Dear all, I think my point was missed.
*It's murder by numbers...one two three..* *it's as easy to learn as your C A Bs* The problem as I see it, is to discover that something that is infinitely knowable, admit at the outset our genuine doubt as to whether it's knowable or not to illustrate the genuine uncertainty of the problem, and then demonstrate that we can know it. The thing will be done if there is both the power and the wish to do it. Best, Jerry Rhee On Thu, Mar 2, 2017 at 10:58 AM, Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: > Clark, list, > > That's a good question. I've tended to think of it this way. Truth enters > logic as a regulative idea that one can hardly doubt in particular cases; > in other words, one thinks that one's idea of truth is true in particular > cases. In committing to inquire into various questions, one commits to the > idea of truths about various questions. This commitment to the idea of > truth applies even when the inquiry is about truth itself. One ends up with > _*practical*_ certainty that there is truth even if, at the theoretical > level, the principle remains regulatory, not speculative. In his brief > intellectual autobiography (1904), Peirce says that philosophy concerns > ideas whose truth or falsehood is the object of no science (i.e., no > theoretical research) because they can hardly be doubted. Moreover, Peirce > behaves as a serious theorist - from his ideas about truth, the real, and > fallibility in particular, he draws nontrivial conclusions in metaphysics, > involving continuity and spontaneity a.k.a. absolute chance. See Peirce > (1897) "Fallibilism, Continuity, and Evolution", CP 1.141–75 > http://www.textlog.de/4248.html , placed by the CP editors directly after > "F.R.L." (1899, CP 1.135–40) https://web.archive.org/web/ > 20120106071421/http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/frl_99.htm . I just > don't know how far beyond regulative conceptions he goes in that case. In > the Wikipedia article "Synechism," somebody wrote, without providing a > reference, "The fact that some things are ultimate may be recognized by > the synechist without abandoning his standpoint, since synechism is a > normative or regulative principle, not a theory of existence." > > It's when one looks at the set of regulative ideas collectively and > philosophically that one can entertain some sort of doubt and regard those > ideas as hopes rather than as something surer. One keeps the door open to > the idea that possibly there's something vaguely wrong in that set. > > In his review "An American Plato" of Royce (1885 MS) W 5:222-235 (see > 227-230), also EP 1:229-241 (see 234-236), Peirce says: > > The problem whether a given question will ever get answered or not is not > so simple; the number of questions asked is constantly increasing, and the > capacity for answering them is also on the increase. If the rate of the > latter increase is greater than that of the former the probability is unity > that any given question will be answered; otherwise the probability is _ > *zero*_. [....] But I will admit (if the reader thinks the admission has > any meaning, and is not an empty proposition) that some finite number of > questions, we can never know which ones, will escape getting answered > forever. [....] Let us suppose, then, for the sake of argument, that some > questions eventually get settled, and that some others, indistinguishable > from the former by any marks, never do. In that case, I should say that the > conception of reality was rather a faulty one, for while there is a real so > far as a question that will get settled goes, there is none for a question > that will never be settled; for an unknowable reality is nonsense. [....] > In that way, if we think that some questions are never going to get > settled, we ought to admit that our conception of nature as absolutely real > is only partially correct. Still, we shall have to be governed by it > practically; because there is nothing to distinguish the unanswerable > questions from the answerable ones, so that investigation will have to > proceed as if all were answerable. In ordinary life, no matter how much we > believe in questions ultimately getting answered, we shall always put aside > an innumerable throng of them as beyond our powers. [....] From this > practical and economical point of view, it really makes no difference > whether or not all questions are actually answered, by man or by God, so > long as we are satisfied that investigation has a universal tendency toward > the settlement of opinion; and this I conceive to be the position of > Thrasymachus. > > If there be any advantage to religion in supposing God to be omniscient, > this sort of scepticism about reality can do no practical harm. We can > still suppose that He knows all that there is of reality to be known. > [....] The scepticism just spoken of would admit this omniscience as a > regulative but not a speculative conception. I believe that even that view > is more religiously fruitful than the opinion of Dr. Royce. > > A while back, Gary F. quoted from MS 647 (1910) which appeared in Sandra > B. Rosenthal's 1994 book _Charles Peirce's Pragmatic Pluralism_: > > An Occurrence, which Thought analyzes into Things and Happenings, is > necessarily Real; but it can never be known or even imagined in all its > infinite detail. A Fact, on the other hand[,] is so much of the real > Universe as can be represented in a Proposition, and instead of being, like > an Occurrence, a slice of the Universe, it is rather to be compared to a > chemical principle extracted therefrom by the power of Thought; and though > it is, or may be Real, yet, in its Real existence it is inseparably > combined with an infinite swarm of circumstances, which make no part of the > Fact itself. It is impossible to thread our way through the Logical > intricacies of being unless we keep these two things, the Occurrence and > the Real Fact, sharply separate in our Thoughts. [Peirce, MS 647 (1910)] > > In that quote Peirce very clearly holds that not all will be known or can > even be imagined. What is left is the idea that details may remain vague > (as indeed a house that one sees is a kind of "statistical" object, > compatible with the existence of innumerable alternate microstates and > that, in any case, the object as it is "in itself" does not involve the > idea of some secret compartment forever hidden from inquiry; it is instead > a matter of deciding which questions one cares about. Material processes > scramble information, and life interpretively unscrambles some of it > according to standards of value and interest. > > On another note, Joe Ransdell used to insist that Peirce's realism was > stronger in the 1860s than it was when he wrote things like "How to Make > Our Ideas Clear" (1878). I once read a review of some Peirce-related > p8blication that said that too, but I couldn't dig it up again. I've also > spent hours looking for a remark by Peirce, that maybe I'm just confused > about, in which he says something like, in the 1870s articles on > pragmatism, he was trying to get pragmatism afloat without trying to take > on too much at once. Of course his fellow pragmatists were not such strong > realists as Peirce, and William James later wrote of liking to think that > J,S. Mill if he were still alive would be the pragmatists' leader. > > Best, Ben > > On 3/1/2017 5:36 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > > Over the years I’ve gone back and forth in terms of how to think of > Peirce’s conception of truth. I’m here speaking of the notion of truth and > less the historical question of what Peirce believe at which times. What > brought this about was our discussion off and on over the past few months > of Peirce’s modal realism starting in the late 1890’s. Prior to that time > while he recognized the need to switch to counterfactual discussions in say > the Pragmatic Maxim he didn’t fully embrace modal realism until quite late. > > The question is what his modal realism does for his conception of truth as > what inquiry would lead to in the long run with an idealized community. > > Way back years ago when I was much more of a novice in Peirce my gut > tended to read this “in the long run” as something actual. Then over time > (primarily due to arguments made here) I switched over to just thinking of > it as a regulative notion. That is we can talk about what we *mean* by > truth but there’s not some actual truth that grounds our statements as > true. This is the way I suspect the majority of Peirceans think about it. > However with modal realism, if continued inquiry and continuity are > possible, they are real as possible. This means that this “in the long” run > of the universe acting has as a real possibility this ‘end.’ It might not > be *actual* but it is *real*. (In a way analogous to how Peirce treats > God) > > Does this seem about right? > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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