Jon S, List,
You refer to sample texts for the sake of supporting the first three of the bulleted points, but no reference is provided for the fourth point. Do you, by chance, have textual references that I might consult in order to understand the seven points that are made: * (1) The efficient cause of the Sign is the DO, * (2) its formal cause is the IO, its material cause is the SR, and * (3) its final cause is mediating between the DO and the FI. * (4) The efficient cause of the Interpretant is the SR, * (5) its formal cause is the II, * (6) its material cause is the DI, and * (7) its final cause is the FI. On a separate note, you might remove some possible confusion by inserting "Legisign" into the diagram and supporting discussion where you are clearly talking about signs that have the character of necessitants (i.e., general rules) in terms of the mode of their apprehension. That might help clarify, for instance, the kind of relation that holds between general legisigns and token sinsigns. Furthermore, one thing that seems missing from the diagram is some indication of where iconic qualisigns fit into the picture. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Monday, June 25, 2018 1:00 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Triad vs. Triadic Relation (was Direct experience and immediate object) Edwina, List: No one is "blaming" anyone for anything. I did (and still do) sincerely find the IO-R-II triad concept attractive, because of how it captures the nature of the IO and II as being internal to the Sign. In the end, the problem for me, as I have already explained, was one of terminological ethics--the inconsistency of using "Representamen" for a component of the Sign with the fact that Peirce never did so. Again, perhaps we can come up with a different term of our own; but as far as I can tell, Peirce nowhere suggested any particular name for whatever is left of the Sign when the IO and II are analytically removed from it, or that such a move is even possible. Nor did he ever say that the DO is "within the definition of the full Sign"; on the contrary, he consistently described the DO as external to the Sign itself, such that they are two of the three Correlates (i.e., subjects) in a triadic relation. Despite your ongoing insistence otherwise, he also did not use "Sign" for "the full triadic process"; instead, he called that "semiosis," and my current model of it--which remains open to correction and refinement--is summarized in the attached diagram (originally posted back in April) and as follows. * Every Sign denotes its Object (Matter/DO), signifies characters or qualities of that Object (Form/IO), and determines its Interpretant (Entelechy/FI as unity of Matter/DI and Form/II); cf. EP 2:304 (1904). * The DO determines the Sign relatively to the FI, while the Sign determines the FI in reference to the DO, such that the DO determines the FI through the mediation of the Sign; cf. EP 2:410 (1907). This is a genuine triadic relation. * The Sign-Replica is a medium for the communication of a Form (which it embodies representatively as the IO) from the DO (which embodies the Form entitatively) to the DI (which embodies the Form interpretatively as the II); cf. EP 2:477 and EP 2:544n22 (both 1906). This is a degenerate triadic relation, such that it can be resolved into the dyadic DO-SR and SR-DI relations. * The efficient cause of the Sign is the DO, its formal cause is the IO, its material cause is the SR, and its final cause is mediating between the DO and the FI. The efficient cause of the Interpretant is the SR, its formal cause is the II, its material cause is the DI, and its final cause is the FI. Notice that "Representamen" is completely absent here, because I now take it as synonymous/interchangeable with "Sign," as Peirce did in and after 1905. You presumably disagree with all of this, because your interpretation of Peirce and your model of semiosis are very different, but I continue to see no need to rehash any of that further. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 12:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: Jon, list Good heavens - I didn't know that your adamant arguments for the triad of IO-R-II was due to any attempt on your part to 'reconcile with my model of semiosis'!!! I thought you were arguing for that triad because you believed in it as a valid model! After all - you were quite insistent on its validity, and openly rejecting my inclusion of the DO! And I didn't know that you abandoned it - not because you didn't believe any longer in its validity - but because you couldn't use it to 'reconcile with my model'. So- I'm to blame both for your support for the model and also, for your abandoning it. Hmmm. And the argument isn't over the term 'Sign' as differentiated from the term 'Representamen'. Peirce does that already. And he readily uses the term 'Sign' when he means the full triadic process - and also - when he refers only to the action of mediation. Therefore, one has to be careful when reading the text. The argument is over the operative nature of the basic semiosic triad - which I claim is DO- [IO/R/II]. Edwina On Mon 25/06/18 9:21 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> sent: Edwina, List: I fought for the definition of the Sign as a triad of IO-R-II because I hoped for a while that it might eventually be possible, on that basis, to reconcile our two different models of semiosis. It became evident a few months ago that this is not the case, since we still cannot even agree on how Peirce defined "Representamen." Consequently, I took a closer look at his usage and came to realize what I stated below--in 1903, a Sign was a Representamen with a mental interpretant; but by 1905, the two terms were basically synonymous and interchangeable. More to the point, nowhere in Peirce's writings did he present the Representamen as a component of the Sign. Therefore, in accordance with Peirce's ethics of terminology, if one wishes to treat the Sign as a triad that includes the IO, the II, and whatever is left over after those are "removed," one must come up with a new name for the latter; Peirce never called it a "Representamen," or anything else as far as I can tell. Regards, Jon S. On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 7:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: JAS, list I have to include myself with Gary R as - in my 1stness - stunned by your abandonment of defining the Sign itself as that triad of II-R-II! You fought for just this definition, tooth and nail, for months. I recall your chastising me for daring to include the DO within the definition of the full Sign. And now, quietly, hidden in the night, you casually tell us that you..some time ago...abandoned this notion. Whew. Edwina On Sun 24/06/18 8:51 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Gary R., List: Are you perhaps referring to my abandonment of characterizing the Sign itself as a triad of IO-R-II? This goes back to the fact that Peirce never distinguished the terms "Representamen" and "Sign" in the specific way that such a model entails. I still affirm that the IO and II are internal to the Sign, while the DO and DI are external to it; and below I quoted Peirce's statement that the two Objects determine the Sign, which determines the three Interpretants; so I suspect that this indeed boils down to "a terminological matter." Does that clarify things? If not, maybe I have just been staring at the pixels on my rather small tablet screen for too many hours consecutively. :-) Jon S. On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:08 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: Jon S, list, Well, I may be the only one on the list who is at all confused by this, and indeed it may prove to be just a terminological matter. Still, Peirce says in many, many places that what happens within the sign is this tripartite process: The IO determines the Sign which determines some Interpretant Sign. You have stated that you reject this internal structure (or am I wrong about that too?) In any event, may I ask: How does this tripartite structure figure in your thinking today without getting a "Where on earth are you, etc." prologue to an response? :-) [Blocked image] Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690 On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: Gary R., List: Where on earth are you getting the idea that my formulation abandons the fundamental semiotic process, in which the Object determines the Sign for its Interpretant? I am sincerely baffled by this suggestion. Here is what I said. JAS: a Sign denotes its Dynamic Object (Matter/2ns), signifies some of that Object's characters/qualities (Form/1ns)--which, taken together, constitute its Immediate Object--and determines its Interpretants to represent the unity of Matter and Form (Entelechy/3ns). I am describing what the Sign does, not what the Object does. I am not at all somehow removing the Sign from its genuine triadic relation with the Object and Interpretant. Peirce himself differentiated the two Objects and three Interpretants when he wrote, "the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant" (EP 2:481; 1908). As for Sign vs. Representamen, Peirce actually did say contradictory things in 1903 (when he gave the sunflower example) and 1905, because he changed his mind sometime during the interval between them--he decided that he no longer needed to use "Representamen," because "Sign" ended up suiting his original purpose after all. I now agree with that decision. Notice that "Representamen" does not appear in the 1908 quote above, or anywhere else in those crucial December letters to Lady Welby. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:43 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: Jon S, list, Thanks.This was quite helpful. But there remains the awkward fact of the Peirce formulation that the Object determines the Sign for its Interpretant Sign. Does he give up this formulation in the 20th century? If not, whether you call it "Representamen" or "Sign," there seems to me the problem that it would appear in your formulation that the IO takes the place of the second moment of that triadic formulation. According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs" (EP 2:273). Of course you now would appear to reject that triadic formulation. Since I very much like your reformulation, I'll have to think long and hard on this. Still, if, as Peirce says, there are "Representamens that are not Signs" (like sunflowers turning toward the sun in Peirce's famous example), then there would seem yet to be a distinction to be made between Sign and Representamen. Yet in your note addressed to me and just now to Gary F you say the Sign and Representamen are "effectively synonymous." So, it appears to me that Peirce is perhaps saying contradictory things when one looks from one quotation to another on this not inconsequential matter of terminology. It seems to me more than a matter of terminology. Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York 718 482-5690 On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: Gary R., List: GR: But would you explain why the Representamen is not included in your formulation whatsoever? In this context, how would you distinguish the Representamen from the Sign? According to Peirce in 1903, "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs" (EP 2:273). If you favor these definitions, such that a Sign is only a certain kind of Representamen, then simply substitute "Representamen" for "Sign" in my formulation. However, according to Peirce in 1905, "I use 'sign' in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition ... I formerly preferred the word representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word" (SS 193). I have come to agree with that assessment. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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