Jerry, List,
I think there are different kinds of composition, meaning of being a part of something/ to consist of something. E.g. there is spatial and functional composition. The terms "external", "internal", and I guess "emanation" too can be used for spatial composition only. I guess that set theory also only applies to spatial composition. But signs are not spatially but functionally composed. A sign functionally consists of sign, object, interpretant, and an object functionally consists of immediate and dynamical object. So the sign functionally consists of the dynamical object too, but spatially it does not, because the dynamical object is external to the sign (spatially). The sign functionally consists of itself and other things: the object and the interpretant. This is not possible in set theory and in spatial composition, but in functional composition it is: It is a re-entry situation like in a loop in a computer program, like "x=x+1". I have started writing a blog about different kinds of composition, power, and classification (about hierarchies): www.signs-in-time.de . Though what I have just written here will only appear in the next chapter I have not yet written.
Best,
Helmut
 
 25. September 2017 um 21:44 Uhr
"Jerry LR Chandler" <jerry_lr_chand...@mac.com>
wrote:

 [PEIRCE-L] Re: Interpretations of the Meaning of Pragmatisism (edited)
(The composition of this message was interrupted by events and was inadvertently sent prematurely. Several edits widen the scope of the message and contain additional concepts.)
 
On Sep 25, 2017, at 12:06 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@mac.com> wrote:
 
List:
 
Earlier in the summer, several posts addressed the meanings of CP2.230 (1910). The topic of interest is the meaning of the term “emanations”. I interpret emanations as signs from emanative sources exterior to the “observer" or any (mechanical) recipient of the emanative signs.  In other words, the generative object that gives forth the emanations is not  only exterior to the observer, it is also physically real.  CP2.230 (1910)  stands behind the subjective meanings of the  logical terms of “quali-sign, sin-sign and legi-signs”.  These three categories of sign terms have no a priori mathematical content and bare no simple relation to mathematical symbolism. As most readers know, these terms were coined by CSP as source terms for his relational semantic logic. These terms apparently denote the potential for interpreting the emanations as icons, indices and symbols. The specific examples of these terms stand behind the logical synthesis of propositions (rhema, dicisigns, argument) for logical argumentation such that “true/false” assertions are valid.   Some authors refer to this chain of reasoning as "emanative causality”. 
 
 
With the above paragraph a merely a quick and dirty summary of a very perplex topic, I ask, how does “emanative causality” relate to the various definitions of pragmatism? The following reference opens an analytical discussion of three formulations of the meaning of the pragmatic maxim. Of particular importance is the discussion of the grammatical forms that relate indicative and imperative sentences.   
 
MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY
v. 28 #1, Sept 2004,  pp. 119-136
Christopher Hookway. “The principle of pragmatism: Peirce’s formulations and examples.”
 
 
 
I note in passing that in modern chemical logic, emanative causality is used to establish the electrical nature of the chemical bond and hence the structural patterns of atoms in molecules. This logical usage differs from the  concept of the relations between atomic sentences and molecular sentences introduced by B. Russell. Thus, emanative causality (the causality associated with signs) contributes to understanding the distinctions between CSP’s notions of graph theory and modern mathematical graph theory based on set theory, functions and mappings.
 
The Hookway reference sheds some light on last summer's discussions  of CP2.230 (1910) and could be of interest to at least two contributors to this list serve.
 
Cheers
 
Jerry
 
 
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