Helmut - No, I consider that the bird's perception of the loud sound
is NOT the representamen. The bird has several means of 'perception'.
IO: the Immediate Object is a first sensual perception of an
external existentiality; the bird's senses absorb the sound
II - the Immediate Interpretant is the bird's neurological and
knowledge based interpretation of this loud sound; It's an external
'thing'
DI- the Dynamic Interpretant is the bird's articulation of the II:
'I should flee this external thing'.
The Representamen is the mediation between the IO and the II/DI. The
Representamen is the site of the information held by the neurological
nature of the bird and the information from its life-experience. This
stored information mediates the sound....and 'thinks' about it..and
comes up with the conclusion that 'this sound is something to run
away from'.
Think of the semiosic triad as a syllogism.
The Objects can be understood as the Minor Premise, i.e., the
individual situation.
The Major Premise - the 'universal or general rules' - can be
understood as the Representamen
the Conclusion - can be understood as the Interpretant[s].
Edwina
On Mon 05/02/18 2:16 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, I wonder if this might be agreeable to all
of you: The loud sound itself is not the representamen. The bird´s
perception of the loud sound is. This has to do with memory: If the
bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to instinct, due to neural
structure, or due to having learned) that a loud sound means
something, it would not perceive it. Best, Helmut 05. Februar
2018 um 19:43 Uhr
Von: "Gary Richmond"
Jon, Edwina, list, I think I'm going to drop out of the
discussion as well principally, because as I wrote before my eye
operations, I've already begun to move in different directions this
year. I noted, Jon that you'll be reading Peirce's late Pragmatism
piece (1907) which I am currently rereading as well. I hope we can
get a fruitful discussion going sometime soon on that extraordinary,
late piece (the last before the Neglected Argument in EP2). There is
so much in it of interest generally and, I think, of potential
relevance to the current discussion, that in the light of
"Pragmatism" it might be posaible to return to it with new
understanding and fresh insights. I'm beginning to think--and
especially in light of this discussion--that some of the issues
discussed in this thread (and not just the terminological) really are
as difficult as they seem. So I, for one, have found the recent
discussion stimulating also because it reminds me that there is much
in Peirce's semeiotic which, while initially seeming clear enough (or
even 'obvious') turns out, upon reflective discussion, not to be at
all. I think that that aspects of both of your approaches have some
validity, while I personally haven't been able to agree with either of
you on certain key points. In a sense I keep flipping back and forth
between your very different interpretations. But, I think that this
difficulty in interpretation may be in the "nature of the beast" and,
again, I think the effort has been most worthwhile, stimulating and
valuable in many ways. What has been somewhat unexpected is the way
that at times you, Edwina and Jon, seem to get closer to agreement on
some points (and I can join you in that agreement) and then a post or
two later find yourself at odds again on what seemed like a kind of
"breakthrough" in mutual understanding on that self-same point. Then
I feel lost again myself. . . I disagree with Jerry C that your
analysis is particularly 'linear', Jon; or, if it is, so is Peirce's.
So will be anyone's to some extent. That is, I think that any such
analysis will at least quasi-necessarily--because of the nature of
language--at times appear linear, while I think that both you and
Edwina have made it abundantly clear, albeit in your different ways,
that the one thing you do clearly agree on is the essentially triadic
nature of semiosis (and that is surely not linear). So, again--and
this time I mean it!--I'll say farewell to this particular discussion
for now to return to "Pragmatism" (1907, EP2: 398-433). And, in
preparation for Lowell 4, read some Bellucci to see if I can make
more sense of it in the light of Stjernfelt's work and Gary f's and
Jeff's analyses, also very intriguing. Best, Gary R
Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690
On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Edwina:
I am probably going to bow out of this conversation now, because
otherwise I fear that it is going to get contentious. You keep
pressing me on where to "locate" collateral experience and habits of
interpretation, when the whole point of this thread is that I am
trying to figure out exactly that--I do not have a firm opinion yet.
Nevertheless, I continue to find your very definitive answer
unpersuasive, since it directly contradicts my understanding of how
Peirce explicitly defined the Representamen. On my reading of
Peirce, all propositions are Symbols (although Dicisigns need not
be), and every Symbol has a Dynamic Object, Immediate Object, and
Representamen that is general--i.e., Symbols can only be Collective
Copulative Legisigns (Types), as EP 2:481 and EP 2:484-489 (1908)
make abundantly clear. Furthermore, in his late writings Peirce
associated form (qualities/characters) with 1ns, matter
(subjects/objects) with 2ns, and entelechy (signs/thought) with 3ns;
e.g., NEM 4:292-300 (c.1903?), EP 2:304 (1904), CP 6.338-344
(1909). Perhaps you and Gary R. can carry on from here and have a
fruitful discussion. Enjoy the sponge cake! :-) Regards, Jon S.
On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 9:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Jon - but you still haven't brought the habits into the semiosic
process. How does the single semiosic action contact the habits?
And you reduce the Representamen to merely being a 'representation'
of the external stimuli. I consider that this action of
representation belongs to the Interpretant.
You haven't defined WHERE in the semiosic process the contact with
the 'memories and habits' takes place. I consider that such contact
is the function of the Representamen, which mediates, by this
contact, with the incoming sensate data of the DO...and interprets
it into the Interpretant.
I also disagree that the DI 'cannot be a cognitive proposition since
that is a Symbol'. I disagree that all cognition takes place as
'symbolic'. After all, as Peirce said - Mind does not involve
consciousness and takes place within crystals. Do you consider that
the habits of chemcial formation which develop a crystal from various
chemcial...understanding the crystals' development as the Dynamic
Interpretant of the chemicals...do you consider that this action is
SYMBOLIC?
I also disagree that a symbolic interpretation requires a general
DO. If I hear that loud sound..and finally think/say: That loud sound
was the oak tree falling...that DI [which itself is a full triad] is a
SYMBOLIC articulation of the physical event. Nothing general about
that Dynamic Object; it was the single tree falling in a local,
particular place.
Again - Form is not in a mode of Firstness, since Form is MIND - and
Mind is an action of Thirdness.
And now - must go and bake a sponge cake....I'll check in later.
Edwina
On Mon 05/02/18 9:59 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[3] sent: Edwina, List: As anticipated, I cannot agree with this
analysis, since I understand the Representamen to be limited to
whatever stands for (i.e., represents) the loud sound in the human's
mind. The Representamen does not itself include the person's
memories and habits; instead, the latter are what enable him/her to
recognize the sensate data as the result of a tree falling (IO), and
then infer that it corresponds in this case to a particular tree
falling (DI). Another complication is that if the (singular) loud
sound is the DO (Concretive), then the DI cannot be a cognitive
proposition, since that is a Symbol, which can only have a general DO
(Collective); so this is another sense in which I concede that 3ns
must come into play somehow. In the bird example, I see the
Rhematic Indexical Sinsign as the single semiosic event that includes
the loud sound (Dynamic Object) and the bird's response of flight
(Dynamic Interpretant). Again, I agree that the bird's habits play a
role in the process, somewhere between those two stages. Regards,
Jon S. On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Edwina Taborsky
wrote:
Jon, Gary R, list:
OK - let's try a human example, but it won't be different:
DO: loud sound. It happens to be the old oak tree falling but I
don't know that.
IO: my hearing of the loud sound. IF I am partly deaf, I hear it
differently than my cat or dog or children or...
R: the Representamen consists of both my physiological and
cognitive MEMORIES. Some are innate [the neurological; some are
learned]. This Representamen accepts the sensate data from the IO
and, according to its full knowledge base....interprets that data.
II: this is my internal interpretation. It's 'honed and constrained
and organized by the combined memories of the Representamen...and I
become conscious of an external disturbance. ..ie.. I become aware
that it is not a dream; that it is existent and that it is outside of
me and that..it might be familiar...
DI: I am articulate, conscious that this external force is outside
of me, is existent and is, since I've heard these noises before..the
sound of a tree falling and dredging up more of my memories from the
Representamen...I decide.."It's that old oak tree'.
Now - the only difference between the bird and the human - is the
Representamen is more powerful in its stock of habits; and thus, sets
up a cognitive rather than physical reaction. The bird's DI is to
flee. The human will come up with a conceptual interpretant...
Again - I emphasize the necessity of the semiosic action including
the action of habits. Jon's outline doesn't seem to include this and
I don't understand how any Interpretation can take place, except an
almost purely mechanical one, that doesn't include this force.
Certainly, the classes of signs that do NOT include Thirdness
[habit-taking] DO exist, but only as a short-term event...and even
they, are 'nestled' within the body of something that DOES function
within habits....
That is - Jon's suggestion that the bird-event is a rhematic
indexical sinsign only refers to the single event of the loud sound.
This is, as Gary R explains, the focus on the EXTERNAL. But - when
we add in the RESULT, the bird's flight - we must include the
neurological habits of the bird, which are: 'run from danger' - and
so, the Interpretant is: flight.
Edwina
Edwina
On Mon 05/02/18 8:33 AM , Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.ca sent:
Jon, Gary R - I thought Gary R's quotes were excellent, pointing out
the necessity for memory/habits and their function in semiosis. What
carries out this function of habit? The Representamen.
Edwina
On Sun 04/02/18 10:31 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent: Gary R., List: Welcome back! I hope that your recovery is
going well, and that you will soon be able to elaborate on these
selectively highlighted quotes, because frankly I am having trouble
seeing how they bear on our current non-human, non-cognitive example.
Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional
Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[5] On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 9:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
Edwina, Jon S, list, At the moment I would tend to agree more with
Edwina's interpretation than with Jon's. But I'm beginning to see the
problem, feel the tension in this matter. I'm not quite yet up to
arguing *why* I agree, but I'll offer a few quotes hints towards a
direction I think might be fruitful (emphasis added by me in all
cases). 1910 | The Art of Reasoning Elucidated | MS [R] 678:23
… we apply this word “sign” to everything recognizable
whether to our outward senses or to our inward feeling and
imagination, provided only it calls up some feeling, effort, or
thought …
1902 [c.] | Reason's Rules | MS [R] 599:38
A sign is something which in some measure and in some respect makes
its interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign.
[—] [A] sign which merely represents itself to itself is nothing
else but that thing itself. The two infinite series, the one back
toward the object, the other forward toward the interpretant, in this
case collapse into an immediate present. The type of a sign is
memory, which takes up the deliverance of past memory and delivers a
portion of it to future memory.
1897 [c.] | On Signs [R] | CP 2.228
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that
is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps
a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the
interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its
object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in
reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground
of the representamen. “Idea” is here to be understood in a sort of
Platonic sense , very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense
in which we say that one man catches another man’s idea, in which we
say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some previous
time, he recalls the same idea, and in which when a man continues to
think anything, say for a tenth of a second, in so far as the thought
continues to agree with itself during that time, that is to have a
like content, it is the same idea, and is not at each instant of the
interval a new idea.
1873 | Logic. Chap. 5th | W 3:76; CP 7.355-6
… a thing which stands for another thing is a representation or
sign. So that it appears that every species of actual cognition is of
the nature of a sign. [—]
Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and
Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City
University of New York 718 482-5690
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