Dear List: Then to keep things clear and tidy, keep things next to each other:
But the beautiful, also, and that which is in itself desirable are in the same column; and the first in any class is always best, or analogous to the best. "That a *final cause* may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by the distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for whose good an action is done, and (b) *something at which the action aims*; and of these the latter exists among unchangeable entities though the former does not. The *final cause, then, produces motion as being loved*, but all other things move by being moved. Now if something is moved it is capable of being otherwise than as it is. ~Aristotle, Metaphysics Book XII Now what is a “final” cause? It is merely a tendency to produce some determinate kind of effect having some relation to the *destiny* of things. But is not such a tendency abundantly manifest in the whole of life-process of plants? ~Peirce, *An Essay toward Improving our Reasoning in Security and Uberty*, *EP 2:464* So with all scientific research. Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish, but to a foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the predestinate opinion. This great hope is embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is *fated to be ultimately agreed to* by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality. ~*How to Make Our Ideas Clear* *Hth,* *Jerry Rhee* On Sat, Jan 14, 2017 at 3:35 PM, CLARK GOBLE <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Jan 14, 2017, at 8:15 AM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > > But I did find this previous comment on Houser on Forster on Peirce while > I was looking for something else, and it reflects my sense that Peirceans > have more trouble controlling that slippery slide toward what I've called > “essentialism” or “ontologism” than they do checking nominalistic drift. > > > I find that if we keep front and center Peirce’s notion of habit that this > is less of a problem. That said though Peirce also treats structures, > essences and similar phenomena through a lens of possibility. That does > open up the danger than in adopting a modal realism one is sneaking a near > Platonism back in through the window. > > A similar risk occurs with Peirce’s notion of teleological causation. At > times he is anxious to distinguish his sense from the type of necessity > that perhaps is closer to Aristotle’s use or among the scholastics. He > adopts a kind of Darwinian approach that seeks to avoid this causation. Yet > at other times he’ll speak of what is necessary and not just highly > probable - perhaps wrapped up in his notion of continuity - which again > constantly keeps the threat of Platonism an ever present one. > > Put an other way, I think you are right but that this difficulty is part > and parcel of Peirce’s own writings that reflect this tension. > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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