John S, Gary F, List,
In response to Gary F's remarks about the first Lowell Lecture, John S says: "His study of logic certainly does not grow out of phenomenology." I tend to think that the conceptual point Gary F has made about the study of the elements of the phenomena we might observe in common experience does apply to the chronological development of Peirce's work in logic--including the development of both the mathematical systems of logic and as well as the normative theory of logic. The simple fact that Peirce didn't use the term "phenomenology" to classify this area of inquiry as a separate branch of philosophy in his early work doesn't negate the fact that Peirce was engaged in the careful study of the phenomena from early on in the early Harvard and Lowell lectures of 1865-6 and in "On a New List of the Categories". This seems to be well supported by the point John makes next: "But I would guess that his experience in math, logic, and science guided the ways he thought about everything -- including elements." It was not just the results of Peirce's inquiries in math, logic and science that guided the way he thought. Rather, the examination of the relations involved in using diagrams to reason about questions in math and logic served as a basis for his conclusions about the elemental categories of all experience--and tended to confirm his earlier analyses of the elements involved, for instance, in our common experience of such things as spatiality, temporality, and the growth of our understanding. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> Sent: Saturday, October 14, 2017 12:35 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10 John, list, My comment wasn’t referring to the chronological order of these developments in Peirce’s work, but still, I put my point badly. “Grow” is the wrong word. What I had in mind was that “the theory of the advancement of knowledge is not possible until the logician has first examined all the different elementary modes of getting at truth”; and “before it is possible to enter upon this business in any rational way, the first thing that is necessary is to examine thoroughly all the ways in which thought can be expressed”; and “this introductory part of logic is nothing but an analysis of what kinds of signs are absolutely essential to the embodiment of thought”; and the final step back to the absolute basics, as it were, is the analysis not only of signs, but of all phenomena, into their essential elements, the “formal elements of the phaneron.” The chronological order is different; Peirce was working on logic since the age of 12; his main focus in the early 1890s was phenomenology, although he didn’t call it that until 1902; and his main work on semeiotic analysis was done in 1903-08. But in his classification of sciences, as your diagram shows, phenomenology is the first division of philosophy, followed by the normative sciences, including logic (with its own three divisions). The main reason I mention this ‘quest for the elementary’ is that I’m looking ahead to the first sentence of Lowell 2, which is: “Let us take up the subject of necessary reasoning, mathematical reasoning, with a view to making out what its elementary steps are and how they are put together.” Peirce consistently introduced his graphs with a similar statement of their purpose, which was not to facilitate reasoning but to analyze it into its simplest and smallest steps. This is consistent with his remark that EGs expressed "the atoms and molecules of logic"; and I see this as analogous to his work in semiotic and phenomenology, especially in this period around 1903. Gary f. -----Original Message----- From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] Sent: 14-Oct-17 11:45 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1.10 On 10/14/2017 8:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Peirce’s study of logic seems to be a /quest for the elemental./ It > grows out of his phenomenology, which aims to identify the... It's unclear what "It" refers to. His study of logic certainly does not grow out of phenomenology. Therefore, "It" probably refers to the quest. > “indecomposable elements” of the phaneron/phenomenon, and his logical > graphs aim to ‘decompose’ the thought process into the simplest > possible steps, the better to understand how arguments are ‘composed, But I would guess that his experience in math, logic, and science guided the ways he thought about everything -- including elements. He even said that his EGs expressed "the atoms and molecules of logic". Since his writings on phenomenology and/or phaneroscopy appear rather late, they would probably be effects rather than causes. John
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