Jon, Edwina, list, I think I'm going to drop out of the discussion as well principally, because as I wrote before my eye operations, I've already begun to move in different directions this year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading Peirce's late Pragmatism piece (1907) which I am currently rereading as well. I hope we can get a fruitful discussion going sometime soon on that extraordinary, late piece (the last before the Neglected Argument in EP2). There is so much in it of interest generally and, I think, of potential relevance to the current discussion, that in the light of "Pragmatism" it might be posaible to return to it with new understanding and fresh insights.
I'm beginning to think--and especially in light of this discussion--that some of the issues discussed in this thread (and not just the terminological) really *are* as difficult as they seem. So I, for one, have found the recent discussion stimulating also* because* it reminds me that there is much in Peirce's semeiotic which, while initially seeming clear enough (or even 'obvious') turns out, upon reflective discussion, not to be at all. I think that that aspects of both of your approaches have some validity, while I personally haven't been able to agree with either of you on certain key points. In a sense I keep flipping back and forth between your very different interpretations. But, I think that this difficulty in interpretation may be in the "nature of the beast" and, again, I think the effort has been most worthwhile, stimulating and valuable in many ways. What has been somewhat unexpected is the way that at times you, Edwina and Jon, seem to get closer to agreement on some points (and I can join you in that agreement) and then a post or two later find yourself at odds again on what seemed like a kind of "breakthrough" in mutual understanding on that self-same point. Then I feel lost again myself. . . I disagree with Jerry C that your analysis is particularly 'linear', Jon; or, if it is, so is Peirce's. So will be anyone's to some extent. That is, I think that any such analysis will at least quasi-necessarily--because of the nature of language--at times *appear* linear, while I think that both you and Edwina have made it abundantly clear, albeit in your different ways, that the one thing you do clearly agree on is the *essentially *triadic nature of semiosis (and *that* is surely *not* linear). So, again--and this time I mean it!--I'll say farewell to this particular discussion for now to return to "Pragmatism" (1907, EP2: 398-433). And, in preparation for Lowell 4, read some Bellucci to see if I can make more sense of it in the light of Stjernfelt's work and Gary f's and Jeff's analyses, also very intriguing. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Edwina: > > I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because otherwise > I fear that it is going to get contentious. You keep pressing me on where > to "locate" collateral experience and habits of interpretation, when the > whole point of this thread is that I am trying to figure out exactly > that--I do not have a firm opinion yet. Nevertheless, I continue to find > your very definitive answer unpersuasive, since it directly contradicts my > understanding of how Peirce explicitly defined the Representamen. > > On my reading of Peirce, all propositions are Symbols (although Dicisigns > need not be), and every Symbol has a Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, and > Representamen that is *general*--i.e., Symbols can *only *be Collective > Copulative Legisigns (Types), as EP 2:481 and EP 2:484-489 (1908) make > abundantly clear. Furthermore, in his late writings Peirce associated form > (qualities/characters) with 1ns, matter (subjects/objects) with 2ns, and > entelechy (signs/thought) with 3ns; e.g., NEM 4:292-300 (c.1903?), EP > 2:304 (1904), CP 6.338-344 (1909). > > Perhaps you and Gary R. can carry on from here and have a fruitful > discussion. Enjoy the sponge cake! :-) > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic process. >> How does the single semiosic action contact the habits? >> >> And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation' of >> the external stimuli. I consider that this action of representation >> belongs to the Interpretant. >> >> You haven't defined WHERE in the semiosic process the contact with the >> 'memories and habits' takes place. I consider that such contact is the >> function of the Representamen, which mediates, by this contact, with the >> incoming sensate data of the DO...and interprets it into the Interpretant. >> >> I also disagree that the DI 'cannot be a cognitive proposition since that >> is a Symbol'. I disagree that all cognition takes place as 'symbolic'. >> After all, as Peirce said - Mind does not involve consciousness and takes >> place within crystals. Do you consider that the habits of >> chemcial formation which develop a crystal from various >> chemcial...understanding the crystals' development as the >> Dynamic Interpretant of the chemicals...do you consider that this action is >> SYMBOLIC? >> >> I also disagree that a symbolic interpretation requires a general DO. If >> I hear that loud sound..and finally think/say: That loud sound was the oak >> tree falling...that DI [which itself is a full triad] is a SYMBOLIC >> articulation of the physical event. Nothing general about that Dynamic >> Object; it was the single tree falling in a local, particular place. >> >> Again - Form is not in a mode of Firstness, since Form is MIND - and Mind >> is an action of Thirdness. >> >> And now - must go and bake a sponge cake....I'll check in later. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Mon 05/02/18 9:59 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> As anticipated, I cannot agree with this analysis, since I understand the >> Representamen to be limited to whatever stands for (i.e., represents) >> the loud sound in the human's mind. The Representamen does not itself >> include >> the person's memories and habits; instead, the latter are what enable >> him/her to recognize the sensate data as the result of a tree falling >> (IO), and then infer that it corresponds in this case to a particular tree >> falling (DI). Another complication is that if the (singular) loud sound is >> the DO (Concretive), then the DI cannot be a cognitive proposition, since >> that is a Symbol, which can only have a general DO (Collective); so this is >> another sense in which I concede that 3ns must come into play somehow. >> >> In the bird example, I see the Rhematic Indexical Sinsign as the single >> semiosic event that includes the loud sound (Dynamic Object) and the >> bird's response of flight (Dynamic Interpretant). Again, I agree that the >> bird's habits play a role in the process, somewhere between those two >> stages. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon, Gary R, list: >>> >>> OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different: >>> >>> DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I don't >>> know that. >>> >>> IO: my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it >>> differently than my cat or dog or children or... >>> >>> R: the Representamen consists of both my physiological and cognitive >>> MEMORIES. Some are innate [the neurological; some are learned]. This >>> Representamen accepts the sensate data from the IO and, according to its >>> full knowledge base....interprets that data. >>> >>> II: this is my internal interpretation. It's 'honed and constrained and >>> organized by the combined memories of the Representamen...and I become >>> conscious of an external disturbance. ..ie.. I become aware that it is not >>> a dream; that it is existent and that it is outside of me and that..it >>> might be familiar... >>> >>> DI: I am articulate, conscious that this external force is outside of >>> me, is existent and is, since I've heard these noises before..the sound of >>> a tree falling and dredging up more of my memories from the >>> Representamen...I decide.."It's that old oak tree'. >>> >>> Now - the only difference between the bird and the human - is the >>> Representamen is more powerful in its stock of habits; and thus, sets up a >>> cognitive rather than physical reaction. The bird's DI is to flee. >>> The human will come up with a conceptual interpretant... >>> >>> Again - I emphasize the necessity of the semiosic action including the >>> action of habits. Jon's outline doesn't seem to include this and I don't >>> understand how any Interpretation can take place, except an almost purely >>> mechanical one, that doesn't include this force. >>> >>> Certainly, the classes of signs that do NOT include Thirdness >>> [habit-taking] DO exist, but only as a short-term event...and even they, >>> are 'nestled' within the body of something that DOES function within >>> habits.... >>> >>> That is - Jon's suggestion that the bird-event is a rhematic indexical >>> sinsign only refers to the single event of the loud sound. This is, as Gary >>> R explains, the focus on the EXTERNAL. But - when we add in the RESULT, >>> the bird's flight - we must include the neurological habits of the bird, >>> which are: 'run from danger' - and so, the Interpretant is: flight. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Mon 05/02/18 8:33 AM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent: >>> >>> Jon, Gary R - I thought Gary R's quotes were excellent, pointing out the >>> necessity for memory/habits and their function in semiosis. What carries >>> out this function of habit? The Representamen. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Sun 04/02/18 10:31 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>> sent: >>> >>> Gary R., List: >>> >>> Welcome back! I hope that your recovery is going well, and that you >>> will soon be able to elaborate on these selectively highlighted quotes, >>> because frankly I am having trouble seeing how they bear on our current >>> non-human, non-cognitive example. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Edwina, Jon S, list, >>>> >>>> At the moment I would tend to agree more with Edwina's interpretation >>>> than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the problem, feel the tension in >>>> this matter. I'm not quite yet up to arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer >>>> a few quotes hints towards a direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis >>>> added by me in all cases). >>>> >>>> 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23 >>>> >>>> … we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable whether to our >>>> outward senses or to our inward feeling and imagination, provided only it >>>> calls up some feeling, effort, or thought… >>>> >>>> >>>> 1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38 >>>> >>>> A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes its >>>> interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign. [—] [A] >>>> sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing else but that >>>> thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back toward the object, the >>>> other forward toward the interpretant, in this case collapse into an >>>> immediate present. The type of a sign is memory, which takes up the >>>> deliverance of past memory and delivers a portion of it to future memory. >>>> >>>> >>>> 1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228 >>>> >>>> A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for >>>> something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, >>>> creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more >>>> developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of >>>> the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands >>>> for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, >>>> which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. “Idea” >>>> is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense , very familiar >>>> in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which we say that one man catches >>>> another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man recalls what he was >>>> thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same idea, and in which >>>> when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so >>>> far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that time, that is >>>> to have a like content, it is the same idea, and is not at each >>>> instant of the interval a new idea. >>>> >>>> >>>> 1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6 >>>> >>>> … a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or sign. >>>> So that it appears that every species of actual cognition is of the >>>> nature of a sign. [—] >>>> >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R >>>> >>>> [image: Blocked image] >>>> >>>> Gary Richmond >>>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>>> Communication Studies >>>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>>> 718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690> >>>> >>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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