For what its worth, I see Reality as embracing all, everything, by any name or with no name, known or unknown. I see existence as a reference to beings with consciousness. The distinction is obvious.
And for argument's sake, my jaw drops at any suggestion that we can speak of parts of reality in firsts, seconds or thirds. If reality is all it is everything no matter what we call them or if we call them or don't yet call them because they aren't yet known. The main value I see in triadic is its enablement of logical thinking tending toward the good, true-beautiful. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 2:38 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon S, Edwina, list, > > This remains a thorny issue, apparently. I personally have found the > quotation below useful in thinking about the distinction Peirce makes > between 'reality' and 'existence' and, by extension, the difference between > realism and nominalism. In his late work Peirce held any theory which did > not accept real generals and real possibles to be nominalistic. > > In this passage the first sentence, which makes reality "non-dependent on > thought" and of a "cognitionary character," has led some commentators to > suggest that the passage also points to Peirce's "objective idealism." > > ". . . reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so > is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the > environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two > meanings, he [the pragmatist] would say, are clearly not the same. > Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding > that all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic realists, > who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." [But] can any such > person believe that the great doctors of that time believed that generals > *exist*? They certainly did not so opine. . . Hence, before we treat of > the evidences of pragmaticism, it will be needful to weigh the pros and > cons of scholastic realism. For pragmaticism could hardly have entered a > head that was not already convinced that there are real generals" (CP > 5.503). > > > Well, whether that quotation proves useful or not, I think that it's > probably unlikely that this issue will be resolved in this thread, and that > it may be indeed be a good time for Gary F to commence posting material > from Lowell 2. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 1:48 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Edwina, List: >> >> Your response seems rather uncharitable; I honestly have neither the time >> nor the inclination to revisit the argument right now. >> >> That said, I offer my sincere thanks for clarifying how you distinguish >> reality and existence, as well as your careful limitation of "things" to >> the latter. I would simply question the notion that anything can exist >> while having no generality whatsoever. >> >> And we explicitly agreed a few months ago to use the term Sign to >> designate the triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate >> Interpretant. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon - that's a specious attempt to revisit this argument - i.e., your >>> saying that 'some people might not have heard this debate before'. Well, >>> tough, frankly it's not worth hearing about - and - I'm not going to >>> revisit it with you. >>> >>> I disagree that existence is a subset of reality, for that implies that >>> both have the same qualities. An existence/ entity can exist within only >>> the mode of Secondness and thus, have no generality in it, but reality >>> requires generality. I disagree that 'some THING' can be real yet not >>> exist'. If it's a 'thing' then it exists. Reality is Thirdness, or >>> generality and is not a thing. >>> >>> And we've been over your rejection of the Sign as a triad of >>> Object-Representamen-Interpretant and your confining of the term 'Sign' >>> to refer only to the mediate Representamen. Again, read 4.551 to its end. >>> >>> There is no positive point in continuing this discussion since it's been >>> done to exhaustion before. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Mon 16/10/17 1:02 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>> sent: >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not >>> interested in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some >>> following along now who were not on the List back then. >>> >>> Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality from >>> existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. Everything that >>> exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is >>> precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their >>> instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may >>> never be) actualized. >>> >>> Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. >>> If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the >>>> triad - and it's elsewhere as well. >>>> >>>> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad >>>> of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general >>>> when in a mode of Thirdness. >>>> >>>> But you know all of that anyway. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>> sent: >>>> >>>> Edwina, List: >>>> >>>> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you >>>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. >>>> >>>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every >>>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my >>>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Gary, list: >>>>> >>>>> I presume you are being sarcastic. >>>>> >>>>> I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this >>>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness????? My point, also posted frequently, >>>>> is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' >>>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space >>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I >>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of >>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often >>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. >>>>> >>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: >>>>> >>>>> Edwina, List, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your >>>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on >>>>> logical >>>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s >>>>> Lowell >>>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary >>>>> reasoning” >>>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m >>>>> ready >>>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to >>>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena >>>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most >>>>> complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his >>>>> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in >>>>> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, >>>>> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell >>>>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that >>>>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of >>>>> resolving >>>>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with >>>>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this >>>>> as >>>>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Gary f. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >>>>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 >>>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard >>>>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview >>>>> >>>>> Jeff, list >>>>> >>>>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >>>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical >>>>> world"....not >>>>> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there >>>>> cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot >>>>> be thought without Signs"...4.551 >>>>> >>>>> Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying >>>>> that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying >>>>> that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances >>>>> embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, >>>>> functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his >>>>> explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, >>>>> in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word >>>>> rather than a bacterium. >>>>> >>>>> Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can >>>>> be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the >>>>> true/false nature of their premises....and since the debate seems to be on >>>>> the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the >>>>> premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account >>>>> [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these >>>>> three forms of argument.. >>>>> >>>>> And I also agree with your other two points. >>>>> >>>>> I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar >>>>> outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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