Gary f, list:


Thank you for that posting.



I must assert though,



I am surprised that if A is true, B is true,

for I thought: if A were true, C would be a matter of course.



Does B and not C surprise you?



http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm



Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 9:36 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Continuing from Lowell 2.3,
>
> https://www.fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-
> manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-lowell-lecture-ii/display/13602:
>
>
>
> The most immediately useful information is that which is conveyed in
> conditional propositions, “*If* you find that this is true, *then* you
> may know that that is true.” Now in ordinary language the conditional form
> is employed to express a variety of relations between one possibility and
> another. Very frequently when we say “If A is true, then B is true,” we
> have in mind a whole range of possibilities, and we assert that among all
> possible cases, every one of those in which A is true will turn out to be a
> case in which B is true also. But in order to obtain a way of expressing
> that sort of conditional proposition, we must begin by getting a way of
> expressing a simpler kind, which does not often occur in ordinary speech
> but which has great importance in logic. The sort of conditional
> proposition I mean is one in which no range of possibilities is
> contemplated, which speaks only of the actual state of things. “If A is
> true then B is true,” in this sense is called a conditional proposition *de
> inesse*. In case A is not true, it makes no assertion at all and
> therefore involves no falsity. And since every proposition is either true
> or false, if the antecedent, A, is not true, the conditional *de inesse*
> is true, no matter how it may be with B. In case the consequent, B, is
> true, all that the conditional *de inesse* asserts is true, and therefore
> it is true, no matter how it may be with A. If however the antecedent, A,
> is true, while the consequent, B, is false, then, and then only is the
> conditional proposition *de inesse* false. This sort of conditional says
> nothing at all about any real connection between antecedent and consequent;
> but limits itself to saying “If you should find that A is true, then you
> may know that B is true,” never mind the why or wherefore.
>
>
>
> *http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm <http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm>* }{
> Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903
>
> https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-
> lowell-lecture-ii
>
>
>
>
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