List, JAS: My opinion on the relative role of representation in perception and cognition was just that.
The following quote parallels certain aspects of my view. Representation and the Meaning of Life W.D. Christensen and C.A. Hooker In the western philosophical tradition the reasoning agent is characterised in a way that is, perhaps unsurprisingly, overwhelmingly preoccupied with ideas. Rationality, and intelligent action, are characterised in terms of relations amongst ideas, and between ideas and the world. In the twentieth century this concern with ideas translated into a strong focus on representation, and a representationally based conception of the nature of cognition called cognitivism. According to cognitivism, representation is the fundamental and ubiquitous unit of all cognitive explanation. It is the key element in the answers to all questions about how we can know about the world and act intelligently in it. Perception, for instance, is modelled as the acquisition of representations and problem solving as the logical manipulation of representations. The challenge to the Peircian perception of a “sign” as a general term in contrast with a representation as a logical term (predicate) for a species is substantial. If one considers the role of lexical fields is separating the meanings of signs standing as predicates, then the challenge is increased in its severity. Or, an alternative statement is that a sign as a generality is vague wrt both scale and scope, severely limiting the relationships between lexical fields. In my view, representation is essential to the natural sciences in order to relate the scale and scope of the terms of representations of parts of wholes such that logical compositions can emerge and be either verified or rejected. Cheers Jerry > On Jun 25, 2018, at 7:09 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > Jerry C., List: > > Where exactly did Peirce use "the sequence of terms thing, representamen, > form"? With respect to his Categories, Form (quality) is 1ns, Matter (thing) > is 2ns, and Entelechy (Sign/Representamen) is 3ns. > > In his later writings, Peirce broadened his one-word summary of 3ns from > representation to mediation. This may have been one motivation for his shift > from "Representamen" to "Sign" as the preferred term. > > I see no reason whatsoever to infer that Peirce was "abandoning realism and > approaching sophism." On the contrary, his realism became more and more > "extreme" (his characterization) over time. > > Regards, > > Jon S. > > On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 4:32 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com <mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote: > JAS, List: > > Thank for clarifying the change of views of CSP wrt meaning of representamen > and sign. > > From my scientific perspective, this substitution of the word sign for the > word represent amen appears to be a major change in his world view toward the > meaning of scientific symbol systems and the arrangement of predicates within > a lexical field. > > Necessary to abstract scientific activity is the expression of existence of > objects as symbols that serve to substitute for the object itself. CSP uses > the sequence of terms thing, representamen, form. This sequence of terms, or > an analogous sequence is essential to relating real (external) events to > internal thought and subsequent scientific activity. > > Linguistically, the notion of “to re - present” is rather specific for the > thing that is symbolically referenced in the term. “Sign” does not connote > in this sense, does it? > > In my opinion, CSP’s appears to be abandoning realism and approaching > sophism. So be it. > > Cheers > > Jerry > >> On Jun 24, 2018, at 6:33 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com >> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> Gary F., List: >> >> Again, Peirce carefully distinguished between "Representamen" and "Sign" >> until 1905, after which he seems to have used them interchangeably and >> generally preferred "Sign." Are you aware of any later writing in which he >> explicitly maintained the previous distinction? >> >> Thanks, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 6:23 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca >> <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote: >> Jon, list, >> >> I’d like to remind you of what Peirce says in Lowell Lecture 3: >> >> [[ I confine the word Representation to the operation of a sign or its >> relation to the object for the interpreter of the representation. The >> concrete subject that represents I call a sign or a representamen. I use >> these two words, sign and representamen, differently. By a sign I mean >> anything which conveys any definite notion of an object in any way, as such >> conveyers of thought are familiarly known to us. Now I start with this >> familiar idea and make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a >> sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies >> to. If therefore I have committed an error in my analysis, part of what I >> say about signs will be false. For in that case a sign may not be a >> representamen. The analysis is certainly true of the representamen, since >> that is all that word means. Even if my analysis is correct, something may >> happen to be true of all signs, that is of everything that, antecedently to >> any analysis, we should be willing to regard as conveying a notion of >> anything, while there might be something which my analysis describes of >> which the same thing is not true. In particular, all signs convey notions to >> human minds; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so. ] >> CP 1.540] >> >> So “representamen” was a term defined to be more general than “sign,” which >> in this context (and in the Syllabus) determine their interpretants in human >> minds. This was Peirce’s way of taking semiosis beyond the human. However, >> most of his subsequent analysis of semiosis dealt with “conveyers of thought >> familiarly known to us” (humans), simply because it is difficult to direct >> attention to representamens that are not known to us, since they are quite >> hard to find in the commens. Thus in most subsequent contexts, as you say, >> the two terms are “effectively synonymous” in that they refer to the same >> objects. However Peirce did distinguish between them, as you see above. >> >> Gary f. >> >> From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com >> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> >> >> Sent: 24-Jun-18 18:25 >> To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> >> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object >> >> >> >> Gary F., List: >> >> Just to clarify, I no longer treat the Representamen as a "component" of the >> Sign along with the IO and II. As I noted to Gary R. a little while ago, I >> have embraced Peirce's 1905 assessment that "Sign" is a preferable >> alternative to "Representamen," such that the two terms are effectively >> synonymous. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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