John, list, The snippet you quoted from this recent discussion of "existence" and "reality" wasn't mine, so I'll confine myself to your conclusion. You wrote:
. . . many sentences that talk about possibilities and generals will cause those words to be mapped to quantified variables. Therefore, they refer to something that exists. But that existence might not be in the physical world. However, Peirce talked about "real possibilities". So they might exist in some possible realm. Next problem: Do signs exist? In the real world or in some realm of possibilities? To analyze that triad, I would use the sentence "Every mark is something perceptible that is classified as a token by some type." By Quine's dictum, a translation of that sentence to logic would assign quantified variables to 'mark', 'token', and 'type'. Therefore, all three refer to something that exists. Mark and token refer to something perceptible. Therefore, they exist in the physical world. But type would refer to a possibility. Therefore, it exists in some realm of possibilities. I don't know whether the people who used those sentences would agree with me. But unless I hear some very persuasive arguments, I'll assume the above answers. Mapping possibilities and generals (laws and habits) to "quantified variables" may be fine for critical logic (logic as logic, as Peirce sometimes puts it), but I don't think it's what he had in mind in positing "may-bes" and "would-bes." To say that "real possibilities" "*exist *in some realm of possibility" erases the clear distinction which Peirce makes between existence and reality in any number of places, one of which I recently quoted from in this thread: [Reality and existence] are clearly not the same. Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." [But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of that time believed that generals *exist*? They certainly did not so opine (CP 5.503). Peirce clearly and often states that 'generals' do *not exist**, that **law* == lawfulness (3ns) is *not* the same as *force* == a law acting in some existential situation or state of affairs (2ns). Similarly, when Peirce speaks of "real possibilities" he is not confining himself to the domain of speculative grammar in consideration of the mark token, type distinction. There is no existential 'mark' (as would, granted, appear in a sentence logically analyzed) in a real possibility seen as a *may-be* (1ns). The same holds for a *would-be* (3ns), for both require a future unfolding of their possibility or necessity: they *may *come to exist *in futuro* as Peirce often phrases it. Consider any *would-be*. This is described by Peirce as something that would *necessarily* come to be *if *such and such conditions for its happening were to eventually come about. In the biological realm, for example, an evolutionary structural change in an organism might occur were certain highly complex conditions (internal and external) to effectively come into being. I am fairly certain that Peirce would not call such a 'would-be' an existence--even though it *may* come to exist *in futuro (*and even if it might possibly--although I have my doubts--be "mapped to quantified variables") Such a strictly logical slight of hand seems to me to attempt to do away with the important distinction which Peirce repeatedly makes between existence and reality, so I don't buy it. Best, Gary R . [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 10:48 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > This thread is getting hung up on words. I recommend Peirce's > advice to look for the "purposive actions" that would follow > from any options that anyone is debating. > > Let's consider the two words 'real' and 'existence'. > > Quine is not one of my favorite philosophers, but I like his > dictum: "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable." > > Consider the following sentence from a recent note: > >> I don't think that a 'thing' is real in itself, It is existential, >> but its attributes, its modal nature, can be real - if that modal >> nature includes Thirdness, which is to say, includes generals or habits. >> > > My recommendation is to translate that sentence (or any other sentence > that is under consideration) to logic (pick whichever version you > like). That process of translation is a purposive action. > > Then look at which words in that sentence get mapped to quantified > variables. Each of them refers to something that the speaker would > be committed to say exists. > > By that test, many sentences that talk about possibilities and > generals will cause those words to be mapped to quantified variables. > Therefore, they refer to something that exists. But that existence > might not be in the physical world. However, Peirce talked about > "real possibilities". So they might exist in some possible realm. > > Next problem: Do signs exist? In the real world or in some > realm of possibilities? > > To answer that question, I'd look at Peirce's simplest triad: > Mark, Token, Type. > > To analyze that triad, I would use the sentence "Every mark is > something perceptible that is classified as a token by some type." > > By Quine's dictum, a translation of that sentence to logic would > assign quantified variables to 'mark', 'token', and 'type'. > > Therefore, all three refer to something that exists. Mark and > token refer to something perceptible. Therefore, they exist > in the physical world. But type would refer to a possibility. > Therefore, it exists in some realm of possibilities. > > I don't know whether the people who used those sentences would > agree with me. But unless I hear some very persuasive arguments, > I'll assume the above answers. > > John > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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