Jeff, List: The fourth bullet is not derived from any particular passage written by Peirce; it is simply my own attempt to analyze the Sign and Interpretant in any concrete instance of semiosis by means of Aristotle's four causes, with the Correlates all conceptualized in terms of Form/Matter/Entelechy.
- The Dynamic Object is the *Matter *that the Sign *denotes*. - The Immediate Object is the *Form *that the Sign *signifies*. - The Immediate Interpretant is the *Form *that a Sign-Replica *communicates*. - The Dynamic Interpretant is the *Matter *that a Sign-Replica *determines*. - The Final Interpretant is the *Entelechy *that the Sign *intends*. As you may recall, I take at face value Peirce's statements in "New Elements" that "a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas* ... The being of a sign is merely *being represented* ... A sign is something that exists in replicas" (EP 2:303,311; 1904). In other words, I see them as pertaining to *all *Signs, such that there really are no Qualisigns or Sinsigns as Peirce defined them in 1903 according to the (ontological) Mode of Being of the Sign itself. Instead, I have adopted his later division into Tone/Token/Type according to the Sign's (phaneroscopic) Mode of Apprehension or Possible Presentation. I remain open to being persuaded that this is mistake on my part, but so far I have not encountered a convincing explanation of why Peirce would have used (and emphasized) the broad term "sign" in those statements--even adding that he was "Giving to the word *sign *the full scope that reasonably belongs to it for logical purposes" (EP 2:303)--if he somehow meant them to apply more narrowly, to only Legisigns or Symbols. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 4:01 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Jon S, List, > > You refer to sample texts for the sake of supporting the first three of > the bulleted points, but no reference is provided for the fourth point. Do > you, by chance, have textual references that I might consult in order to > understand the seven points that are made: > > - (1) The efficient cause of the Sign is the DO, > - (2) its formal cause is the IO, its material cause is the SR, and > - (3) its final cause is mediating between the DO and the FI. > - (4) The efficient cause of the Interpretant is the SR, > - (5) its formal cause is the II, > - (6) its material cause is the DI, and > - (7) its final cause is the FI. > > On a separate note, you might remove some possible confusion by inserting > "Legisign" into the diagram and supporting discussion where you are clearly > talking about signs that have the character of necessitants (i.e., general > rules) in terms of the mode of their apprehension. That might help clarify, > for instance, the kind of relation that holds between general legisigns and > token sinsigns. Furthermore, one thing that seems missing from the diagram > is some indication of where iconic qualisigns fit into the picture. > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* Monday, June 25, 2018 1:00 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Triad vs. Triadic Relation (was Direct experience > and immediate object) > > Edwina, List: > > No one is "blaming" anyone for anything. I did (and still do) sincerely > find the IO-R-II triad concept attractive, because of how it captures the > nature of the IO and II as being *internal *to the Sign. > > In the end, the problem for me, as I have already explained, was one of > terminological ethics--the inconsistency of using "Representamen" for a > *component* of the Sign with the fact that Peirce *never *did so. Again, > perhaps we can come up with a *different *term of our own; but as far as > I can tell, Peirce nowhere suggested *any *particular name for whatever > is left of the Sign when the IO and II are analytically removed from it, or > that such a move is even possible. > > Nor did he ever say that the DO is "within the definition of the full > Sign"; on the contrary, he consistently described the DO as *external *to > the Sign itself, such that they are two of the three Correlates (i.e., > subjects) in a *triadic relation*. Despite your ongoing insistence > otherwise, he also did not use "Sign" for "the full triadic process"; > instead, he called that "semiosis," and my current model of it--which > remains open to correction and refinement--is summarized in the attached > diagram (originally posted back in April) and as follows. > > - Every Sign *denotes *its Object (Matter/DO), *signifies *characters > or qualities of that Object (Form/IO), and *determines *its > Interpretant (Entelechy/FI as unity of Matter/DI and Form/II); cf. EP 2:304 > (1904). > - The DO determines the Sign *relatively to the FI*, while the Sign > determines the FI *in reference to the DO*, such that the DO > determines the FI through the mediation of the Sign; cf. EP 2:410 (1907). > This is a *genuine* triadic relation. > - The Sign-Replica is a medium for the communication of a Form (which > it embodies representatively as the IO) from the DO (which embodies the > Form entitatively) to the DI (which embodies the Form interpretatively as > the II); cf. EP 2:477 and EP 2:544n22 (both 1906). This is a > *degenerate *triadic relation, such that it can be resolved into the > dyadic DO-SR and SR-DI relations. > - The efficient cause of the Sign is the DO, its formal cause is the > IO, its material cause is the SR, and its final cause is mediating between > the DO and the FI. The efficient cause of the Interpretant is the SR, its > formal cause is the II, its material cause is the DI, and its final cause > is the FI. > > Notice that "Representamen" is completely absent here, because I now take > it as synonymous/interchangeable with "Sign," as Peirce did in and after > 1905. You presumably disagree with all of this, because your > interpretation of Peirce and your model of semiosis are very different, but > I continue to see no need to rehash any of that further. > > Regards, > > Jon S. >
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