Jeff, List:
Again, I am shifting this exchange to the new thread.
First of all, CP 1.537 is from 1903, when Peirce still thought of semiosis
as an "infinite series" of Signs in both directions. By 1906 (CP 4.536),
he recognized that some Signs *do not* have other Signs as their
Interpretants--they have feelings or exertions as their Interpretants
instead. By 1907 ("Pragmatism"), he further recognized that even
intellectual Signs have "ultimate logical interpretants" that are *not *Signs;
rather, they are habits (or habit-changes).
Moving on, my initial answer to your question is as follows.
- The II of the first Sign is internal to it.
- The DI of the first Sign *is *the second Sign, which has its own II
that is internal to it and not necessarily identical to the first Sign's II.
- The FI of the first Sign is also the FI of the second Sign.
- The second Sign may or may not have a DI; and if it does, that DI can
be a feeling, an exertion, or a third Sign.
The II, DI, and FI are not three *parts *of one Interpretant, but three
*aspects* of it. In my current model, the II is its Form, the DI is its
Matter, and the FI is its Entelechy.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 8:27 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
> Gary R, Jon S, Gary F, List,
>
> Here is a question. Consider the following definition of the sign, which
> is consistent with what Peirce says in a number of places:
>
> A sign stands *for *something *to *the idea which it produces, or modifies.
> Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for
> which it stands is called its *object; *that which it conveys, its
> *meaning; *and the idea to which it gives rise, its *interpretant. *The
> object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the
> first representation is the interpretant. But an endless series of
> representations, each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to
> have an absolute object at its limit. The meaning of a representation can be
> nothing but a representation. In fact, it is nothing but the
> representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But
> this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only changed
> for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here.
> Finally, the *interpretant is nothing but another representation to* *which
> the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its
> interpretant* *again. Lo, another infinite series*.
>
> For starters, let us focus on the last sentence, which I have highlighted
> in bold and underline. If an interpretant functions as a sign in relation
> to some further interpretant, what is the implication of saying that there
> are three interpretants, the immediate, dynamical and final? Peirce says
> that in the process of cognition by agents who are relatively
> self-controlled, that the sign is thought playing the part of firstness,
> while the object is thought playing the role of secondness, while
> the interpretant is thought playing the part of thirdness. (CP 1.537)
>
> If this sounds odd to you, especially when thinking about the object, then
> consider the case where the object is something like a number, which is an
> idealized object formed by a process of hypostatic abstraction. In this
> kind of case of hypostatic abstraction, which is not by any means limited
> to mathematical objects, what was once a predicate comes to serve as the
> object for some further interpretant. Having made this point about the
> object, let's set it to the side and focus on the relation between signs
> and interpretants.
>
> In order to keep things straight, let's label things by saying that the
> object, sign and interpretant in the first case are each labelled
> level (1), and in the next stage where the interpretant is now serving as a
> sign in relation to some further interpretant, the sign, object and
> interpretant are at level (2). What is the implication of describing the
> interpretant (at level 1) that also functions as a sign (at level 2) in
> this way? The interpretant in level (1) is thought playing the part of
> thirdness (i.e., a genuine triad) with respect to the sign that it is
> serving to interpret, but that same interpretant/sign at level (2) has the
> character of firstness (i.e., a monadic character) with respect to
> its level (2) interpretant.
>
> Here is the question: what is the implication with respect to the
> character of the sign and interpretant at each level? That is, the
> interpretant at level (1) has three parts (immediate, dynamical and final)
> in its relation to the level (1) sign it interprets, but then it does not
> appear to have three parts when it is serving as a sign at level (2) in
> relation to some further level (2) interpretant. As a sign, it has the
> character of a thought playing the role of a first.
>
> Let me now restate the question: does the three part interpretant still
> have three parts when it is functioning as a sign, or does it have just one
> part?
>
> Yours,
>
> Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
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