> On Mar 2, 2017, at 1:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > > CG: Yes, if there were a late quote along those lines that would have > answered my question directly. I suspect though that is just someone assuming > it’s merely regulative. > > How about this one, from Peirce's definition of "synechism" in Baldwin's > Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902)? > > CSP: It would, therefore, be most contrary to his own principle for the > synechist not to generalize from that which experience forces upon him, > especially since it is only so far as facts can be generalized that they can > be understood; and the very reality, in his way of looking at the matter, is > nothing else than the way in which facts must ultimately come to be > understood. There would be a contradiction here, if this ultimacy were looked > upon as something to be absolutely realized; but the synechist cannot > consistently so regard it. Synechism is not an ultimate and absolute > metaphysical doctrine; it is a regulative principle of logic, prescribing > what sort of hypothesis is fit to be entertained and examined. (CP 6.173)
That’s really close but not quite there. Note the last part which I highlighted. Logically it’s regulative in terms of what hypotheses can be examined. So it’s a way of casting off a hypothesis somewhat akin to the way the positivists dismissed many things as meaningless. So while synechism isn’t a metaphysical doctrine the question of truth and continuity can still entail metaphysical doctrines once those are examined as a hypothesis. His point is just that as a regulatory principle we have to assume that things aren’t inexplicable. So we can’t assume my question is inexplicable. But that doesn’t mean of course we have a metaphysical answer for my question. Now if we simply extend from the idea of continuity to metaphysics we’re doing it wrong. However if we’re extending from modal realism to the question of whether there is a real possibility of stability (i.e. something beyond the regulative) I think we’re making a different sort of argument. Maybe I’m wrong in that though.
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