BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R - thanks for a wonderful post as moderator. I don't know how
to describe it - but- it was 'reasonable and moderate'. I have two
comments:
1] Since Peirce considered that Mind is operative in all of nature,
then, Mind operates within the physic-chemical, and biological realms
as well as within the human conceptual realm. As such, Mind must
operate within a triadic semiosic process in all realms, for Mind
operates only within a triad.
I note that Jon AS denies this - and considers that the 'natural
world' is dyadic and reactive rather than operating within the triad
of Mind. Again, I note that Peirce insisted that Mind is operative
even within crystals. And by Mind's operation, I do not mean one
'hide-bound with habits' but capable of interaction. Atoms interact
within molecules - according to their laws of organization - and
therefore, are within the domain of Mind.
I consider that the Quasi-mind is, as I said, the LOCAL emergence of
this universal Mind, which occurs between an utterer and an
interpreter, in a Local situation. I think this is a simple
explanation of Quasi-Mind and feel that no further explanation is
needed. The nature of this interaction as Local and direct [which
includes therefore Firstness and Secondness] is added to the habits
of Thirdness within both parties. That's also why I refer to the role
of the Rhematic Indexical Legisign - but that's not the important
point.
2] The fact that the example of the liquid in test-tubes is a
metaphor of the operation of Quasi-minds does not suggest or imply
that Quasi-minds do not exist or function within chemical compounds
and their interactions.
To say that the 'hurricane wind was like a charging bull' doesn't
imply that a bull does not charge'. The metaphor is just a vivid
comparison between two things/events that are similar in type. Both
can exist.
Edwina
On Wed 21/02/18 4:51 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Jon S, Gary f, Jeff, Edwina, list,
Jon, I'm entering this discussion rather late for reasons I offered
last week, for at least that reason I'm finding it difficult to find
a 'place' to enter it. For me your hypothesis regarding quasi-Mind is
not yet confirmed but is quite interesting and well-worth framing
thought experiments around should we first get some agreement on the
abstract part of the inquiry.
I personally think that it might have been better for the inquiry
had we first worked through the concept of Quasi-mind--say, by taking
up in chronological order two or three (at a time) of the quotations
on Quasi-mind presented in roughly that order that you offed a couple
of days ago--before getting into the matter of a perfect Sign even if
they are, at least in your thinking, deeply related. I still think
that slower approach might be worth considering. I know your mind is
very agile and wants to move quickly into a collaborative after
you've become more or less content with the concepts involved. But I
don't see anything approaching agreement here on either the
Quasi-mind or the perfect Sign (or both of them together).
Be that as it may, I'll offer a few thoughts on your recent post. I
feel like I've been absorbing some of the thinking of Gary f, Jeff,
and Edwina in this response, but I certainly don't want to burden
them in any way with the errors of my interpretation so I won't
informally cite them within this post. Suffice it to say for now that
I agree with some but not all of their--and your--thinking on the
matters being considered. You wrote:
JAS: 1. A hypothesis is not intended to be an argument. However,
your point about providing multiple terms for the same concept is
well-taken. With that in mind, I now see three interpretive
possibilities for Peirce's statement, "Such perfect sign is a
quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs."
*A perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same, and the
Sheet of Assertion is an example.
*A perfect Sign and the Sheet of Assertion are one and the same,
but there are other kinds of Quasi-minds.
*Every Sheet of Assertion is a perfect Sign, but there are other
kinds of perfect Signs; and every perfect Sign is a Quasi-mind, but
there are other kinds of Quasi-minds.
Again, I think you may be leaping ahead rather too quickly--at least
for me!--in equating a perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind ("A perfect Sign
and a Quasi-mind are one and the same"). I can readily agree that the
Sheet of Assertion is an example of a Quasi-mind and that there are
other kinds of Quasi-minds. But your introduction of the perfect Sign
into your hypothesis at this state of the inquiry is highly
problematic for me.
You begin by stating above that a perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are
one and the same, then conclude by stating that there are other kinds
of Quasi-minds than a perfect Sign. I find this, well, confusing if
not exactly circular. But, again, I'm not at the moment interested in
discussing the perfect Sign, but only the Quasi-mind which,
personally, I considered to be the semeiotically more important
concept (not that the concept of the perfect Sign shouldn't be
analyzed). I don't recall many of those several quotations you, Gary
f, and I have offered on the Quasi-mind connecting it to the perfect
Sign. Looking at the beginning of the 2nd of the chronological
quotations on Quasi-mind that you offered
CSP: 2. All the various meanings of the word "Mind," Logical,
Metaphysical, and Psychological, are apt to be confounded more or
less, partly because considerable logical acumen is required to
distinguish some of them, and because of the lack of any machinery to
support the thought in doing so, partly because they are so many, and
partly because (owing to these causes), they are all called by one
word, "Mind."
. . . I couldn't help but think that this must a fortiori be the
case not only for Mind, but for Quasi-mind as well so that it will be
important to distinguish the various logical, metaphysical, and
psychological meanings of Quasi-sign. If may be that your hypothesis
regarding the perfect Sign applies to the logical but, say, not to
the psychological or metaphysical meanings of Quasi-mind. Right now I
have no idea whether or not that is the case.
JAS: 2. I posted my current tentative definition of a Quasi-mind a
few days ago. It is a bundle of habits (reacting substance) that has
the capacity for Habit-change (learning by experience); the latter is
what distinguishes it from a brute Thing, a strictly material
reacting substance whose habits have become inveterate, like a mere
"set of molecules." It is also a perfect Sign that constitutes an
aggregate or complex of all previous Signs that have determined it,
which are so connected together as to produce one Interpretant; this
is the sense in which it "stores" the Immediate Objects of all those
previous Signs, which serve as its Collateral Experience, as well as
their Final Interpretants, which serve as its Habits of
Interpretation.
Again, I find your equating Quasi-mind and perfect Sign problematic
although I can agree with some of what you state concerning the
Quasi-mind, some concerning the perfect Sign. But as I reread your
quote above, I still am perplexed by what I am seeing as your
possibly conflating the two. Again, you may be correct; but you
haven't yet produced enough evidence nor a strong enough argument to
have convinced me that the two are one. Again, this is why I think it
might be helpful to have a clear understanding of Quasi-mind before
leaping to that conflating (or equating, or whatever it is).
JAS (2, continued): As for what a Quasi-mind "does," I see it as
an indispensable ingredient for any semiosis to occur. For natural
Signs, there is no utterer, but the interpreter is a Quasi-mind. For
genuine Signs, the utterer is a Quasi-mind, the interpreter is a
Quasi-mind, and their overlap--where they are "welded" and become one
in the Sign itself--is a Quasi-mind. This is illustrated by the
Phemic Sheet, which is the Quasi-mind where the Graphist and
Interpreter are at one--not only in the Signs that they proceed to
scribe on it, but also in everything that is tacitly taken for
granted between them from the outset of their discussion, when the
sheet itself is still blank. As always, these two Quasi-minds can
be different temporal versions of the same Quasi-mind.
I don't see why Nature cannot be an utterer and I think Peirce
somewhere says as much (but I haven't been able to find that passage
yet). As for your trio of Quasi-minds for genuine signs, I'll have
to think about that. Certainly this may be the case for the Graphist
and Interpreter of a Phemic sheet, but I don't know how far one ought
generalize this most logical example. I agree, however, that "two
Quasi-mind can be different temporal versions of the same
Quasi-mind." My principal thought experiments regarding the
Quasi-mind has for years been my own thought process, that dialogue
with oneself which Peirce once illustrated with the (then)
commonplace expression, "So I says to myself. . ."; also, the way one
"catches" the thought of another, or she of you, etc.
JAS (2. concluded): As for Peirce's example of molecules, unlike
when he called the universe a Symbol and an Argument, he explicitly
stated that he was presenting it as a metaphor to help explain what
he meant by "determination."
CSP: This perplexes us, and an example of an analogous phenomenon
will do good service here. Metaphysics has been said contemptuously
to be a fabric of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but logical
and phaneroscopical concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For
a pure idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion
without a peel. Let a community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid
in a number of bottles ... (EP 2:392; 1906)
I agree: the example of molecules is explicitly given as a metaphor.
JAS: 3. We are still in the (abstract) retroductive and deductive
stages of this inquiry. Moving on to the (concrete) inductive stage
would involve analyzing an example like the bird that flees upon
hearing a loud sound, the vase that someone sees upon opening his
eyes, or the child who screams upon touching a hot burner. The bird,
the person who sees the vase, and the child and her mother are all
presumably Quasi-minds.
I would be interested in moving from the abstract to the concrete
stage of this inquiry, but only after we have settled a bit more
firmly on what a Quasi-mind is; then on what a perfect Sign is; then
if the two really are one. Once we have some agreement on that
perhaps we can move on to a more concrete experiment.
Best,
Gary R
Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718
482-5690 [1]
On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 2:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Edwina, List:
1. A hypothesis is not intended to be an argument. However, your
point about providing multiple terms for the same concept is
well-taken. With that in mind, I now see three interpretive
possibilities for Peirce's statement, "Such perfect sign is a
quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of Existential Graphs."
*A perfect Sign and a Quasi-mind are one and the same, and the
Sheet of Assertion is an example.
*A perfect Sign and the Sheet of Assertion are one and the same,
but there are other kinds of Quasi-minds.
*Every Sheet of Assertion is a perfect Sign, but there are other
kinds of perfect Signs; and every perfect Sign is a Quasi-mind, but
there are other kinds of Quasi-minds.
I am sorry that you do not find my identification and exploration of
these options enlightening.
2. I posted my current tentative definition of a Quasi-mind a few
days ago. It is a bundle of habits (reacting substance) that has
the capacity for Habit-change (learning by experience); the latter is
what distinguishes it from a brute Thing, a strictly material
reacting substance whose habits have become inveterate , like a mere
"set of molecules." It is also a perfect Sign that constitutes an
aggregate or complex of all previous Signs that have determined it,
which are so connected together as to produce one Interpretant; this
is the sense in which it "stores" the Immediate Objects of all those
previous Signs, which serve as its Collateral Experience, as well as
their Final Interpretants, which serve as its Habits of
Interpretation.
As for what a Quasi-mind "does," I see it as an indispensable
ingredient for any semiosis to occur. For natural Signs, there is
no utterer, but the interpreter is a Quasi-mind. For genuine Signs,
the utterer is a Quasi-mind, the interpreter is a Quasi-mind, and
their overlap--where they are "welded" and become one in the Sign
itself--is a Quasi-mind. This is illustrated by the Phemic Sheet,
which is the Quasi-mind where the Graphist and Interpreter are at
one--not only in the Signs that they proceed to scribe on it, but
also in everything that is tacitly taken for granted between them
from the outset of their discussion, when the sheet itself is still
blank. As always, these two Quasi-minds can be different temporal
versions of the same Quasi-mind.
As for Peirce's example of molecules, unlike when he called the
universe a Symbol and an Argument, he explicitly stated that he was
presenting it as a metaphor to help explain what he meant by
"determination."
CSP: This perplexes us, and an example of an analogous phenomenon
will do good service here. Metaphysics has been said contemptuously
to be a fabric of metaphors. But not only metaphysics, but logical
and phaneroscopical concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For
a pure idea without metaphor or other significant clothing is an onion
without a peel. Let a community of quasi-minds consist of the liquid
in a number of bottles ... (EP 2:392; 1906)
3. We are still in the (abstract) retroductive and deductive stages
of this inquiry. Moving on to the (concrete) inductive stage would
involve analyzing an example like the bird that flees upon hearing a
loud sound, the vase that someone sees upon opening his eyes, or the
child who screams upon touching a hot burner. The bird, the person
who sees the vase, and the child and her mother are all presumably
Quasi-minds.
I do not expect you to say anything further about any of this.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Wed, Feb 21, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Jon -
1. All I can say is that your definitions are circular. You repeat
that 'a perfect mind= a quasi-mind= the sheet of assertion of the EG.
This, frankly, is not an argument; it is not enlightening; it doesn't
MEAN anything. I must even wonder why, if you are correct - Peirce
provided all these terms for the SAME thing.
I'm not going to repeat my interpretation of the Rhemetic Indexical
Legisign - since we won't get anywhere with that.
2. I also disagree with your view of the Quasi-mind...You don't
provide a definition of WHAT it does; you merely tell us all the
synonyms for it. I understand it as a local emergence of Mind,
emerging within a semiosic interaction between an 'utterer and an
interpreter' [which could be between two chemicals, between two
insects, between two people or in one person]. The point is - it's a
LOCAL and dialogic interaction of, so to speak, the Universal Mind,
and is thus - as local - a 'Quasi-Mind'.
So- yes, a 'mere set of molecules' qualifies as a Quasi-mind when
in interaction. After all Peirce provided such an example of
molecules as an example of a quasi-mind.
3. You don't propose a definition; you simply copy words from
Peirce; collate them; use them as synonyms - but - the function of
what these terms stand for - is ignored. So- I don't see the point of
this discussion and won't continue.
Edwina
On Wed 21/02/18 11:52 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt
jonalanschm...@gmail.com [4] sent:
Edwina, List:
1. We can say two things for sure based on that straightforward
pair of sentences by Peirce--first, that a perfect Sign, whatever
else it might be, is a Quasi-mind; and second, that the Sheet of
Assertion of Existential Graphs is a perfect Sign. We also know,
from various other quotes, that the Sheet of Assertion (or Phemic
Sheet) is a Quasi-mind. My current hypothesis is that a perfect Sign
and a Quasi-mind are one and the same, but Gary F. has challenged
this; and if he (or anyone else) provides a clear counterexample, I
will abandon it accordingly and be grateful for the correction. The
alternative, as I see it, is that a perfect Sign and the Sheet of
Assertion are one and the same, but there are also other kinds of
Quasi-minds.
In CP 4.550-553, Peirce characterized both Mind ("in one of the
narrowest and most concrete of its logical meanings") and the Phemic
Sheet ("representing the Mind" and "being the Quasi-mind") as "a Seme
of the Truth, that is, of the widest Universe of Reality"; so in that
sense, the Sheet of Assertion is indeed a Rheme. However, he went on
to say that it is, " at the same time, a Pheme of all that is tacitly
taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the
outset of their discussion"; so in that sense, the Sheet of Assertion
is also a Dicisign. He also stated, "We are to imagine that two
parties collaborate in composing a Pheme, and in operating upon this
so as to develop a Delome"; so in that sense, the Sheet of Assertion
is also an Argument. The reason why it can be all three Sign classes
simultaneously is because every Argument involves Dicisigns, and
every Dicisign involves Rhemes.
Since the Sheet of Assertion is both an Argument and a perfect Sign,
it obviously cannot be the case that what Peirce means by "perfect
Sign" is a Rhematic Indexical Legisign. Furthermore, "perfect" in
this context does not necessarily imply the ability to "do everything
and anything semiosic," although I find it noteworthy that an Argument
is the only class of Sign that involves all of the others. Again, I
strongly suspect that "perfect" is instead related to Entelechy,
especially in light of Peirce's statement elsewhere that "We may
adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which
should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a
sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very
form signified by it" (EP 2:304; 1904).
2. I obviously cannot read your mind and do not have your
experience, so the only way for me to see how you justify your
position--that CP 5.119 is "mere metaphoric rhetoric"--is if you
provide an explanation. Since "thought is not necessarily connected
with a brain" (CP 4.551) and "matter is effete mind" (CP 6.25),
"mental association" is not confined to human conceptual semiosis;
it can (and does) occur in any Quasi-mind. I am certainly not
claiming that a mere "set of molecules" qualifies as a Quasi-mind;
are you?
3. What we are pursuing here is, like all thought, a dialogic
process of inquiry. We propose a definition (Retroduction),
explicate its implications (Deduction), test it against experience
(Induction), and revise/repeat as needed.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 9:01 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Jon -
1]You are the one who is 'asserting' Peirce's sentence: " Such
perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion of
Existential Graphs" (EP 2:545n25).
So- you should be the one explaining how this 'perfect sign' [which
still hasn't been described as to how it operates'] - is a 'sheet of
assertion of Existential Graphs'.
I've tried to explain the Rhematic Indexical Legisign as a clear
tri-relative operation; as a] including laws that adapt and evolve;
as b] directly connected to its object; and c] as expressing an
individual local interpretation of that object. Therefore - to me -
since it includes the utterer and interpreter, so to speak, and all
three categorical modes and - is that clear tri-relative framework,
then, it's the 'perfect sign' and can do everything and anything
semiosic. ..The rheme's individual local interpretation is related to
the legisign's general Thirdness and - and yet- is grounded by that
existential indexical connection to the object.
2] What do you mean - what is my 'warrant' for interpreting Peirce's
statement in a certain manner? My mind and logic and experience leads
me to make this interpretation. Do I need anything else? A higher
authority?
As for your statement about the ten classes - you yourself have
claimed that the symbol is a factor of human conceptualization. [I
don't keep archives]. Plus - I've provided the definition of the
symbol - and it is clearly Not iconic which involves a mimetic action
and Not indexical which involves an existential connection. The symbol
is a 'mental association 1.372, .."a relation which consists in the
fact that the mind associates the sign with its object; in that case,
the sign is a name or symbol". It is a mental act 2.438] . It
requires an interpretant [see 2.304]...
Your quoting of 4.551 has nothing to do with the definition of a
symbol and I don't know why you inserted it. Are you going to claim
that molecules use symbols in their informational interactions?
Because Mind, as law, is involved in chemical composition, does not
mean that this same set of molecules uses its own mental actions to
interpret its own nature.
3] I don't agree that definitions can exist without a clear idea of
the function of that which is being defined.
Edwina
On Tue 20/02/18 9:08 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
1. Respectfully, I asked you to make your case for that position,
not simply reassert it. I honestly do not see how a Rhematic
Indexical Legisign can be "the sheet of assertion of Existential
Graphs"; please explain it to me.
2. What is your warrant for taking Peirce's explicit designation of
the universe as a Symbol and an Argument to be "mere metaphoric
rhetoric"? Again, please explain it to me, rather than just
asserting it. Since "thought is not necessarily connected with a
brain" (CP 4.551; 1906), why should we treat any of the ten Sign
classes as confined to human conceptual semiosis?
3. I have freely admitted a strong bent for abstract analysis,
rather than the more concrete approach that Gary R. (for example)
ably practices, and I have also acknowledged its limitations. Such
differences are precisely why collaboration is such an important
aspect of the List--genuinely seeking to engage in shared inquiry and
learn from each other, rather than dogmatically maintaining our
pre-established views. I am actually very interested in exploring
the nature and function of perfect Signs and Quasi-minds within
concrete semiosis, but for me, coming up with clear definitions of
those terms is the first step.
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 5:34 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Jon, list
1. I see no reason why a rhematic indexical legisign, with its
qualities that fit all of Peirce's stated description of a 'perfect
sign' cannot fulfill being a 'sheet of assertion of existential
graphs.
2. I really don't see Peirce's use of the word 'symbol' or
'argument' in this selection as meaning the same as is meant in the
ten classes of signs. I consider his use here as mere metaphoric
rhetoric and not as a semiotic analysis of the Universe.
If you read his definitions of these two terms as used within
semiosis, you will see that the 'symbol' is an intellectual
construct, it refers to "the Object that it denotes by virtue of a
law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause
the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object" 2.249.
And the same thing with the Argument, which is equally an
intellectual construct.[see 2.251-3].
Therefore, these two terms refer to human conceptual semiosis and
not to physic-chemical or biological semiosis.
3. The problem I have with your approach to these definitions is
that they seem purely abstract and theoretical and confined to words;
i.e., substituting one set of words for another set of words.
I don't know what you see as the function of these terms; you don't
seem interested in examining 'what is a perfect sign' within the
semiosic universe and how and why does it even exist and operate.
And- ; what is the function of a 'quasi-mind' within semiosis. Why
and how does it emerge and function? You don't seem involved in this
aspect.
Edwina
On Tue 20/02/18 5:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
Setting aside our different models of semiosis, and simply looking
at Peirce's own words ...
1. "Such perfect sign is a quasi-mind. It is the sheet of assertion
of Existential Graphs" (EP 2:545n25). Are you prepared to claim that
a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is the sheet of assertion of
Existential Graphs? If so, then please make your case for that
position. If not, then a Rhematic Indexical Legisign cannot be what
Peirce meant by "perfect sign."
2. "... the universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of
God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now
every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of
Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these
reactions and these qualities play in an argument that, they of
course, play in the universe--that Universe being precisely an
argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903). Since Peirce calls the
entire universe a Symbol and an Argument, he obviously did not
confine Symbols and Arguments to human conceptual semiosis. Why
should we?
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [5] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [6]
On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 2:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
list -
I think the terms need to be defined, since, apparently, each of us
has different definitions of 'sign'; perfect sign' and 'quasi-mind'.
Again, my understanding of the Sign is not confined to its function
as the Representamen, but to the semiosic process of DO-[IO-R-II].
The Representamen, after all, doesn't exist 'per se' but only within
that semiosic process, where the representamen is "a subject of a
triadic relation to a second, called its object, for a third, called
its interpretant, this triadic relation being such that the
representamen determines its interpretant to stand in the same
triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant" [1.541].
This relational, dynamic nature must be acknowledged.
Therefore, since I am focusing on the triadic semiosic process,
then, I consider the 'perfect sign' to be the Rhematic Indexical
Legisign', for, in my view, it fulfills all the actions outlined by
Peirce : connection to object [indexical]; aging [within the
legisign]; and local individualism [within the rhematic local
interpretation].
What is the quasi-mind? My understanding is that it is the
localization of Mind, emerging within the dialogic semiosic
interaction between Utterer and Interpreter and thus - such an
interaction would have two quasi-minds. I don't see why this
localization of mind, which I see as the quasi-mind, is ALSO a
perfect sign.....unless it is that Rhematic Indexical Legisign which
is, after all, the basic sign class in the ten classes [includes all
three categorical modes].
In addition, this interaction and quasi-mind is not confined to
humans but, as Peirce points out, one can have a 'community of
quasi-minds' consisting of the chemical liquids in bottles that are
'intricately' connected. [2.392]. Therefore - I don't see Jon AS's
view that the quasi-mind [if I remember correctly what he wrote]
appears as a Symbol and Argument - which would confine it to human
conceptual semiosis.
I presume that the above would meet with strong disagreement from
some posters - and I think one also has to consider the function of a
quasi-mind and a perfect sign.
Edwina
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