produce the feeling of heat
[which is experienced by an other as a FEELING of HEAT - is a possibility
within the volcano - just as the other attributes of the volcano; namely, its
chemicals etc..are a definitive part of its identity]. But - my point is that
the experience of Firstness is within interaction. I consider the Peircean
semiosic world to be one that is continuously dynamic and interactive.
3) I see too many references to the role of Mind in Peirce - and his
outlining of this Mind in the physico-chemical, biological and socioconceptual
world - to reject its similarities within all three realms. I don't see the
term 'god' as a synonym of Mind - and Mind is immanent in Nature -
understanding that this Mind is a developing, evolving, complex process.
4) And I continue to read the NA as a metaphoric argument for the three
modes of argumentation of Abduction, Induction, Deduction.
What was before our universe: As Peirce wrote - nothing. [1.274
Edwina
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
