Hi all, As a point of clarification:
This is an argument: The surprising fact, C, is observed. But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. because An "Argument" is any *process of thought* *reasonably tending to produce a definite belief*. In an argument, the premisses form a representation of the conclusion, because they indicate the interpretant of the argument, or representation representing it to represent its object. This is an argumentation: C = Father A = Son B = Spirit because An "Argumentation" is an *Argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses*. Best, Jerry R This maxim once accepted, – intelligently accepted, in the light of the evidence of its truth, – speedily sweeps all metaphysical rubbish out of one’s house. Each abstraction is either pronounced to be gibberish or is provided with a plain, practical definition. On Wed, Oct 12, 2016 at 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon, list > > Well, it's rather clear that we read Peirce differently. > > I read the NA as an outline of the three methods of argumentation, with > the use of 'god' as an example. I think that if you google 'Peirce > Neglected Argument abduction deduction induction' that you'll find plenty > of articles focused on that. > > I also don't agree with your view that the Three Universes are a 'more > mature' outline of the three categories. I see the three universes, > comparing them to Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, do this only in the > most superficial manner - for Abduction, although acting within the > freshness and novelty of Firstness only exists as such - within the nested > work of Secondness and Thirdness. Otherwise, its content would disappear > like a cloud. > > And - the three categories are, in my reading of Peirce, PRIMAL - and > basic to existence, for none of the ten classes of Signs [and all existence > is in Signs] - could function without those categories. > > And - you view Thirdness as Mind [or, Mind as Thirdness] whereas I > consider that Mind operates within all three categorical modes - and > Thirdness requires Secondness and Firstness as components. > > So- our readings of Peirce differ quite a bit. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Sent:* Tuesday, October 11, 2016 10:58 PM > *Subject:* Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology > > Edwina, List: > > As a matter of fact, I have read that particular article, since it came up > in the thread on "Peirce's Theory of Thinking." Chiasson's thesis is that > Peirce was really writing about "the *attitude* and *method* from which > all decisions of importance to the conduct of a life should begin." I find > this implausible for the same reason as your previous suggestion that he > was really offering "a metaphoric argument for the three modes of > argumentation"--if that were the case, why is it not reflected in the > title? Surely the burden of proof is on anyone who claims that Peirce's > intention was anything other than describing a neglected argument for the > reality of God. > > In any event, Chiasson's article does not discuss the three Universes of > Experience *at all*, so I am still looking for a good reason to think > that they correspond to retroduction/induction/deduction rather than > Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. Obviously Peirce's article *does *discuss > those three types of inference, but it does so quite explicitly. The > interesting thing is that it *never* brings up the categories--which is > why it makes a lot of sense to recognize them as the Universes. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 9:33 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon, list >> >> You wrote: >> Searching the List archives and the Internet in general has (so far) >> turned up no rationale for instead taking them to represent the three types >> of inference. >> >> By 'three types of inference' - I am guessing that you mean the three >> types of argumentation. That's how I read the NA - and as I said - it's >> been analysed in this way before. Phyllis Chiasson, a respected Peirce >> scholar, certainly makes such an analysis. >> >> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/chiasson/revisit.htm >> >> I suggest you google: 'Peirce neglected argument and abduction' - and >> you'll come up with further discussion. So, it's strange that you haven't >> come across this argument before. >> >> And I don't consider the three universes as equivalent to the three >> categories. I don't see how one can analyze the ten classes of signs >> without the use of the three categories - and the three universes would be >> irrelevant in that analysis of the semiosic process. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Cc:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 11, 2016 9:58 PM >> *Subject:* Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> ET: I think that one has to first define 'God'. If the term means 'pure >> mind' then, this fits in with Peirce's analysis ... >> >> >> The handful of quotes that I included in my post to start this thread >> give us a pretty good idea of how Peirce defined God, at least with respect >> to his cosmology, which is (after all) what we are discussing. "Pure mind" >> is only one aspect, and God is certainly not *identical* to >> mind--according to Peirce, God is also *Ens necessarium*; Creator of all >> three Universes of Experience and everything in them, without exception; >> not immanent in them or in nature, but independent of them, or at least two >> of them; omniscient, omnipotent, and infinitely benign. >> >> ET: ... for he considers that Mind is 'immanent in nature'. >> >> >> Except that he never actually says this, using these particular words. I >> guess it depends on how we define "immanent" and "nature." >> >> ET: This means that the results of the process of abduction, an act of >> immediate Firstness. can be moved into the present instantation of >> inductional experience..and then, backed up by analysis over time, or, >> deduction. >> >> >> Peirce, of course, put these in a different order--abduction, then >> deduction, then induction. The hypothesis must be explicated in order to >> determine whether and how it can be evaluated. >> >> ET: Panpsychism seems to have a different meaning ... >> >> >> Terms like pantheism, panentheism, and panpsychism seem to be rather >> broad and vague, with considerable overlap. Given the scope of Peirce's >> writings, I am now inclined to avoid attaching any such labels to his >> thought, except the ones that he himself used--such as synechism. >> >> ET: There is no way, I feel, that the Categories can be removed from >> being an integral component of Peircean semiosis. >> >> >> I am not suggesting that the categories be *removed*, just that Peirce >> changed his own terminology toward the end of his life. In fact, there >> seems to be broad consensus among Peirce scholars that the three Universes >> of Experience *do *correspond to the three categories. After all, what >> viable alternatives are there? Searching the List archives and the >> Internet in general has (so far) turned up no rationale for instead taking >> them to represent the three types of inference. Would you mind sharing >> your own reasons for reading "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" >> as "a metaphoric argument for the three modes of argumentation"? >> >> Thanks, >> >> Jon >> >> On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 2:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> I think that one has to first define 'God'. If the term means 'pure >>> mind' then, this fits in with Peirce's analysis - for he considers that >>> Mind is 'immanent in nature'. Of course, one then has to define 'Mind' - >>> and I disagree that it is only Thirdness, but consider that it, as a >>> powerful process, contains the actions of Firstness and Secondness as well >>> - This means that the results of the process of abduction, an act of >>> immediate Firstness. can be moved into the present instantation of >>> inductional experience..and then, backed up by analysis over time, or, >>> deduction. >>> >>> Panpsychism seems to have a different meaning, ie, "the doctrine or >>> belief that everything material, however small, has an element of >>> individual consciousness.". Since Peirce rejected consciousness as a >>> necessary attribute of Mind and wasn't keen on psychology - then, this >>> definition doesn't seem to work. However, if you remove 'individual >>> consciousness' from the definition and define it instead as a 'process of >>> Mind or Reason'...then..this would, I think, fit into the Peircean analysis. >>> >>> And I don't consider the Universes as equivalent to the Categories and >>> thus, do not, in my view, 'supplant' the Categories. There is no way, I >>> feel, that the Categories can be removed from being an integral component >>> of Peircean semiosis. The Categories, in my reading of Peirce, are >>> certainly not external labels which we use to categorize experience. I read >>> them as integral to reality and existence. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> *To:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> >>> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >>> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 11, 2016 3:22 PM >>> *Subject:* Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology >>> >>> Helmut, List: >>> >>> My understanding of "pantheism" is that it entails that God is "immanent >>> in nature," so Peirce's explicit denial of this in three different drafts >>> of "A Neglected Argument" is pretty decisive evidence against deeming him a >>> pantheist. It seems to me that Edwina's adjustment--stating that Mind >>> (rather than God) is immanent in nature--is more properly classified as pan >>> *psychism*, and I do not believe that it is terribly controversial to >>> apply that particular label to Peirce. At least some of the other >>> formulations that you offered sound to me more like *panentheism* than >>> pantheism, but my impression is that there are a lot of different >>> varieties, and I am not personally familiar with the nuances. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 12:26 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> List, >>>> Regarding the question, whether Peirce was a pantheist or not, I was >>>> thinking about the meaning of "immanent". If it means that something is >>>> contained (nonlocally in this case), like as an epiphenomenon or a trait of >>>> something, then something "immanent" implies not being the creator of this >>>> thing. But if God is the creator, and still is present everywhere and >>>> everywhen, i.e. nonlocally and nontemporally, might this still be >>>> pantheism, though without immanence? In this case the universe does not >>>> contain God, but the other way round. And the immanence is also the other >>>> way: God is not immanent in the universe (or the three of them), but the >>>> universe is immanent in God? No, maybe one cannot say so, if one believes >>>> in creation as a process, because then in the beginning there must have >>>> been a God without a universe. But on the other hand, this might be a too >>>> anthropocentric concept of God and of creation: Maybe it is not a linear >>>> process, like a carpenter making a chair? >>>> About possibilities: Are they creative or privative? Is a possibility >>>> an invention, or something that remains when a lot of other items in >>>> question have been identified as, or turned out to be, impossibilities? >>>> With God as firstness, it should be the first (creative possibility) , I >>>> guess. But this might be a hen-and-egg-question, which suggests that there >>>> was a beginning: Either a nothing, or an everything. But maybe there was no >>>> beginning (like eg. buddhists claim). >>>> Best, >>>> Helmut >>>> >>> ------------------------------ >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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