Dear list,
*"Examples are the go-cart of judgments."* To wit, *Perhaps a concrete example would help clarify all of this.* With best wishes, Jerry R On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 12:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jeff, List: > > Regarding your first reconstruction (#1-#3), I do not think that Peirce > ever deviated from the basic principle that the Object determines the Sign, > which determines the Interpretant, such that the Object determines the > Interpretant via the mediation of the Sign. The later taxonomies simply > expand the Object to Dynamic and Immediate, and the Interpretant to Final, > Dynamic, and Immediate. Lieb (among others) aligns the Destinate > Interpretant with Ii and the Explicit Interpretant with If; but as I have > argued in this thread, I now think that it makes more sense both > terminologically (Destinate=Final, Explicit=Immediate) and conceptually for > the If to determine the Id, which determines the Ii. > > Regarding your second reconstruction (#1-#4), I am having trouble > understanding exactly what you mean by #3 and #4. In #3, are you > suggesting that the three Interpretants are in a triadic relation to *each > other*, or that each stands in *its own* triadic relation to the Od and > the Sign? In #4, "mental image" seems to limit the Interpretants to human > semiosis; and did you mean to state in the last sentence that the > *Interpretant > *represents the Od-Oi correspondence relation? Normally we would say > that the Sign represents the Od *itself*, and it seems to me that an > Interpretant can only represent something if it is another Sign, rather > than a feeling or exertion. > > I still struggle at times to grasp exactly what Peirce meant by > "determines," especially in different contexts. Does the Object determine > the Sign and the Sign determine the Interpretant in exactly the same sense > that the Od determines the Oi, which determines the Sign, which determines > the If (or Ii), etc.? I am also not following your last paragraph. In > your second sentence, what is the general/necessitant, and what are the two > existents? Are you suggesting that "determination" in this context is > always with respect to "possible characters"? In your third sentence, > which three Correlates (there are six total) did you have in mind? What > would be the existents that embody them per your fourth sentence? Perhaps > a concrete example would help clarify all of this. > > Thanks, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, Apr 3, 2018 at 10:44 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > >> Jon S, List, >> >> Having spent some time digging for textual evidence--one way or the >> other--concerning the order of determination in the relations between >> objects, signs and interpretants, here is an alternate reading based on >> what I've found thus far. >> >> On the model presented in NDTR, the order is simply, >> >> 1) object determines sign >> >> 2) sign determines interpretant >> >> 3) object determines interpretant via the mediation of the sign (and >> possibly also via the relations between the object and sign, on the one >> hand, and the sign and interpretant, on the other). >> >> This appears, at first glance, to be somewhat at odds with the order of >> determination provided later, when the division between two objects and >> three interpretants is made (e.g., see the interpretation by Lieb in the >> collection of letters between Peirce and Lady Welby). >> >> Having spent more time digging, here is a simplified version of my still >> tentative and rather incomplete reconstruction of what Peirce seems to be >> saying about the relations of determination. >> >> 1) a dynamical object determines sign >> >> 2) the sign determines each of the three interpretants >> >> 3) the dynamical object determines the three interpretants to stand in a >> triadic relation, one to the others via the mediation of the sign and the >> relations that it stands to object and interpretant. >> >> 4) the interpretants (largely the final) determines a mental image of the >> relation that holds between the dynamical object and sign (e.g., its being >> a icon, index or symbol) to stand in a relation of correspondence with the >> object. The sign represents that relation of correspondence between mental >> image (which functions as the immediate object) and the dynamical object. >> >> I've expressed the fourth point in overly complicated terms, but I hope >> the general idea comes through. On this reading of the later texts, >> Peirce is later elaborating on the earlier account in NDTR--but in a >> manner that is entirely consonant with what he claimed there. >> >> For my part, I think that the relations of determination should be >> understood as applying at three levels that are considered strata--that of >> possibles, existents and necessitants. Where there is a general that serves >> as a necessitant, two existents are, in their possible >> characters, determined in accord with the general rule. When each of the >> three correlates has the character of a thought sign, it is one habit >> determining another habit in accord with a general rule. In this sort of >> case involving three thought-signs as correlates, each of the habits is >> embodied in existents having possible characters. And so on. >> >> --Jeff >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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