Jeff, List: JD: I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, existents and necessitants.
That is certainly the dominant interpretation. I only started questioning it because Peirce explicitly situated Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants in the three Universes in 1908; and two years earlier, he seemed to indicate that Universes only contain Subjects, while Categories only contain Predicates (including relations). However, I now notice that he added the caveat that whether this is correct "is a question for careful study" (CP 4.545), and then proceeded to present a long and complicated analysis of propositions to explain why he found it *unsatisfactory *to view Universes as "receptacles of the Subjects alone" (CP 4.548). So I am back to being confused about the distinction (if there is one) between Universes and Categories, especially since a predicate can be turned into a subject by hypostatic abstraction. JD: As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb ... Ah, I guess this reference to Lieb is what you meant in the other thread. Thanks, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:34 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hi Jon S, > > I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes > of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, > existents and necessitants. As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb when he argues > in the essay at that is appended to the collection on Semiotics that > consists of the Letters to Lady that all of the classes of signs can be > understood on the basis of this division. > > So, we have the following classifications of signs: > > A. Mode of Apprehension of Sign itself: Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign > B. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Object: Descriptives, Designatives, > Copulatives > C. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Interpretant: Hypotheticals, > Categoricals, Relatives > D. Mode of Being of Dynamical Object: Abstractives, Occurrences, > Collectives > E. Nature of the Dynamical Interpretant: Sympathetics, Percussives, Usuals > F. Nature and Purpose of the Final Interpretant: Emotional > (aesthetic-produce feeling), Energetic (moral-produce action), Logical > (scientific-produce self control) > G. Relation of Sign to its Dynamical Object: Icons (image, diagram, > metaphor), Indices (reference to objects or facts), Symbols (general rule) > H. Relation of Sign to Dynamical Interpretant: Suggestives, Imperatives > (e.g. interrogatives), Indicatives > I. Relation of Sign to the Final Interpretant: Rheme (Seme), Dicent > (Pheme), Argument (Delome) > J. Nature of assurance in the triadic relation between sign, object and > interpretant: Instinct, Experience, Form > > So, for example, I think that the division of signs into suggestives, > imperatives, indicatives hinges on the character of the relation of > the sign to dynamical Interpretant as being a possible, an existent or an > necessitant. How might a relation between a sign and a dynamical > interpretant have such a character? My hunch is that his long discussions > of the different kinds of relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an > attempt to develop my categories from within" and in his discussions of the > nomenclature and division of dyadic and triad relations is meant to work > that out. > > --Jeff > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Wednesday, October 19, 2016 7:42 AM > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's > Cosmology) > > List: > > While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I > noticed that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents > of the three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign > itself, the Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object. He > then implied that they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here > called Destinate, Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the > order of determination after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible > can determine nothing but a Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by > nothing but a Necessitant." However, as I have suggested previously, the > three Interpretants *themselves *seem to be more properly characterized > as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each > divided into feeling/action/thought. > > Peirce went on to say that the four semeiotic relations--Sign to Dynamical > Object, Sign to Dynamical Interpretant, Sign to Normal Interpretant, and > (triadic) Sign to Dynamical Object and Normal Interpretant--also "appear to > me to be all Trichotomies." However, he never definitively stipulated on > what basis they were thus to be divided, instead merely suggesting three > descriptive terms in each case. The only hint is his remark that applying > the same rule to all ten trichotomies would produce just 66 sign classes, > rather than 59,049. > > This raises the question of whether a relation, as such, also must belong > to one of the three Universes. If so, what exactly does it mean for a > *relation > *to be an Idea vs. a Thing or Fact vs. a Habit or Law or Continuum? In > particular, what exactly does it mean to align each of the *semeiotic > *relations > with these three Universes--the S-O relation of icon/index/symbol, the S-I > relations of rheme/dicent/argument (nature of influence) and > presented/urged/submitted (manner of appeal), and the S-O-I relation of > assurance by instinct/experience/form? Is anyone aware of anything in the > literature that addresses these specific questions? > > Thanks, > > Jon > > On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 5:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary F., List: >> >> I finally had a chance to take a look at the two letters in EP 2 that you >> mentioned. Here are each of the three Universes as defined in the one to >> Lady Welby, followed by the corresponding text in "A Neglected Argument." >> >> CSP: One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself >> alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one >> consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being. It >> follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not >> even to the principle of contradiction. I denominate the objects of this >> Universe *Ideas*, or *Possibles*, although the latter designation does >> not imply capability of actualization. On the contrary as a general rule, >> if not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect actualization on >> account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason. For that which >> is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially vague. (EP >> 2.478-479) >> >> >> CSP: Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first >> comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, >> pure mathematician, or another might give local habitation and a name >> within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being >> consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually >> thinking them, saves their Reality. (CP 1.455) >> >> >> These are basically consistent, although the letter to Welby clarifies >> that "capability of getting thought"--what Peirce's definition of "Idea" in >> CP 1.452 called "capacity for getting fully represented"--"does not imply >> capability of actualization." This is thus the universe of pure >> possibility, rather than potentiality. Whatever belongs to this universe >> "is not subject to the principle of contradiction" because it "is >> essentially vague." >> >> CSP: Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in >> their Brute reactions, and of, second, the facts (reactions, events, >> qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the last >> analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more >> unambiguously, *Existents*, and the facts about them I call *Facts*. >> Every member of this Universe is either a Single Object subject, alike to >> the Principles of Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle, or it is >> expressible by a proposition having such a singular subject. (EP 2.479) >> >> >> CSP: The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and >> facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute >> forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable until they are closely and >> fairly examined. (CP 6.455) >> >> >> These are also basically consistent, and the letter to Welby confirms >> that whatever belongs to this universe is "subject, alike to the Principles >> of Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle." >> >> CSP: The third Universe consists of the co-being of whatever is in its >> Nature *necessitant*, that is, is a Habit, a law, or something >> expressible in a universal proposition. Especially, *continua *are of >> this nature. I call objects of this universe *Necessitants*. It >> includes whatever we can know by logically valid reasoning. (EP 2.479) >> >> >> CSP: The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in >> active power to establish connections between different objects, especially >> between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is >> essentially a Sign--not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially >> such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power >> of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a >> living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. >> Such is a living constitution--a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social >> "movement." (CP 6.455) >> >> >> These seem to have some important differences. In particular, the letter >> to Welby describes the scope of this universe in terms of habits, laws, and >> (especially) continua, rather than Signs. It then goes on (EP 2.480) to >> discuss how a Sign, rather than always belonging to the third universe, can >> be a Possible (Tone or Mark), an Existent (Token), or a Necessitant >> (Type). The letter to James confirm that "A *Sign *is anything of >> either of the three Universes ..." (EP 2.497) >> >> Here we see the association of the modality of Signs with the three >> categories, as Edwina has been advocating--and therefore the three >> universes, if my hypothesis is right that the latter correspond to (and >> perhaps even replace) the former. It thus leaves me wondering how to >> interpret CP 1.480, where Peirce stated that "a triad if genuine cannot be >> in the world of quality nor in that of fact" and "a *thoroughly *genuine >> triad is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of >> *representations*." One plausible explanation is that Peirce simply >> changed his mind about this between c.1896 and 1908; another is that what >> he meant by "world" or "universe" in c.1896 was different from what he >> meant by "universe" in 1908. I will obviously need to think about this >> some more. >> >> As for the discussion of "Universes" and "Categories" in "Prolegomena to >> an Apology for Pragmaticism" (CP 4.547-549), it is not clear to me that >> Peirce used either of those terms there in the same sense in which we are >> using them here. I will quote the concluding paragraph--where he aligned >> the "three Universes" with the "modes of reality," which are presumably the >> "Modes of Being" that he had just identified as Actuality, Possibility, and >> Destiny--in case anyone would like to comment further on it. >> >> CSP: I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories, >> but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you have >> explained as predicates of predicates. That wonderful operation of >> hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create *entia rationis* that >> are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning >> predicates from being signs that we think or think *through*, into being >> subjects thought of. We thus think of the thought-sign itself, making it >> the object of another thought-sign. Thereupon, we can repeat the operation >> of hypostatic abstraction, and from these second intentions derive third >> intentions. Does this series proceed endlessly? I think not. What then are >> the characters of its different members? My thoughts on this subject are >> not yet harvested. I will only say that the subject concerns Logic, but >> that the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different >> Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny). >> On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in >> the different Modes of Being. Meantime, it will be proper that in our >> system of diagrammatization we should provide for the division, whenever >> needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality into *Realms *for >> the different Predicaments. (CP 4.549) >> >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 7:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Gary F., List: >>> >>> Thank you for those references. I was thinking about conducting a >>> search myself, and you have saved me the trouble, although I may still do >>> some digging through CP. I will take a look as soon as I can, although I >>> am traveling tonight and tomorrow and do not have my hard copy of EP 2 with >>> me. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:03 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon, Gary R et al., >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I’ve been away for a couple of days and haven’t yet caught up with the >>>> discussion. However I’ve done a bit of searching through Peirce’s late >>>> texts to see whether I could confirm your suggestion that Peirce “seems >>>> to have shifted toward discussing "Universes" rather than "categories.” I >>>> found a couple of extended discussions of the difference between >>>> “Categories” and “Universes,” one in the “Prologemena” of 1906. But I also >>>> found two other places where Peirce writes of “the three Universes”: the >>>> long letter to Welby of Dec. 1908 (EP2:478 ff.) and a 1909 letter to James >>>> (EP2:497). He doesn’t refer to Categories in these letters, so that would >>>> seem to support your suggestion. I found very little that uses *either* >>>> term from 1909 on. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I see that Gary R. has corrected me on my reference to the >>>> ‘ur-continuity’, and I’ll leave any further comments on that until I catch >>>> up with the thread. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Gary f. >>>> >>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
