Jeff, Gary F., List: When I see the word "involve" or "involution" in a conversation about Peirce, I tend to think of how he used those terms with respect to his Categories--3ns involves 2ns, which involves 1ns. In the context of semeiotic, this applies *across* each of the trichotomies--Necessitants involve Existents, which involve Possibles--rather than from one trichotomy to another, which is where the order of determination governs (cf. EP 2:481; 1908). Specifically, according to NDTR (EP 2:291-297; 1903) ...
- Legisigns (indirectly) and Sinsigns (directly) involve Qualisigns. - Symbols involve Indices, which involve Icons (restated in "New Elements," EP 2:318; 1904). - Arguments involve Dicisigns, which involve - Rhemes. Peirce went on to extend this notion to some of the ten classes of Signs--Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns and Dicent Sinsigns involve Iconic Sinsigns, Dicent Indexical Legisigns involve Iconic Legisigns, and Dicent Symbols involve Rhematic Symbols. On the other hand, no passages come to mind where Peirce used "evolve" or "evolution" in this kind of technical sense when discussing semeiotic; are there any? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 2:09 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jeff, list, > > A couple of comments inserted … > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > *Sent:* 27-Jun-18 14:50 > > Gary F, List, > > If I confused matters by using the noun form in place of the verb form of > the words, then my apologies. > > GF: No, that didn’t confuse me, as I too had looked up both the noun and > verb forms of both words in both the Century and Baldwin dictionaries. > However I did notice a quirk of usage of “evolve”: although in our time it > is almost always used as an *intransitive* verb, in Peirce’s time it was > normally used, either in the active or passive voice, as a *transitive* > verb. Indeed every one of Peirce’s uses of the verb that I’ve been able to > find was transitive, including the one you quoted: > > In "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from > within", Peirce draws a contrast between what is involved in a relation and > what evolves from such a relation. Consider, for instance, the following > passage: > > Let us not put the cart before the horse, nor the evolved actuality before > the possibility as if the latter *involved *what it only *evolves. * CP > 1.422 > > GF: If “the latter” in that sentence refers to “the possibility”, the > sentence implies that *the possibility evolves the actuality.* And this > is confirmed later on, at CP 1.453: “I follow an order of evolution in such > phrases, the possibility evolves the actuality.” Now, if our usage of > “evolution” and “involution” is meant to follow Peirce’s (in logic and > mathematics if not in biology), this creates a contrast between the order > of evolution and the order of determination: for I think we agree that a > possibility (as First) cannot *determine* an actuality (as Second). But > the order of determination does not seem to be the order of involution > either; so we have two different orders of order, so to speak. I;m not sure > how this will play out in the classification of signs. > > In the Century Dictionary, he distinguishes between the mathematical and > the logical use of "involves." Here is a logical definition: > > Involve (df): to bring into a common relation or connection. Hence, to > include as a necessary or logical consequence; imply; comprise. > > My understanding is that we determine what is involved in a relation > generally or in some specific conception by analysis, and we determine what > is evolved from a relation by synthetic processes. > > The mathematical definitions of involve and involution have to do with > processes of multiplication which, as far as I can see, are species of > determining what is logically involved in a relation. My hunch is > that Peirce was generalizing from the mathematical meanings of these terms > as they were being used in algebra and projective geometry (by Desargues) > and applying them in the context of mathematical logic to both the > relational algebras and the EG. From the use of these terms in mathematical > logic, he then may have generalized further to a clarification of the > proper use of the terms in philosophy. > > Hope that helps to clarify the meanings of "involve" and "involution." I > should note that the list of Peirce's entries written for the Century > Dictionary suggest that he didn't provide the definition for "evolve", but > he did provide a definition for "evolution". Looking at the two > definitions, they are quite close. As such, I suspect that Peirce may have > written the definition of "evolve" or someone else may have written it > based on Peirce's definition of evolution. Either way, here is a > definition: > > Evolve: to unfold or develop by a process of natural, consecutive or > logical growth from, or as if from, a germ, latent state or plan. > > It is worth pointing out that the entry makes a distinction between the > transitive and intransitive use of the verb. The definition of the > intransitive form of the verb seems to highlight something opening or > disclosing *itself* (as if it were becoming developed under its own plan > and/or power). > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ------------------------------ > > *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> > *Sent:* Wednesday, June 27, 2018 10:06:31 AM > *To:* 'Peirce-L' > *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object > > > > Jeff, > > You’ve put a lot of questions on our plate here, and I’m still working on > the first one: “Can the distinction you are drawing between the analytic > and synechistic approaches also be expressed in terms of the evolution and > involution of signs and their relations?” I don’t have a definite answer to > that yet — just more questions! > > First I have to ask whether your intention is to use the terms “evolution” > and “involution” as Peirce would use them in logic or semiotic (rather than > in the biological context in which most usage of “evolution” occurs). I > looked in both the *Century Dictionary* and *Baldwin’s Dictionary* > without finding much about how Peirce (or anybody) would apply those terms > to “signs and their relations.” The entries written by Peirce on both words > are largely devoted to their use in *mathematics*, and that seems to be > the context in which Peirce most often uses “involution”. His Baldwin entry > on involution, http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Involution, does > give some logical senses, but it’s not very clear to me how any of them > would apply to Peirce’s speculative grammar. > > It occurred to me after reading your post that what I meant by *analytic* > and *synechistic *was pretty close to *synchronic *and *diachronic* > respectively — since *synechism* is about continuity and time is > continuous, while analysis is about making distinctions that don’t > necessarily take time into account. That doesn’t seem to align with your > evolution/involution pairing, especially if those two are opposites in some > sense; but it does raise the question of how *time* is involved (no pun > intended!) in all this. > > Maybe I’m just introducing complications (another meaning of > “involutions”!) into all this that can be avoided if you can supply working > definitions of “evolution” and “involution” as you intend them to be used > in the taxonomy of signs. Then we can go from there instead of sliding into > the metaphysics and logic of *time*. > > Gary f. > > > *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > *Sent:* 26-Jun-18 12:37 > *To:* 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; g...@gnusystems.ca > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object > > Gary F, List, > > Can the distinction you are drawing between the analytic and synechistic > approaches also be expressed in terms of the evolution and involution of > signs and their relations? My assumption is that we are looking for a > natural classification of the different objects and interpretants that are > essential for semiosis. As such, my working assumption is that we should > hope to arrive at agreement on the natural classification of objects and > interpretants when studying the matter both by involution and evolution. > > Having said that, I agree with you that approaching the study of sign > relations by involution tends to treat them as relatively static entities > that we are "taking apart" via analysis, so to speak. When we look at the > matter from the perspective of the evolution of the relations between > objects, signs and interpretants, we are studying how things grow over > time. > > As far as I can tell, one of the guiding ideas in the division of these > natural classes is the modal character of the objects and > interpretants--just as it is in the classification of signs. As such, the > proper study of the evolution of signs must take into account the way > generals govern the determination of what is possible with respect to the > characteristics of those things that are existent. If this is on track, > then we should expect Peirce to be focusing on the differences between the > conditions under which we actually identify objects today as compared to > the way they would be identified if inquiry were carried forward, just as > we should expect a division between the ways signs and their relations > to objects are interpreted in the past and present in comparison to how > they might come be interpreted if inquiry were carried forward. > > Getting a clearer understanding of the character of the continuity > involved in the the homeostasis, growth and reproduction of signs > relations does appear to be essential for arriving at a more adequate > understanding of semiosis. Do you think we could gain some traction on > these questions by clarifying the role of the principle of continuity in > guiding these sorts of inquiries? In the last lecture of Reasoning and the > Logic of Things (Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898), Peirce seems to > make some progress in terms of clarifying the conception of continuity that > is needed for inquiry in logic. How might we make use of this principle for > the purposes of making a natural classification of objects, signs > and interpretants and, in turn, use this classification for the sake of > better explaining the physiology of semiotic processes? > > The key to the lock on the door to this problem appears to be > understanding the character of synthesis generally and its role in such > processes as (1) the composition of concepts, (2) synthetic judgments and > (3) synthetic reasoning. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ------------------------------ > > *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca> > *Sent:* Tuesday, June 26, 2018 7:50:50 AM > *To:* 'Peirce-L' > *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object > > > > Jeff, > > I see the question you’ve posed here as one manifestation of the necessary > tension between analysis and synechism which drives Peircean semiotic. For > the synechist, semiosis is a continuous process: any *parts* it has are > of the same nature as itself. Yet for the analyst, it has three “separate” > parts: object, sign, interpretant (in the order of determination); and the > various possible relations between the parts (taking account of the mode of > being of each part) enable us to distinguish between types of signs. > > If we think of determination as a continuous process *that takes time*, > its continuity implies that the analysis can be applied at any time scale, > and the relations between the structures at these different scales (or > levels of analysis) will show a self-similarity. But if we do a *logical* > (rather than temporal) analysis of the *parts*, which as products of > analysis have already given up their continuity, then the relations between > parts at different levels of analysis becomes problematic. For instance, > when we analyze the sign’s determination of the interpretant to get > different three types of interpretants, we can’t take for granted that they > all have the same relation to the object that the Interpretant has to the > Object at the first level of analysis. > > So my answer to your question is: It depends on whether you consider the > matter analytically or synechistically. > > Gary f. >
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