Edwina, List: Peirce explicitly associated the conclusion of an Argument with its Interpretant--e.g., "An *Argument *is a sign which distinctly represents the Interpretant, called its *Conclusion*, which it is intended to determine" (CP 2.95; 1902). Just curious--is there any text where he similarly associated the Representamen with the major premiss and/or the Object with the minor premiss? Or is that just your own illustrative example?
Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 2:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Helmut - No, I consider that the bird's perception of the loud sound is > NOT the representamen. The bird has several means of 'perception'. > > IO: the Immediate Object is a first sensual perception of an external > existentiality; the bird's senses absorb the sound > > II - the Immediate Interpretant is the bird's neurological and knowledge > based interpretation of this loud sound; It's an external 'thing' > > DI- the Dynamic Interpretant is the bird's articulation of the II: 'I > should flee this external thing'. > > The Representamen is the mediation between the IO and the II/DI. The > Representamen is the site of the information held by the neurological > nature of the bird and the information from its life-experience. > This stored information mediates the sound....and 'thinks' about it..and > comes up with the conclusion that 'this sound is something to run away > from'. > > Think of the semiosic triad as a syllogism. > > The Objects can be understood as the Minor Premise, i.e., the individual > situation. > > The Major Premise - the 'universal or general rules' - can be understood > as the Representamen > > the Conclusion - can be understood as the Interpretant[s]. > > Edwina > > On Mon 05/02/18 2:16 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: > > Edwina, Jon, Gary, List, > I wonder if this might be agreeable to all of you: The loud sound itself > is not the representamen. The bird´s perception of the loud sound is. This > has to do with memory: If the bird would not know (by memory e.g. due to > instinct, due to neural structure, or due to having learned) that a loud > sound means something, it would not perceive it. > Best, > Helmut > >
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