I haven’t been following this discussion closely due to illness, but it seems to me that a lot of the trouble with the role of subjects and predicates can be alleviated in favour of predicates) by Peirce’s colocalization. The SP distinction can be reinterpreted so that the subject becomes identified by a predicate with an index, making it in itself a dicisgn (proposition). So a subject-predicate form really combines two (or more) propositions). There is an extensive discussion of this in Frederik Sternfelt, Natural Propositions, 4.2 Co-localization as the basis of syntax (pp. 108-114). Unfortunately, to fully understand what Sternfelt is saying and how it relates to Peirce requires reading a good deal more in chapter 4 as well as chapter 3.
I am not sure that this solves the problem of the relation between Categories and Universes, but it did help me. John Collier Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: Thursday, 20 October 2016 3:15 AM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) Jeff, List: JD: I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, existents and necessitants. That is certainly the dominant interpretation. I only started questioning it because Peirce explicitly situated Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants in the three Universes in 1908; and two years earlier, he seemed to indicate that Universes only contain Subjects, while Categories only contain Predicates (including relations). However, I now notice that he added the caveat that whether this is correct "is a question for careful study" (CP 4.545), and then proceeded to present a long and complicated analysis of propositions to explain why he found it unsatisfactory to view Universes as "receptacles of the Subjects alone" (CP 4.548). So I am back to being confused about the distinction (if there is one) between Universes and Categories, especially since a predicate can be turned into a subject by hypostatic abstraction. JD: As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb ... Ah, I guess this reference to Lieb is what you meant in the other thread. Thanks, Jon On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:34 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Hi Jon S, I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, existents and necessitants. As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb when he argues in the essay at that is appended to the collection on Semiotics that consists of the Letters to Lady that all of the classes of signs can be understood on the basis of this division. So, we have the following classifications of signs: A. Mode of Apprehension of Sign itself: Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign B. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Object: Descriptives, Designatives, Copulatives C. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Interpretant: Hypotheticals, Categoricals, Relatives D. Mode of Being of Dynamical Object: Abstractives, Occurrences, Collectives E. Nature of the Dynamical Interpretant: Sympathetics, Percussives, Usuals F. Nature and Purpose of the Final Interpretant: Emotional (aesthetic-produce feeling), Energetic (moral-produce action), Logical (scientific-produce self control) G. Relation of Sign to its Dynamical Object: Icons (image, diagram, metaphor), Indices (reference to objects or facts), Symbols (general rule) H. Relation of Sign to Dynamical Interpretant: Suggestives, Imperatives (e.g. interrogatives), Indicatives I. Relation of Sign to the Final Interpretant: Rheme (Seme), Dicent (Pheme), Argument (Delome) J. Nature of assurance in the triadic relation between sign, object and interpretant: Instinct, Experience, Form So, for example, I think that the division of signs into suggestives, imperatives, indicatives hinges on the character of the relation of the sign to dynamical Interpretant as being a possible, an existent or an necessitant. How might a relation between a sign and a dynamical interpretant have such a character? My hunch is that his long discussions of the different kinds of relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within" and in his discussions of the nomenclature and division of dyadic and triad relations is meant to work that out. --Jeff --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354> ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2016 7:42 AM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology) List: While reviewing the letters to Lady Welby that are in EP 2.477-491, I noticed that Peirce only explicitly employed his terms for the constituents of the three Universes (Possibles/Existents/Necessitants) to the Sign itself, the Dynamoid or Dynamical Object, and the Immediate Object. He then implied that they can also be used for the three Interpretants--here called Destinate, Effective, and Explicit--by including the latter in the order of determination after stating the well-known rule that "a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible ... a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant." However, as I have suggested previously, the three Interpretants themselves seem to be more properly characterized as possible (Immediate), actual (Dynamic), and habitual (Final), with each divided into feeling/action/thought. Peirce went on to say that the four semeiotic relations--Sign to Dynamical Object, Sign to Dynamical Interpretant, Sign to Normal Interpretant, and (triadic) Sign to Dynamical Object and Normal Interpretant--also "appear to me to be all Trichotomies." However, he never definitively stipulated on what basis they were thus to be divided, instead merely suggesting three descriptive terms in each case. The only hint is his remark that applying the same rule to all ten trichotomies would produce just 66 sign classes, rather than 59,049. This raises the question of whether a relation, as such, also must belong to one of the three Universes. If so, what exactly does it mean for a relation to be an Idea vs. a Thing or Fact vs. a Habit or Law or Continuum? In particular, what exactly does it mean to align each of the semeiotic relations with these three Universes--the S-O relation of icon/index/symbol, the S-I relations of rheme/dicent/argument (nature of influence) and presented/urged/submitted (manner of appeal), and the S-O-I relation of assurance by instinct/experience/form? Is anyone aware of anything in the literature that addresses these specific questions? Thanks, Jon On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 5:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Gary F., List: I finally had a chance to take a look at the two letters in EP 2 that you mentioned. Here are each of the three Universes as defined in the one to Lady Welby, followed by the corresponding text in "A Neglected Argument." CSP: One of these Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being. It follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not even to the principle of contradiction. I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or Possibles, although the latter designation does not imply capability of actualization. On the contrary as a general rule, if not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect actualization on account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason. For that which is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially vague. (EP 2.478-479) CSP: Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another might give local habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their Reality. (CP 1.455) These are basically consistent, although the letter to Welby clarifies that "capability of getting thought"--what Peirce's definition of "Idea" in CP 1.452 called "capacity for getting fully represented"--"does not imply capability of actualization." This is thus the universe of pure possibility, rather than potentiality. Whatever belongs to this universe "is not subject to the principle of contradiction" because it "is essentially vague." CSP: Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in their Brute reactions, and of, second, the facts (reactions, events, qualities, etc.) concerning those Objects, all of which facts, in the last analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects, Things, or more unambiguously, Existents, and the facts about them I call Facts. Every member of this Universe is either a Single Object subject, alike to the Principles of Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle, or it is expressible by a proposition having such a singular subject. (EP 2.479) CSP: The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and facts. I am confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute forces, notwithstanding objections redoubtable until they are closely and fairly examined. (CP 6.455) These are also basically consistent, and the letter to Welby confirms that whatever belongs to this universe is "subject, alike to the Principles of Contradiction and to that of Excluded Middle." CSP: The third Universe consists of the co-being of whatever is in its Nature necessitant, that is, is a Habit, a law, or something expressible in a universal proposition. Especially, continua are of this nature. I call objects of this universe Necessitants. It includes whatever we can know by logically valid reasoning. (EP 2.479) CSP: The third Universe comprises everything whose being consists in active power to establish connections between different objects, especially between objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially a Sign--not the mere body of the Sign, which is not essentially such, but, so to speak, the Sign's Soul, which has its Being in its power of serving as intermediary between its Object and a Mind. Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth, of a plant. Such is a living constitution--a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social "movement." (CP 6.455) These seem to have some important differences. In particular, the letter to Welby describes the scope of this universe in terms of habits, laws, and (especially) continua, rather than Signs. It then goes on (EP 2.480) to discuss how a Sign, rather than always belonging to the third universe, can be a Possible (Tone or Mark), an Existent (Token), or a Necessitant (Type). The letter to James confirm that "A Sign is anything of either of the three Universes ..." (EP 2.497) Here we see the association of the modality of Signs with the three categories, as Edwina has been advocating--and therefore the three universes, if my hypothesis is right that the latter correspond to (and perhaps even replace) the former. It thus leaves me wondering how to interpret CP 1.480, where Peirce stated that "a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact" and "a thoroughly genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of representations." One plausible explanation is that Peirce simply changed his mind about this between c.1896 and 1908; another is that what he meant by "world" or "universe" in c.1896 was different from what he meant by "universe" in 1908. I will obviously need to think about this some more. As for the discussion of "Universes" and "Categories" in "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (CP 4.547-549), it is not clear to me that Peirce used either of those terms there in the same sense in which we are using them here. I will quote the concluding paragraph--where he aligned the "three Universes" with the "modes of reality," which are presumably the "Modes of Being" that he had just identified as Actuality, Possibility, and Destiny--in case anyone would like to comment further on it. CSP: I will now say a few words about what you have called Categories, but for which I prefer the designation Predicaments, and which you have explained as predicates of predicates. That wonderful operation of hypostatic abstraction by which we seem to create entia rationis that are, nevertheless, sometimes real, furnishes us the means of turning predicates from being signs that we think or think through, into being subjects thought of. We thus think of the thought-sign itself, making it the object of another thought-sign. Thereupon, we can repeat the operation of hypostatic abstraction, and from these second intentions derive third intentions. Does this series proceed endlessly? I think not. What then are the characters of its different members? My thoughts on this subject are not yet harvested. I will only say that the subject concerns Logic, but that the divisions so obtained must not be confounded with the different Modes of Being: Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or Freedom from Destiny). On the contrary, the succession of Predicates of Predicates is different in the different Modes of Being. Meantime, it will be proper that in our system of diagrammatization we should provide for the division, whenever needed, of each of our three Universes of modes of reality into Realms for the different Predicaments. (CP 4.549) Regards, Jon On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 7:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: Gary F., List: Thank you for those references. I was thinking about conducting a search myself, and you have saved me the trouble, although I may still do some digging through CP. I will take a look as soon as I can, although I am traveling tonight and tomorrow and do not have my hard copy of EP 2 with me. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 5:03 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote: Jon, Gary R et al., I’ve been away for a couple of days and haven’t yet caught up with the discussion. However I’ve done a bit of searching through Peirce’s late texts to see whether I could confirm your suggestion that Peirce “seems to have shifted toward discussing "Universes" rather than "categories.” I found a couple of extended discussions of the difference between “Categories” and “Universes,” one in the “Prologemena” of 1906. But I also found two other places where Peirce writes of “the three Universes”: the long letter to Welby of Dec. 1908 (EP2:478 ff.) and a 1909 letter to James (EP2:497). He doesn’t refer to Categories in these letters, so that would seem to support your suggestion. I found very little that uses either term from 1909 on. I see that Gary R. has corrected me on my reference to the ‘ur-continuity’, and I’ll leave any further comments on that until I catch up with the thread. Gary f. ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
