"Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
CSP: Thus, while the complete Object of a Symbol, that is to say, its meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a character. A genuine Symbol is a Symbol that has a general meaning. There are two kinds of degenerate Symbols, the Singular Symbol whose Object is an existent individual, and which signifies only such characters as that individual may realize; and the Abstract Symbol, whose only Object is a character. (EP 2:275; 1903)
CSP: The word signify has been the regular technical term since the twelfth century, when John of Salisbury (Metalogicus, II, xx) spoke of "quod fere in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse quod appellativa [i.e., adjectives] significant, et aliud esse quod nominant. Nominantur singularia [i.e., existent individual things and facts], sed universalia [i.e., Firstnesses] signifcantur." (EP 2:281n; 1903)
CSP: In addition however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently complete [there is that phrase again] signifies characters, or qualities ... Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the Aristotelian Form of the universe that it signifies. (EP 2:304; 1904).
CSP: It will be observed that the icon is very perfect in respect to signification, bringing its interpreter face to face with the very character signified ... An icon is a sign fit to be used as such because it possesses the quality signified. (EP 2:307; 1904)
Jon,
As I said before, “Fregean interpretation” is Bellucci’s label for your position, which I assumed you were already familiar with. Whether it should be called “pejorative” or not, I don’t know. Here is his note on the subject from Peirce’s Speculative Grammar (p. 350):
[[ Peirce's distinction between the immediate and the dynamic object of a sign has often been taken to account for something similar to the Fregean distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, and accordingly it has been assumed that the immediate object should have something to do with the “meaning” or “sense” of a sign. For a criticism of this interpretation see Bellucci (2015c). Here I can observe that, as Peirce explains to Lady Welby, “signification is only one of the two chief functions of signs; as the elegant and correct John of Salisbury notices, in referring to ‘quod £ere in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse quod appellativa significant, et aliud esse quod nominant. Nominantur singularia, sed universalia significantur’” (RL 463 ISP 148). A sign both denotes and connotes, nominat and significat. It denotes its object and signifies its interpretant. It says something, and also indicates that of which it says what it says. If it is thought that the dynamic object corresponds to what the sign nominat, while the immediate object to what the sign significat — as, for example, Mats Bergman does when he says that the “aspect of saying something about something in some manner is conceptualized as the immediate object in distinction from the dynamical object that encompasses identification and demarcation” (2008, 86) — the result would be precisely that confusion between the object and the interpretant of a sign against which Peirce warned us. As far as I know, the only Peirce scholar who has fully recognized that the immediate object of a sign has nothing to do with its “meaning” is Frederik Stjernfelt: “neither the Immediate Object nor the Dynamic Object is concerned with descriptive characters — this is left to the meaning categories. Both deal with the identity of reference" (2014, 98). ]]
And Bellucci 2015 is here: http://www.sss.ut.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/SSS.2015.43.4.02. Since you’ve been arguing against it since it was mentioned on the list some time ago, I mistakenly assumed you had read it.
Gary f.
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