Edwina, List: ET: I think we have, remaining, ONE 'difference', which is in point 4 below.
That is what I anticipated, but I thought it was important to confirm it so that we are not surprised if and when it comes up again in the future. ET: I don't think that the Sign is only an INTERNAL triad. There has to be, in my view, a triadic networking going on outside of this internal one. This is basically the same sticking point as #4, right? I am now on board with conceiving the Sign as a triad consisting of the Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant, since Peirce described the Oi and Ii as "internal to" or "within" the Sign. I also agree that there is, always and everywhere, "triadic networking" of the Sign with the Dynamic Object and (when it has one) the Dynamic Interpretant. However, since Peirce described the Od and Id as "external to" or "without" the Sign, and the Od as "independent of" the Sign, I remain uncomfortable with also calling *this *a triad, and especially with calling *this *the Sign. I would personally prefer to stick with Peirce's terminology, in which S, Od, and Id are three correlates (i.e., subjects) of a triadic relation; and I honestly believe that this still captures the idea of ubiquitous "triadic networking" that you rightly insist on maintaining. More below. ET: IF, for example, the Immediate Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness, then, the other two Interpretants must be in the same mode, i.e., they can't add information. Right, if a Sign is *only *"interpretable" by a feeling--i.e., that is its only *possible *effect--then obviously any *actual* effect of that Sign will be a feeling, as well as any resulting *habit*. On the other hand, if a Sign is interpretable by a thought, then it is *also *interpretable by an action or a feeling; so its actual effects and resulting habits may be any of these. Again, I am interested in learning what might correspond in the physico-chemical and biological realms to feeling, action, and thought in the human realm as the three kinds of effects that a Sign can produce. ET: I understand your saying that this INTERNAL triad is the first correlate - and the DO as the second correlate and the DI as the third correlate. I understand what you are setting up - but my view is that the semiosic action cannot allow distinct subjects. That is, there is nothing on this planet that exists, as I see it, outside of the semiosic 'network' so to speak. I wonder if at this point our remaining disagreement is mostly a modeling issue. I can absolutely endorse your last statement here, while still maintaining that there are distinct subjects. After all, in order for there to be real *relations*, there must be real *subjects *that are thus related--and that is precisely what I take Peirce to mean by "correlates." Calling them "distinct" does not entail that they are "separate," as I wrongly said a while back, let alone "isolated" such that they somehow "exist outside of semiosis." Even in your current model, each individual triad is "distinct" (or at least distinguishable) from the others, despite being integrally networked with them; otherwise, you would not be able to pick out particular combinations of Representamen, Object, and Interpretant as examples. What I am basically suggesting is that we make the model a bit more granular, in a way that I believe is more consistent with Peirce's own model. We would use "Sign" to refer only to the triad of Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant. We would say that every such Sign is the first correlate of a triadic relation, and that its Dynamic Object (which determines it) and its Dynamic Interpretant (which it determines) are the other two correlates. We would recognize that these three subjects are embedded within a comprehensive network of further relations with *other *subjects, all of which can play any of the three roles--Sign, Dynamic Object, or Dynamic Interpretant; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n1; 1905). I certainly do not expect you to change your mind immediately, but I hope that you will think about it. Thanks, Jon On Sun, Apr 2, 2017 at 7:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > > See my comments below - and yes, I think we are making progress in > understanding each other's views better. I think we have, remaining, ONE > 'difference', which is in point 4 below. > -- > > On Sat 01/04/17 4:52 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > It is very gratifying to make so much progress in (finally) understanding > each other better. I am sincerely sorry that we were not able to get to > this point sooner. > > 1) ET: I don't think I'm ready to reduce the Immediate Interpretant to a > potentiality held within the Representamen although - I see your point and > it seems valid. > > > JAS: I did not mean to imply that the Immediate Interpretant is "held > within the Representamen"; rather, it is within the Sign, which is a triad > consisting of the Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate > Interpretant. > > EDWINA: OK - I accept this triad but I'm going to consider it only ONE > triad. That is, I don't think that the Sign is only an INTERNAL triad. > There has to be, in my view, a triadic networking going on outside of this > internal one. > ----------------------------------- > > 2) ET: ... so my question is - as potential - is [the Immediate > Interpretant] always in a mode of Firstness? ... If the Immediate > Interpretant operates as potentiality - then - how can it be within the > other two modes? > > > It depends on what we mean by "mode." In my working hypothesis, the > Immediate, Dynamic, and Final Interpretants are indeed manifestations of > 1ns as possibility, 2ns as actuality, and 3ns as habituality, > respectively. However, each is still divisible into its own trichotomy, > which corresponds to 1ns as feeling, 2ns as action, and 3ns as thought. So > the Immediate Interpretant is the range of possible feelings > (Ejaculative), actions (Imperative), or thoughts (Significative) that the > Sign may produce; the Dynamic Interpretant is any actual feeling > (Sympathetic/Congruentive), action (Shocking/Percussive), or thought > (Usual) that the Sign does produce; and the Final Interpretant is a habit of > feeling (Gratific), action (To produce action), or thought (To produce > self-control) that the Sign would produce through repetition of various > Dynamic Interpretants. Every Sign has an Immediate Interpretant within > itself, but some Signs never produce a Dynamic Interpretant, and some of > those Signs never produce a Final Interpretant. > > Once again, the terminology here seems more directly applicable to > Sign-action involving human minds, rather than the physico-chemical and > biological realms. I am open to suggestions for how to transfer the > concepts from one context to the other. I suspect that the key is > remembering that Peirce did not confine feeling, action, and thought to > humans--or even just to living things. > > EDWINA: OK - I see what you have done, by dividing the three > Interpretants, effectively, into the 'range of possible'; the actuality and > the habit. You have, therefore, said that an ACT of feeling is in a mode of > Firstness - within the Dynamic Interpretant, while a physical ACT....is in > a mode of Secondness within that same DI. I see your point. ..though I'm > not sure about this - IF, for example, the Immediate Interpretant is in a > mode of Firstness, then, the other two Interpretants must be in the same > mode, i.e., they can't add information. But I do see what you are doing and > it makes sense. > ------------------------------------- > > 3) ET: The Interpretant in a Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a demonstrative > pronoun] is in a mode of Firstness. It is, I think, externalized by the > modes of Secondness and Thirdness in the other correlates. How does this > fit in with your outline? > > > JAS: My understanding of Peirce's three-trichotomy, ten-Sign > classification--and what I have found to be the nearly unanimous consensus > in the secondary literature that I have read--is that the third trichotomy > does not divide the Interpretant itself, but the relation between the > Sign and its Interpretant; i.e., how the Interpretant represents the Sign. > > CSP: Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as the > sign in itself is a mere quality [Qualisign], is an actual existent > [Sinsign], or is a general law [Legisign]; secondly, according as the > relation of the sign to its Object consists in the sign's having some > character in itself [Icon], or in some existential relation to that Object > [Index], or in its relation to an Interpretant [Symbol]; thirdly, according > as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility [Rheme], or as a > sign of fact [Dicent], or as a sign of reason [Argument]. (EP 2:291-292; > 1903) > > > JAS: Hence a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is a Sign that is a general law, > which is in some existential relation to its Object, and which is > represented by its Interpretant as a sign of possibility. A demonstrative > pronoun, such as "this" or "that," is a Legisign because it is applicable > to a wide variety of situations, rather than being tied to one particular > Object; but whenever it is actually uttered, that replica is a Sinsign. > It is an Index because it only has an Object by virtue of collateral > experience that draws attention to that Object, such as the utterer > pointing at it. It is a Rheme because its Interpretant includes no > information about its Object. > > EDWINA: Good explanation. > ------------------------------------------------------------ > -------------------------------- > > 4) JAS: The possible modes of the Interpretant itself depend on where we > insert that trichotomy among the first three--which is something that > Peirce never clearly specified, with the result that it has been a topic of > considerable debate over the years, on this List and elsewhere. I would > suggest that it must come after the Sign, since the Sign determines the > Interpretant; and it must come before the Sign-Interpretant relation, > such that the two correlates determine the relation. In my working > hypothesis, if it comes before the Sign-Object relation, then the > Interpretant must be either an action (2ns) or a thought (3ns); and if it > comes after the Sign-Object relation, then the Interpretant must be > either a feeling (1ns) or an action (2ns). Hence it is a matter of which > we find more plausible--that the Interpretant of a Rhematic Indexical > Legisign can be a thought, or that it can be a feeling. > > ET: Yes - I can accept 'Sign as Triad and Correlate of Triadic Relation'. > Good heavens - we are agreeing - and it's real, not a factor of April 1st! > > > Indeed, no fooling on my part, either. Just to be clear, though--what I > am proposing is that the Sign is a triad consisting of the Representamen, > Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant; and that this triad is the > first correlate of a triadic relation, with the Dynamic Object as the > second correlate and the Dynamic Interpretant as the third correlate. In > other words, the Sign, Dynamic Object, and Dynamic Interpretant are distinct > subjects, rather than parts of a triad. Is this an acceptable > formulation, or still a sticking point? > > EDWINA: I think, unfortunately, this is still a sticking point. My reason > for quibbling is because you are defining and confining the triadic Sign as > strictly INTERNAL. That's what bothers me. I understand your saying that > this INTERNAL triad is the first correlate - and the DO as the second > correlate and the DI as the third correlate. I understand what you are > setting up - but my view is that the semiosic action cannot allow distinct > subjects. That is, there is nothing on this planet that exists, as I see > it, outside of the semiosic 'network' so to speak. So, my problem is that > you seem to be confining semiosis to an INTERNAL interaction. > > Think of a spider's web. Outside of this web, is a fly. It's even far > away. It is an objective reality. It is NOT a Dynamic Object in this > particular situation ...until..it is trapped on that web. THEN, it is a > Dynamic Object in this particular situation and becomes an Immediate > Object when it is accepted as 'possible food' by the Spider. > > BUT - I'll say that the fly is ALWAYS in a semiosic triad - which > includes its being a Dynamic Object in THIS particular spider's web > experience...but it's also in other semiosic triads where it is a DO, or a > DI..[and a representamen and..] ..The mere fact that it is a particular fly > makes it also a Dynamic Interpretant of the biological 'genes' that make > up flies. ...and this is quite separate from its role on the spider's web. > It is a Dynamic Object in the huge ecosystem of a particular swamp. > > The way you seem to be setting up the semiosic process - leaves the > 'things' or flies in this case, in a non-semiosic lifestyle...UNTIL they > are trapped on that web, so to speak. That's what bothers me. I don't see > how any 'thing' can exist outside of semiosis. > > Edwina > > On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 1:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon, list - >> >> OK - I'll take each point. >> >> 1)You write: " I would suggest that an Immediate Interpretant is never an >> actual >> interpretant that a Sign produces, but rather a range of possible >> interpretants >> that a Sign may produce. In other words, the Immediate Interpretant is the >> Sign's capacity to produce an actual interpretant--i.e., a Dynamic >> Interpretant." >> >> EDWINA: Hmm. I'd have to think about this. I agree that it is never an >> actual interpretant. I don't think I'm ready to reduce the Immediate >> Interpretant to a potentiality held within the Representamen although - I >> see your point and it seems valid. >> >> . I accept the notion of the representamen's capacity to produce an actual >> interpretant, the DI, - but the way you are setting it up, the Immediate >> Interpretant - which I acknowledge has no actual existentiality [for that >> would require that it be external and have some links to a mode of >> Secondness]....remains purely potential - i.e., so my question is - as >> potential - is it always in a mode of Firstness? >> >> Your suggestion of potentiality would fit in with Peirce's outline in >> 8.314, where he writes that "The Immediate Interpretant is what the >> Question expresses, all that it immediately expresses' [the question was >> the Object]. This would suggest that the Immediate Interpretant is closely >> linked to the Object. >> >> Again, he writes: "The Immediate Interpretant consists in the Quality of >> the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual reaction" >> 8.315. And he further refers to the Immediate Interpretant as in a "mode of >> Presentation' 8.344 - i.e., not in a Mode of Being or actuality. >> >> Then, he describes the Immediate Interpretant as 'felt' 8.369 - and >> acknowledges that it can be in any of the three modes: 'ejaculative or >> merely giving utterance to feeling; imperative, including of course, >> Interrogative; Significative. ". So - my question is: If the Immediate >> Interpretant operates as potentiality - then - how can it be within the >> other two modes? >> >> Or would - these three modes be within the Relation that the >> Representamen has in determining the Immediate Interpretant . In other >> words - this would agree with your analysis. >> >> But is this the case? The Interpretant - - in a Rhematic Indexical >> Legisign [a demonstrative pronoun] is in a mode of Firstness. It is, I >> think, externalized by the modes of Secondness and Thirdness in the other >> correlates. How does this fit in with your outline? >> >> Again - your analysis makes sense - but I'll have to think about it. >> >> 2) I think that we are merely quibbling over the word 'determines' - >> which still has a whiff of authority to it, which I am aware was not what >> Peirce meant. Otherwise - I agree with your outline. >> >> 3) Yes - I can accept 'Sign as Triad and Correlate of Triadic Relation'. >> Good heavens - we are agreeing - and it's real, not a factor of April 1st! >> >> Edwina >> >> -- >> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's >> largest alternative telecommunications provider. >> >> http://www.primus.ca >> >> On Sat 01/04/17 1:46 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> I really appreciate this discussion, which has been very enlightening. >> This time I am the one with a couple of quibbles, which I hope will prove >> to be minor. >> >> ET: And yes, I DO fully agree with your comment that the >> sign/representamen must have the capacity to produce an Immediate >> Interpretant - even if it does not do so, at this moment in time. >> >> >> I would suggest that an Immediate Interpretant is never an actual >> interpretant >> that a Sign produces, but rather a range of possible interpretants that >> a Sign may produce. In other words, the Immediate Interpretant is the >> Sign's capacity to produce an actual interpretant--i.e., a Dynamic >> Interpretant. Furthermore, the Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant >> are internal to the Sign--i.e., the Sign itself is a triad consisting of >> the Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant. I suspect >> that this is precisely why Peirce's late 66-Sign classification did not >> include the S-Oi or S-Ii relations as distinct trichotomies. >> >> ET: The Form or Dynamic Object is 'independent of the Sign' - but only >> in its nature as an Object. As soon as it interacts with the Sign-vehicle, >> then, it becomes a Dynamic Object and as such - it is in a relationship >> with the sign. Before that - it is simply an external Object. >> >> >> I would suggest that the Dynamic Object determines the Sign, rather than >> merely interacting with it. In other words, the Dynamic Object is >> independent of the Sign in a certain sense, but the Sign is not independent >> of the Dynamic Object in the same way; and similarly, the Sign is >> independent of the Dynamic Interpretant in a certain sense (as discussed >> above), but the Dynamic Interpretant is not independent of the Sign in >> the same way. I suspect that this is precisely why Peirce's late 66-sign >> classification did include the S-Od and S-Id relations as distinct >> trichotomies. >> >> ET: But then, since I also subscribe to a view that nothing at all >> exists independently 'per se' and outside of networked semiosic >> connections, then, if one follows this view through....it would conclude >> that there is no such thing as a separate Object. All 'things' are in >> interaction with something else ... >> >> >> Right, "separate" was too strong a word on my part; I agree that every >> "thing" has real relations with other "things." The Dynamic Object has a >> peculiar kind of relation with the Sign, which has a peculiar kind of >> relation with the Dynamic Interpretant. However, I would suggest that >> these are still relations that the Sign has with two external "things," >> not relations that are somehow internal to the Sign itself--i.e., the >> Sign (R-Oi-Ii), Dynamic Object, and Dynamic Interpretant are the three >> correlates of a single triadic relation, rather than the three components >> of a single triad. >> >> I guess I should have made the thread title "Sign as Triad AND Correlate >> of Triadic Relation," because that is the view on which I seem to be >> settling now. Again, what do you think? >> >> Thanks, >> >> Jon >> >> On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 7:22 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, list - yes, there's a lot of agreement in our views. >>> >>> So, first, the Sign must have a Dynamic Object- at some time in its >>> experience. For example, that could be some chemical trigger that does not >>> affect the body for years, that is dormant internally as an Immediate >>> Object for years before moving into the Interpretant phase. >>> >>> And yes, I DO fully agree with your comment that the sign/representamen >>> must have the capacity to produce an Immediate Interpretant - even if it >>> does not do so, at this moment in time. >>> >>> And I would agree that the internal triad is thus basic - and the >>> external parts could be called correlates - and are not necessarily found >>> at the same time. Again, I refer to that chemical affecting the body which >>> might take years to have a real effect. >>> >>> The Form or Dynamic Object is 'independent of the Sign' - but only in >>> its nature as an Object. As soon as it interacts with the Sign-vehicle, >>> then, it becomes a Dynamic Object and as such - it is in a relationship >>> with the sign. Before that - it is simply an external Object. That is, >>> that chemical that affects the human or the tree...is only a Dynamic Object >>> when it actually interacts with that human or that tree. >>> >>> But then, since I also subscribe to a view that nothing at all exists >>> independently 'per se' and outside of networked semiosic connections, then, >>> if one follows this view through....it would conclude that there is no such >>> thing as a separate Object. All 'things' are in interaction with something >>> else - even if it's merely one grain of sand in interaction with the water >>> flowing over it. That chemical might not be a Dynamic Object to the human >>> body but it is such with something else - let's say with the water. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> -- >>> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's >>> largest alternative telecommunications provider. >>> >>> http://www.primus.ca >>> >>> On Fri 31/03/17 11:46 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>> sent: >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> No problem, it was a long shot but worth a try. In fact, your points >>> about the two Objects are well-taken; and that is the part of my hypothesis >>> that feels the most speculative, since what I quoted from Peirce and Short >>> does not say anything about them. After all, the Dynamic Object determines >>> the Sign/Representamen; so if there is no Dynamic Object, how can there >>> be a Sign at all? So I think that we are actually on the same page there. >>> >>> We also apparently agree that a Sign can have an Immediate Interpretant >>> without also having a Dynamic Interpretant. You went on to suggest that it >>> might be possible for a Sign to have no Interpretant at all; but if the >>> Immediate Interpretant is defined as a range of possibilities (as we >>> previously agreed), then that would be a Sign that is incapable of >>> determining an Interpretant--and again, if that is the case, how can it be >>> a Sign at all? >>> >>> That just leaves the fundamental issue of the thread title still >>> unresolved, and I am not quite ready to give up yet. We now agree that the >>> Sign is a triad in the sense that the Immediate Object and Immediate >>> Interpretant >>> are internal to it. What remains is whether the Dynamic Object and the >>> Dynamic >>> Interpretant are also parts of the Sign as a single triad, or distinct >>> correlates >>> of a triadic relation. >>> >>> It seems to me that if there can be a Sign without a Dynamic >>> Interpretant, then the latter cannot be an essential part of the >>> former; they must be distinct in some way. Furthermore, Peirce >>> carefully chose the adjective "dynamic" (sometimes "dynamical" or >>> "dynamoid") because of the indexical and reactive nature of the Object and >>> Interpretant that he explicitly characterized as external to the Sign. >>> >>> CSP: It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, the >>> Mediate without, and the Immediate within the Sign. Its Interpretant is >>> all that the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by >>> collateral experience. The Mediate Object is the Object outside of the >>> Sign; I call it the Dynamoid Object. (EP 2:480; 1908) >>> >>> CSP: We must distinguish between the Immediate Object,--i.e., the >>> Object as represented in the Sign,--and ... the Dynamical Object, which, >>> from the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, which it can only >>> indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by collateral experience. >>> (EP 2:498; 1909) >>> >>> CSP: The Dynamical Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind >>> actually makes of a sign. This Interpretant derives its character from the >>> Dyadic category, the category of Action ... the meaning of any sign for >>> anybody consists in the way he reacts to the sign. (EP 2:499; 1909) >>> >>> >>> Now, Peirce is evidently talking mainly about Sign-action involving human >>> minds here, rather than the physico-chemical and biological Sign-action >>> that is of primary interest to you. So the question becomes how to >>> transfer the concepts from one context to the other. I think that Peirce >>> himself may have been trying to point the way in two additional passages. >>> >>> CSP: I use the word "Sign" in the widest sense for any medium for the >>> communication or extension of a Form (or feature). Being medium, it is >>> determined by something, called its Object, and determines something, >>> called its Interpretant or Interpretand ... In order that a Form may be >>> extended or communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really >>> embodied in a Subject independently of the communication; and it is >>> necessary that there should be another Subject in which the same Form is >>> embodied only in consequence of the communication. The Form (and the Form >>> is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is >>> quite independent of the sign ... (EP 2:477; 1906) >>> >>> >>> To me, this is saying that both the (Dynamic) Object and (Dynamic) >>> Interpretant are distinct Subjects that are independent of the Sign, >>> which causes the same Form that was previously embodied in the former >>> to become embodied in the latter. >>> >>> CSP: I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something >>> else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which >>> effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately >>> determined by the former. My insertion of "upon a person" is a sop to >>> Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception understood. >>> (EP 2:478; 1908) >>> >>> >>> Here the Object is "something else" than the Sign, while the >>> Interpretant is the "effect" of the Sign; so again, it strikes me as saying >>> that they are separate. Of course, this is also the most famous quote >>> demonstrating that Peirce intended his model of Sign-action to have very >>> broad application. >>> >>> This has gotten a bit long, so I will stop there for now, and ask one >>> more time--what do you think? >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Fri, Mar 31, 2017 at 6:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Oh dear - it was certainly nice while it lasted. I'm going to disagree >>>> with your suggestion that there could be a Representamen without an >>>> external Dynamic Object...at some point in its experience. That is, I don't >>>> see the Representamen - or any of the triad - as 'standing alone'. Peirce >>>> DOES, after all, define the Representamen as 'the first correlate of a >>>> triadic relation'. A Representamen, in my understanding, acts as >>>> mediation and how can such an action exist - except within mediation or >>>> interaction with something else? >>>> >>>> Equally, I can't see that the INTERNAL object, i.e., the Immediate >>>> Object could exist without the iconic or indexical or symbolic stimuli of >>>> an external Dynamic Object. I can, however, accept that there might be only >>>> an internal Immediate Interpretant which never makes it to the externality >>>> of being a Dynamic Interpretant. And it is still possible that the >>>> Representamen might be functioning only within the stimulation of a Dynamic >>>> Object-Immediate Object and does not actually produce even an Immediate >>>> Interpretant. >>>> >>>> And I see your image of a triad made up of the Internal aspects of the >>>> Object-Interpretant, I,e, the Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate >>>> interpretant, but, I still consider that the real genuine triad has to have >>>> that externality. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's >>>> largest alternative telecommunications provider. >>>> >>>> http://www.primus.ca >>>> >>>> On Fri 31/03/17 5:29 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>> sent: >>>> >>>> Edwina, List: >>>> >>>> At the risk of pressing our luck, since we have already unexpectedly >>>> identified at least two points of agreement today, I would like to revisit >>>> (selectively) some comments that I posted yesterday. >>>> >>>> CSP: A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, >>>> the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third >>>> Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation >>>> the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the >>>> same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible >>>> Interpretant. (EP 2:290, emphases in original; 1903) >>>> >>>> >>>> Notice that Peirce twice characterized the Interpretant as "possible"; >>>> here is a second passage that touches on that. >>>> >>>> CSP: Namely, while no Representamen actually functions as such until >>>> it actually determines an Interpretant, yet it becomes a Representamen >>>> as soon as it is fully capable of doing this; and its Representative >>>> Quality is not necessarily dependent upon its ever actually determining >>>> an Interpretant, nor even upon its actually having an Object. (CP >>>> 2.275, emphases added; c. 1902) >>>> >>>> >>>> My understanding is thus that every Sign/Representamen has an >>>> Immediate Object and determines an Immediate Interpretant, because >>>> those are real possibilities that are internal to it; but evidently >>>> there might be such a thing as a Sign/Representamen that has no >>>> Dynamic Object and/or (especially) determines no Dynamic Interpretant, >>>> because those are external to it. I wonder if recognizing these >>>> distinctions--possible vs. actual, and internal vs. external--could be a >>>> way to reconcile "the Sign as triad" (with Immediate Object/Interpretant) >>>> and "the Sign as one correlate of a triadic relation" (with Dynamic >>>> Object/Interpretant). >>>> >>>> What do you think? >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>>
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