Gary F., List: I am afraid that I continue to be baffled by your response. Peirce explicitly stated, more than once, that *all *Signs have Immediate Objects; i.e., something that *does not* have an Immediate Object *cannot *be a Sign at all. Anyone who claims otherwise is evidently using "Sign," "Immediate Object," or both in a way that is different from Peirce, which you said you feel obligated *not *to do. Adapting your example ...
- Person A wrote, "All animals have souls." - Person B says, a century later, "Only humans have souls." - You say, "Person A invented and defined the term 'soul,' so I feel obligated to make my usage of it conform to his as much as possible." - Person B says, "Person A's actual view was that only humans have souls." The burden of proof is now very much on Person B to demonstrate that what Person A explicitly stated was somehow not his actual view. You can still ask your question, "What is this thing you're calling a 'soul'?" and the repetitive responses are indeed still largely unhelpful, other than providing different boundaries for where you should be looking for souls. Nevertheless, you have already committed yourself to using Person A's terminology, and should proceed accordingly; whatever a "soul" is, according to Person A's own words, it is something that all animals have, not just humans. Likewise, whatever an "Immediate Object" is, according to Peirce's own words, it is something that all Signs have, not just propositions; or at least, that is how I see it right now. Furthermore, it would require only a single counterexample--a non-human animal that has a soul, or a non-Dicent Sign that has an Immediate Object--to refute Person B, and I believe that I have provided one with my analysis of the statue. Do you disagree? Regards, Jon S. On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 12:37 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, > > As I said before, I’m not interested in arguing for or against the > proposition that “all signs have immediate objects.” Moreover, I don’t see > that the “burden of proof” is on anybody engaged in that argument, because > it is a terminological issue that I don’t see as being provable or > refutable. > > I do have a problem with taking that proposition as *definitive* of the > term “immediate object.” Let me venture an analogy to explain why. > > Suppose somebody states the claim that “all animals have souls.” Somebody > else says “No, only humans have souls.” I say to both of them, “What is > this thing you’re calling a ‘soul’? Can you direct my attention to it > somehow?” One says, “It’s something that all animals have.” The other says > “It’s something that all humans have.” My reply to both is: “Sorry, you’ve > given me no information whatsoever, because you have to tell me or show me > what a ‘soul’ *is* before the statement you just made can *mean anything* > to me.” > > I too have been reading MS 318 lately. When I read something like that, I > am trying to direct my attention as precisely as possible to the dynamic > object(s) of that sign, which requires me to draw upon my collateral > experience of semiosis, my previous acquaintance with the language Peirce > is using, and the indexical function of the context of statements embedded > in that highly complex article. I’m trying to get a more well-grounded idea > of how signs work; and in trying to do that, I can’t help noticing how > Peirce’s usage of the word “sign” varies from text to text among his works. > > When I read Bellucci’s article, I’m trying to understand what Peirce is > talking about when he uses the term “immediate object.” In that context, he > says that “All signs have dynamic objects; but not all signs have a part > of themselves deputed to represent those objects, that is, not all signs > have an immediate object.” This is part of an explanation of what an > “immediate object” *is*; it is not a thesis Bellucci is attempting to > prove. > > I wish you well in your ongoing work to codify and systematize Peirce’s > terminology and sort out the more abstruse divisions of sign types, but for > me, that would be putting the cart before the horse. For you, if you find > it useful and informative to rely on the assumption that all “signs” have > “immediate objects”, then you should keep on doing that until the ground > gives way, as Peirce’s metaphor put it. I am certainly not arguing against > that assumption. I just have no use for it, myself. > > Gary f. > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > > *Sent:* 31-Jan-18 10:39 > *To:* Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immediate Objects and Phenomena (was Lowell > Lecture 3.14) > > > > Gary F., List: > > GF: This ["Immediate Object"] being a Peircean term, i.e. one invented > and defined by Peirce, I feel obligated to make my usage of it conform to > his as much as possible. > > It probably goes without saying by now that I agree wholeheartedly with > this. Consequently ... > > GF: Since then, your reply to Jon has made it clear that the proposition > “every sign has an immediate object” is actually part of your concept of > “immediate object” (not to mention your concept of “sign.”) > > ... your objection to this surprises me; the series of quotes that Gary R. > provided from the Commens Dictionary seems to indicate pretty conclusively > that the proposition "every sign has an Immediate Object" was actually part > of *Peirce's *concept of "Immediate Object" (not to mention his concept > of "Sign"). Here is another that I came across yesterday. > > CSP: In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional > interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are "subjective"; > both, too, appertain to all signs without exception. (EP 2:410; 1907) > > Of course, the debate about Peirce's fluid terminology for the various > Interpretants is longstanding and inconclusive, but in this particular case > I lean toward the "emotional interpretant" as designating the Immediate > Interpretant, the range of *possible* effects that the Sign *may *produce. > As I see it, the reason why the Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant > "appertain to all Signs without exception" is that they are *internal *to > the Sign; something that lacks one or the other *cannot *be a Sign at > all. This is why Edwina and I were able to agree a while back on treating > the Sign itself as a *triad *of Immediate Object, Representamen, and > Immediate Interpretant, which is in an irreducibly triadic *relation *with > the real Dynamic Object that determines it and the Dynamic Interpretant(s) > that it determines as the *actual *effect(s) that it *does *produce. > > Hence the burden of proof is still very much on Bellucci, or anyone else > who claims that Peirce attributed Immediate Objects *only *to > propositions (or Dicisigns). So far, I remain unconvinced. In Peirce's > example of a statue (per my last post), as a Descriptive Potisign > (Qualisign)--i.e., apart from its embodiment as a Sinsign--its Immediate > Object is the vague mix of qualities that constitute "some common > soldier." Of course, when a person with the appropriate collateral > experience actually looks at it and readily identifies what it represents > on the basis of those qualities, then the resulting perceptual > judgment--"that is a common solider"--*is *a proposition, just like when > Gary R. identifies as a vase the peculiar shape that he sees upon opening > his eyes. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Tue, Jan 30, 2018 at 9:59 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > > Gary R, Jon, Jeff, list, > > I hesitate to post again in this thread because it has taken a polemical > turn that I didn’t anticipate and don’t want to follow. But the last > sentence of Gary’s post below renews my hope that our concepts of an > “immediate object” and of a “sign” can still be clarified. Gary speaks for > me when he says “Perhaps I'll discover that I have myself completely > misunderstood Peirce's semeiotic terminology.” > > I’ve been using the term “immediate object” for years, including a dozen > times or so in my book, which means that I *have a concept* of “immediate > object,” which enables me to recognize one when I see it and constitutes > the reason why I would call some specific object an *immediate* object. > This being a Peircean term, i.e. one invented and defined by Peirce, I feel > obligated to make my usage of it conform to his as much as possible. Recent > events have forced me to question how well my usage has actually conformed > to Peirce’s, and I was hoping that some dialogue on the Peirce list about > our various concepts of it might further that inquiry (and might encourage > others to take a closer look at Peirce’s concept in relation to their own). > > What provoked this inquiry for me was re-reading the Bellucci 2015 > article, and especially the concrete example he quotes from Peirce’s letter > to James. Here it is again: > > [[ For instance, suppose I awake in the morning before my wife, and that > afterwards she wakes up and inquires, “What sort of a day is it?” *This* > is a sign, whose Object, as expressed, is the weather at that time, but > whose Dynamical Object is the *impression which I have presumably derived > from peeping between the window-curtains.* … I reply, let us suppose: “It > is a stormy day.” Here is another sign. Its *Immediate Object* is the > notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and > mine,— not the *character* of it, but the *identity* of it. ]] > > Peirce specifies two “signs” here, and distinguishes between two Objects > of each sign. The first sign is the wife *inquiring* “What sort of a day > is it?”. It is important to notice (though it may be obvious) that the > “sign” does not consist merely of the spoken words between those quotation > marks, because, for one thing, “the common stock of knowledge of utterer > and interpreter, called to mind by the words, is a part of the sign” > (EP2:310). Also, the “Object as expressed” — which I take to be the > *immediate* object — is also part of the sign (according to Peirce’s > definition). Possibly these two “parts” overlap, but neither is to be found > between the quotation marks surrounding the spoken utterance. This tells us > something about what it means for an immediate object to be “part of the > sign,” which is essential to the distinction between the two kinds of > Object. > > Another key distinction is between the two entities which are said to be > “immediate,” the object and the interpretant. For the second “sign” > specified by Peirce (his reply to his wife’s question), he tells us that its > “*Immediate Object* is the notion of the present weather so far as this > is common to her mind and mine,— not the *character* of it, but the > *identity* of it.” The point here is that a sign’s *object*, whether > dynamic or immediate, is what the sign directs our attention to. It is not > what kind of thing we recognize that thing to be, nor is it any quality or > attribute which we assign to that particular thing. This is the basis of > the difference between an immediate *object* and an immediate > *interpretant*. The immediate *interpretant* of Peirce’s utterance to his > wife would certainly be informed by the word “stormy,” which specifies the > “character” of the “notion of the present weather.” The immediate *object*, > on the other hand, is the *identity* of that notion. It’s the place we > look in conceptual space to locate what we’re talking about when we talk > about “the weather” of the present moment. > > Now, this is not a *complete* analysis of Peirce’s concrete example of a > sign with an immediate object, but it’s my way of trying to determine where > to look in conceptual space to locate what we’re talking about when we talk > about “immediate objects.” That’s what I refer to as my “concept” of > “immediate object,” and the same goes for “sign” and all those semiotic > terms. > > When I read your thought-experiments, Gary, I found it difficult to apply > this kind of analysis to them, because you didn’t clearly specify which > details of the scenario you were identifying as “immediate objects” or as > “signs.” I had the same questions in mind that Jon posted about your > examples, but instead of posting them as Jon did, I tried to infer your > concept of “immediate object” from what you wrote. Since then, your reply > to Jon has made it clear that the proposition “every sign has an immediate > object” is actually *part of your concept* of “immediate object” (not to > mention your concept of “sign.”) You appear to be treating that proposition > as axiomatic in your attempt to give concrete examples of signs with > immediate objects. I’m referring here to this sentence: > > GR: Though there are no "pure qualities of feeling" (although sign #1 > in the 10 classes is a qualisign: Peirce gives the example, "Red"), however > these are involved in an experience of "Red" or "Hot" (red apple, hot > pepper), *however* they may require another or several more developed > sign for their expression, that is, how the must *necessarily by their > nature be involved in other classes of signs*, are they not yet signs > (and all signs will have Immediate Object)? > > The problem I have with this is that if “all signs will have Immediate > Object” is an intrinsic part of the concept, or the definition, of > “Immediate Object,” then whatever you call a “sign,” you will expect to > find (and probably *will* find) some part of that “sign,” or something > associated with it, that you will call its “Immediate Object.” But you > can’t argue for the truth of a proposition by assuming that very > proposition as an axiom. For my part, I’m not that interested in arguing > for or against the truth of that proposition, but I do think that the > *meaning* of that proposition depends its applying a concept of > “immediate object” which is determined independently of the proposition > itself. For me, the concept is (or should be) determined by Peirce’s > definitions and concrete examples of “immediate objects.” > > That concept is the subject of Bellucci’s paper, which compares it with a > Fregean concept and investigates Peirce’s reasons for making a distinction > between the two kinds of objects. This is what has caused me to rethink my > own usage of the term, and to check in with others by posting about it > here. I need that concept clarified — *and* the concept of “sign” too — > *before* I can make any exact sense of the proposition that “every sign > has an immediate object.” And I definitely want to make some sense of it > before arguing over whether it’s true or not. > > Gary f. > >
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