Dear list,
I think there are many beautiful things in this conversation. “For dialectic to exert its full force upon the individual mind, complete frankness is essential; it requires a kind of shamelessness in saying what one really thinks.” “The real skeptic, the one who states, "There is no truth," will immediately be answered by the dogmatist.. And, since the dogmatist is usually a rather aggressive fellow, he will proceed and say, "Since you are intelligent enough to understand the contradiction, I must conclude that you have an *interest* in destroying truth; you are a nihilist." Also, I believe Peirce is a fool if he had not anticipated and adapted our current situation. If he were truly a careful writer, he should have first sketched its general outline, and then filled in the episodes and amplified in detail. That is, if *A clear idea is defined as one which is so apprehended that it will be recognized wherever it is met with, and so that no other will be mistaken for it. * *If it fails of this clearness, it is said to be obscure.* “Looking at your own diagram--thank you for offering it--you seem to associate each *Quasi-mind* with a single IO and II. I, on the other hand, associate each *Sign *(or Representamen) with a single IO and II. If we could switch these terms--change "Generalizing Representamen" to "Generalizing Quasi-mind" and "Quasi-minds" to "Signs" (or "Representamens")--then our models might not be so different after all.” *I should have hoped to put an end to these idle and fruitless disputations in a direct manner, by an accurate determination of the concept of existence, had I not found that the illusion which is caused by the confusion of a logical with a real predicate (that is, with a predicate which determines a thing) is almost beyond correction. Anything we please can be made to serve as a logical predicate; the subject can even be predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from all content. * “If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow; if we find them, after the most elaborate preparations, invariably brought to a stand before the goal is reached, and compelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they are far from having attained to the certainty of scientific progress and may rather be said to be merely groping about in the dark. In these circumstances we shall render an important service to reason if we succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must travel, in order to arrive at any results — even if it should be found necessary to abandon many of those aims which, without reflection, have been proposed for its attainment.” *.. since it is clearness that they were defining, * *I wish the logicians had made their definition a little more plain.* “Having said all of that, we can imagine some justifications for some applications of the plain meaning rule— that is, some cases in which the conditional relevance of nontextual evidence could make sense. But even so, we stress that these justifications are both conditional and incomplete. They are conditional because they are merely an outline of the circumstances under which a plain meaning threshold might make sense.” *So then, where is it, and how shall we know it were we to come across it?* *We must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is. .* With best wishes, Jerry R On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 4:36 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > John, list, > > > JS: On 3/21/2018 2:22 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > >> Peirce says here that this kind of analysis "relates to a real and >> important three-way distinction." It may yet have been--at that point in >> time--"quite hazy," but since Peirce saw it as "a real and important >> three-way distinction" there would seem to be very good reason to continue >> to study it in the interests of rendering it at least a bit less imperfect. > > > JS: > I agree that the issues are important. And I am > > not objecting to people > continuing to study the issues. > > > [. . .] > > JS: But I wouldn't waste my time, *unless* some significant new evidence > is discovered. > > > New evidence? I have no ideas what you might mean by that. Peirce seems to > have taken these late semeiotic notions as far as he could at the time, > especially as he saw that this kind of analysis "relates to a real and > important three-way distinction." In my opinion, what is needed is greater > clarity as to the meaning of these late semeiotic ideas (and the terms used > to express them) as well as how they might relate to each other. > > John concluded: > > JS: I was trying to state a point about Peirce's ethics of terminology. > Note that he did not approve of people who took his word 'pragmatics' > and used it in a very different way. > > > I agree that the misuse of terms established by Peirce like 'pragmatic' is > unacceptable (btw, I don't believe Peirce used the word 'pragmatics', > Charles Morris' term for his distorted view of Peirce's work which has > plagued Peircean pragmatic inquiry since). But in my view the current issue > has little if anything to do with the 'ethics of terminology' and to the > extent that it does in any way relate to that ethics, Jon Schmidt has *not > *used Peirce's terminology "in a very different way," quite the contrary. > > JS: My only point is that if any of those definitions are precise, then > they cannot be > the same as the hazy notion that Peirce was trying to define. If so, > Peirce's ethics of terminology implies they should not use Peirce's > term -- they should choose a different word or phrase of their own. > > > Your point seems to me more than a little strained. The "hazy notion that > Peirce was trying to define" might *yet *be clarified in the very terms > he created and used. That clarification affects the 'haziness', not > necessarily the concepts as such, nor the terminology being considered. > What Jon seems to be doing, at least in part, is to bring these concepts > together into a well organized structure for our contemplation. > > So, again, while I'm all for adhering to Peirce's 'ethics of terminology', > at least in Jon Alan Schmidt's case he is employing in his inquiry terms > Peirce used late in his career, notably, Quasi-mind, Quasi-utter, > Quasi-interpreter, Commens, and perfect Sign in ways which I do not see > much deviating from Peirce's (he offers textual support for this). It is my > sense that Peirce did not live long enough to fully explore, explicate, and > further develop the meanings of those admittedly complex late semeiotic > notions (we may find more discussions of them as more of his work is > published); while Lady Welby and her group didn't get much beyond "Sense, > Meaning, Significance." I see no reason why--and certainly not in > consideration of the 'ethics of terminology'--that these late semeiotic > notions not be inquired into further employing the terminology Peirce > invented. > > And, speaking personally, I am for the most part following Jon's > argumentation, finding his outlines and diagrams of interest and value. So > I am glad to read that you are "not objecting to people continuing to study > the issues." > And knowing Jon as well as I do from his list discussions, I would expect > that were there *real* issues involving the ethics of terminology in his > inquiry that he would be the first to address them. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > > xx > > > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>* > > On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 9:38 PM, John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > >> On 3/21/2018 2:22 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: >> >>> Peirce says here that this kind of analysis "relates to a real and >>> important three-way distinction." It may yet have been--at that point in >>> time--"quite hazy," but since Peirce saw it as "a real and important >>> three-way distinction" there would seem to be very good reason to continue >>> to study it in the interests of rendering it at least a bit less imperfect. >>> >> >> I agree that the issues are important. And I am not objecting to people >> continuing to study the issues. >> >> I was trying to state a point about Peirce's ethics of terminology. >> Note that he did not approve of people who took his word 'pragmatics' >> and used it in a very different way. >> >> For the issues in this thread, Peirce himself said that he was unable >> to state a precise definition in terms of his own system and that >> Lady Welby was unable to state a precise definition of a related >> concept in terms of her system. >> >> It's conceivable that somebody someday may define a related notion >> more precisely in terms of some other system. But if that definition >> were truly precise, it could not be exactly the same as any "hazy" >> notion -- by Peirce, by Lady Welby, or by anyone else. >> >> In browsing through this thread, I see people claiming that their >> definition is better or that they don't understand someone else's >> definition. >> >> I won't make any judgments about any of those claims. My only point >> is that if any of those definitions are precise, then they cannot be >> the same as the hazy notion that Peirce was trying to define. If so, >> Peirce's ethics of terminology implies they should not use Peirce's >> term -- they should choose a different word or phrase of their own. >> >> John >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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