Gary R., List: Okay, I think that we are making some progress. The actual vase is the Dynamic Object (DO), and your initial thoughts about it are a series of Signs. Nevertheless, how you proceed to talk about the Immediate Object (IO) remains problematic for me.
- You say at first that the DO *becomes *an IO, which seems wrong; but then you say that the DO *determines *the IO, which seems right. - You say that the IO *involves *Qualisigns, but that strikes me as a category error. In my understanding, the IO *itself *cannot be a Sign or "involve" Signs, because by definition it is *part of* a Sign. Hence those Qualisigns that you experience are *already *Signs that have the actual vase's shape(s), color(s), texture(s), size, etc. as their IOs; or alternatively, what you experience is a single Qualisign--the percept, perhaps?--which has the actual vase's particular *mix *of qualities as its IO. - You say that your subjective experience of these various qualities initiates a selection of them that will become the IO as the "grounds" of the Rheme that corresponds to your recognition, "vase." You are right that we still part ways here; I do not see how *making the connection* between what you are seeing and your *collateral knowledge* of the common noun, "vase," could be anything other than *formulating the proposition*--the perceptual judgment--"this is a vase." Again, if you keep your eyes closed and *imagine *a vase--either a generic one, or a particular one that you *remember *seeing in the past--then *that *thought-Sign would certainly be a Rheme, in my view. As for the statue, I see no way around the fact that Peirce himself explicitly classified it as a Descriptive Potisign (Qualisign). Are you taking the position that he was simply incorrect about this? I wholeheartedly agree that we should "always enter into a discussion such as this with the ... good faith hope that we will better understand each other and the subject of our discussion." Hopefully we are on our way toward such an outcome. Again, best wishes for your surgery tomorrow. Regards, Jon S. On Thu, Feb 1, 2018 at 12:18 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, list, > > You wrote: "I am still having trouble matching up Signs with Immediate > Objects in your thought experiment. Are we talking about ..." > > * "vase" as a common noun, or "this vase" as a particular thing > > I am talking about "this vase" as a particular thing, ,a dynamic object, > which becomes an immediate object for me as the subjective sign is > determined by that dynamic object, "this vase." But Peirce also speaks of > something possibly being "the sign of a sign" (in his discussion of > potisigns, famisigns, etc.), and this may be the root cause of our--or at > least, my--confusion. For in one sense the vase (or the statue of the > soldier) is itself a sign, and my subjective sign is a different sign. > > JS: * the vase itself as the Sign, or as the Dynamic Object of your > thought-Signs about it? > > In my view, at first the subjective immediate object mainly involves > qualisigns, viz., the shape(s), color(s), texture(s), size, etc. which I > experience. These initiate the "grounds" of my sign, a selection of > characters, etc. which will become my immediate object (a representation of > some *Ding an sich* not even being possible); *then* my thought, as a > complex of memories, brings that ground into a recognition, 'vase'. Almost > immediately (in the ordinary temporal sense of the word), but not > simultaneously, rather in a triadic moment I will assert "this is a vase" > or hypothesize "is this a vase?" I have the strong sense that you will not > agree with me and, rather, hold that my saying "vase" to myself represents > a dicisign, rather than a memorial recognition (a kind of remembrance). > > JS: * the vase as (initially) unidentified object, or as (eventually) > recognized to be a vase? > > Again, initially there are only qualisigns (of course I grant you that > they are embodied in sinsigns since there are no pure qualisigns; indeed, > Joe Ransdell used to argue, citing Peirce sources, that there are not even > any pure icons, that one should rather speak of 'icon*ic*' signs). But > then,* in a flash* so to speak, there comes (from my associative > memories) the rhematic apprehension, 'vase', which will *then*--in > another 'flash'--be asserted or questioned. This is how I see lived thought > flowing in the present context. > > You wrote: JS: I am unclear on exactly what Peirce meant by "subjective" > in EP 2:410, especially since he himself put that word in quotation marks. > As for "locating" the Immediate Object, it has to be "within the Sign," but > I agree that further reflection on what this means is warranted. In my > example, does that place it within the statue itself, or within the > thought-Signs of an observer? I emphasized the statue's "Qualisignic" > aspects because Peirce explicitly classified it as a Descriptive Potisign > (Qualisign), and I was trying to figure out why. > > Subjective: In quotation marks or not, it is my understanding that the > immediate object in a person's vital semiosis will be *his*, will be > 'subjective' in that ordinary sense. The statue or vase may itself be a > sign, and I cannot say that I quite fully comprehend what Peirce is > entailed in "a sign of a sign." > > Location of the immediate object: As I see it, even if one sees the the > statue as itself a sign, for me, as it concerns my "subjective" sign, the > statue is the dynamic object. It is, as you wrote, "within the > thought-Signs of an observer," and no two subjective immediate objects will > be exactly the same (e.g., if there are several observers at a give time, > they will all be standing in slightly different locations, have different > memories to draw on, have different immediate objects in their semioses). > > The statue as qualisign: What Peirce writes is: "That statue is one piece > of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is what we call a "General" sign, > meaning that it is *applicable *to many singulars. It is not *itself *General: > it is its Object which is taken to be General. And yet this Object is not > truly Universal, in the sense of implying a truth of the kind of "Any S is > P"; it only expresses "Some S is P." This makes it *not *a // > *Copulant/Copulative*// but only a *Descriptive*. > > So the stature is a "General sign" but not itself general, rather > "applicable to many singulars." ". . .it is its Object which is taken to be > General" but not Universal. It is "only a Descriptive." 'Descriptives', > Peirce says, "determine their Objects by stating the characters of the > latter." > > So, as I see it, while potisigns (qualsigns) are necessarily involved, in > no way can the statue be understood to be essentially a qualisign. That > makes no sense at all to me. For a subjective sign involves all the > associations and meanings and feelings of those who have known fallen > soldiers. > > Well, I don't know if any of that helped clarify how I'm seeing things, > but I hope so. On the other hand, in certain matters (e.g., "the sign of a > sign") I remain confused and uncertain. And for me the terminology remains > a morass which I due soon to leave to others to try to sort out. > > Still, I think both you and I, Jon, always enter into a discussion such as > this with the, shall I say, good faith hope that we will better understand > each other and the subject of our discussion. > > But now I really must stop writing! I've rescheduled my dental appointment > for this afternoon and have much to do in preparation for my operation > tomorrow! > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 11:33 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Gary R., List: >> >> I appreciate you taking another stab at this. I think that you are >> exactly right about my bent toward abstract analysis being very different >> from your much more concrete, experiential approach. Perhaps for that very >> reason, I am still having trouble matching up Signs with Immediate Objects >> in your thought experiment. Are we talking about ... >> >> - "vase" as a common noun, or "this vase" as a particular thing? >> - the vase itself as the Sign, or as the Dynamic Object of your >> thought-Signs about it? >> - the vase as (initially) unidentified object, or as (eventually) >> recognized to be a vase? >> >> I am unclear on exactly what Peirce meant by "subjective" in EP 2:410, >> especially since he himself put that word in quotation marks. As for >> "locating" the Immediate Object, it has to be "within the Sign," but I >> agree that further reflection on what this means is warranted. In my >> example, does that place it within the statue itself, or within the >> thought-Signs of an observer? I emphasized the statue's "Qualisignic" >> aspects because Peirce explicitly classified it as a Descriptive Potisign >> (Qualisign), and I was trying to figure out why. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Wed, Jan 31, 2018 at 6:09 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, list, >>> >>> Thanks for your good wishes regarding my cataract surgery. As I noted >>> earlier, I've pretty much run out of time before the Friday surgery and >>> wanted to respond not only to you and Gary f, which I was able to do a few >>> times recently, but I also wanted to respond to Jeff as I hadn't had that >>> opportunity until today. So that's why I haven't been able, until now, to >>> respond to your most recent post. I had to cancel a dental appt. today, >>> which gave me a little more unexpected time to comment. >>> >>> You wrote: "My main request was to identify the Signs that correspond >>> to the Immediate Objects that you posited. My understanding of the triadic >>> nature of semiosis is such that something *cannot *be an Immediate >>> Object unless it serves as such *within *a particular Sign." >>> >>> >>> To which I'd add that Peirce holds that both the immediate object and >>> the emotional interpretant are "*subjective*." >>> >>> "In point of fact, we do find that the immediate object and emotional >>> interpretant correspond, both being apprehensions, or are "subjective"; >>> both, too, appertain to all signs without exception." (EP 2:410; 1907) >>> >>> >>> JS: "Socrates" and "vase" are indeed both Rhemes, but taking Bellucci's >>> clue as I have applied it to the statue, their Immediate Objects as used in >>> these examples correspond to different quantifications--"Socrates" is >>> singular (Designative), while "vase" is general (Collective). >>> >>> GR: Firstly, I see no reason to take "Bellucci's clue," and there is >>> much else I do not agree with in his interpretation. Secondly, you seem to >>> leap to a wholly abstract way of analyzing *my* semiosic experience so >>> that for you my 'vase' cannot be 'this vase' that I perceive and make an >>> immediate object in my inner semiosis. It may be the case that at the >>> moment of recognition of the vase *qua* vase that I unconsciously (via >>> memory) take it to be an example of that Collective (general) 'vase'despite >>> its bizarre shape, but it is *this* vase that is the dynamic object of my >>> subjective immediate object. >>> >>> JS: Furthermore, I still maintain that when the Athenian says "Socrates" >>> to himself, what he is *really *saying to himself is "that is >>> Socrates"; i.e., he is making a perceptual judgment, either presenting (as >>> hypothesis) or asserting (as fact) a proposition. It seems to me that only >>> the vague thought of (absent) Socrates as generated by the imagination >>> could be a true Rheme. >>> >>> GR: And I continue to disagree with you. Again, you seem to me to leap >>> to *assertions* and *propositions* which, as I see it in the case of >>> the example of the Athenian, would happen *de post facto*. I don't at >>> all see why you find this logicizing essential and necessary to an >>> individual's subjective semiosis. Closely connected to this, at times it >>> seems to me almost as if you don't truly accept that there are real signs >>> with immediate objects lower in the classification (although you've stated >>> that you agree with all those quotes I gave where Peirce says or infers >>> that all signs must have immediate object, even in order to be a sign, and >>> analyze the Soldier Statue example *as* a Qualisign). Your example of >>> "the vague thought of (absent) Socrates" almost confirms this for me. In >>> short, what you're doing seems to me logical analysis after the fact of the >>> subjective "experience" of the sign, rather ignoring EP2:410 above. So, >>> perhaps we both need to further reflect on what Peirce means by saying that >>> the immediate object is *within the sign* (rather than without, as the >>> dynamic object is). >>> >>> GR: As I've already written more than I intended, I'll only briefly >>> comment within your comments on the Common Soldier statue, relating it to >>> my vase example where possible. You wrote: >>> >>> JS: As I noted previously, Peirce gave the somewhat surprising example >>> of a statue of a common soldier in a town square as a Descriptive Potisign >>> (Qualisign). Here is what he said about it. >>> >>> CSP: ... in the middle of this will be a stone statue, often of >>> granite, representing a common soldier standing in his regulation overcoat >>> and resting on his grounded musket. Nothing imaginable could be more devoid >>> of imagination, less idealized, less artistically beautiful. They are >>> eyesores to all cultivated people; but not to me. For I know that that >>> means that almost every family in that place,—vulgar people. . . The very >>> fact of their vulgarity, which the statue proclaims above all else, makes >>> this universal self-sacrifice on the altar of the abstraction which we call >>> the "general government" pathetically sublime. To each such family, that >>> very realistic statue represents the mourned one who fell in the war. That >>> statue is one piece of granite, and not a Famisign. Yet it is what we call >>> a "General" sign, meaning that it is *applicable *to many singulars. It >>> is not *itself *General: it is its Object which is taken to be General. >>> And yet this Object is not truly Universal, in the sense of implying a >>> truth of the kind of "Any S is P"; it only expresses "Some S is P." This >>> makes it *not *a //*Copulant/Copulative*// but only a *Descriptive*. >>> This needs to be borne in mind. (EP 2:486; 1908) >>> >>> >>> JS: The Dynamic Object of the statue is *general **[it is general >>> because it is "representing a common soldier," whereas my vase in the >>> unfamiliar room is a particular vase GR]* presumably the collection (or >>> continuum?) of soldiers who fell in the Civil War* [but my vase doesn't >>> represent vases in general, but is a unique example of one (and peculiar in >>> its shape, etc. in my example), recognized by me (through my memory, etc.) >>> as a vase (and that's the sum of the generality in it]*; so the Sign *[the >>> statue, its DO representing something common, and *not* a unique DO as in >>> the case of my vase]* is a Collective (he introduced this term later). >>> However, its Immediate Object is *vague **[where, btw, do you *locate* >>> this immediate object? Subjectively in that someone is observing it? If >>> not, where? ]*, so the Sign is a Descriptive *[my immediate object is >>> *not* vague, but is of *this* unique and peculiar vase--which, btw, may >>> turn out *not* to be a vase at all, but a piece of sculpture]*; Peirce >>> even said that it expresses a *particular *proposition (not a >>> *universal *one) *[and I maintain that my vase expresses no proposition >>> whatsoever, although you disagree]*, consistent with Bellucci's >>> hypothesis *[this statue is *loaded* with meaning; my vase is not]*. >>> But this entails that the statue, as a Sign, *must *be a Qualisign *[do >>> you mean that it involves a Qualisign? It seems to me that what is >>> Qualisignific here would entail not one, but several Qualisigns]*, and >>> thus an Icon and a Rheme; as such, it *cannot *be a proposition. Yet >>> obviously it is *embodied *as a Sinsign, as all Qualisigns (and >>> Legisigns) *must *be, and a Sinsign *can *be a Dicisign. Does the >>> statue, as an embodied Qualisign, turn out to be a Dicent Sinsign of a >>> peculiar kind? If so, what are S and P in the particular proposition that >>> it expresses? *[I don't see at all why you are emphasizing what is >>> Qualisignic about it.]* >>> >>> While it's kind of 'fun', I can't say that I find this kind of meta- on >>> top of meta-analysis, heavy with problematic terminology, very helpful. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R >>> >>> [image: Gary Richmond] >>> >>> *Gary Richmond* >>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>> *Communication Studies* >>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* >>> >>
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