List: I agree with Gary F. and Francesco, and share Auke's puzzlement that there is any question about this.
CSP: Normative Science has three widely separated divisions: (i) *Esthetics*; (ii) *Ethics*; (iii) *Logic*. Esthetics is the science of ideals, or of that which is objectively admirable without any ulterior reason. I am not well acquainted with this science; but it ought to repose on phenomenology. Ethics, or the science of right and wrong, must appeal to esthetics for aid in determining the *summum bonum*. It is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, conduct. Logic is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought; and as such, must appeal to ethics for its principles. It also depends upon phenomenology and upon mathematics. All thought being performed by means of signs, *Logic may be regarded as the science of the general laws of signs*. It has three branches: (l) *Speculative Grammar*, or the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; (2) *Critic*, which classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of each kind; (3) *Methodeutic*, which studies the methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of truth. Each division depends on that which precedes it. (CP 1.191, EP 2:260; 1903, bold added) Logic as semeiotic is the third branch of Normative Science. As such, it depends on ethics, which depends on esthetics, which depends on phenomenology (Phaneroscopy), which depends on mathematics (including "the *Mathematics of Logic*," CP 1.185, EP 2:259; 1903); while the Special Sciences (Idioscopy) depend on metaphysics, which depends on logic as semeiotic. Peirce addressed elsewhere why it is a mistake to treat "exact logic" as "on a par with pure mathematics." CSP: There are three excellent reasons any one of which ought to rescue them from the error of this opinion. In the first place, the hypotheses from which the deductions of normative science proceed are *intended to conform* to positive truth of fact and those deductions derive their interest from that circumstance almost exclusively; while the hypotheses of pure mathematics are purely ideal in intention, and their interest is purely intellectual. But in the second place, the procedure of the normative sciences is *not purely deductive*, as that of mathematics is, nor even principally so. Their peculiar analyses of familiar phenomena, analyses which ought to be guided by the facts of phenomenology in a manner in which mathematics is not at all guided, separate normative science from mathematics quite radically. In the third place, there is a most intimate and essential element of normative science which is still *more *proper to it, and that is its *peculiar appreciations*, to which nothing at all in the phenomena, in themselves, corresponds. These appreciations relate to the conformity of phenomena to *ends *which are not immanent within those phenomena. (CP 5.126, EP 2:198-199; 1903) Peirce embraced his father's definition of mathematics, "which runs, not that mathematics is the science *of drawing* necessary conclusions,--which would be deductive logic,--but that it is the science *which draws* necessary conclusions" (CP 4.239; 1902); and its subject matter consists entirely of "hypothetical states of things" (CP 4.233; 1902). Logic as semeiotic, on the other hand, is the science of *all *reasoning--deductive or otherwise--"whose end is to represent something" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200; 1903); namely, "positive truth of fact." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 6:35 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > John, list, > > I have to agree with Francesco and Auke. I’m guessing that you don’t want > to include semiotics with logic, as Peirce did in the Syllabus > classification of 1903 (without using the word “semiotic”), because it > doesn’t seem normative enough. Peirce recognized the problem here and had > already wrestled with it in his Carnegie application in 1902 (Draft D - > MS L75.235-237): > > [[ I define logic very broadly as the study of the formal laws of signs, > or formal semiotic. I define a sign as something, A, which brings > something, B, its interpretant, into the same sort of correspondence with > something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to C. In this > definition I make no more reference to anything like the human mind than I > do when I define a line as the place within which a particle lies during a > lapse of time. At the same time, a sign, by virtue of this definition, has > some sort of meaning. That is implied in correspondence. Now meaning is > mind in the logical sense. But many will object that the only signs we can > study are signs interpreted in human thought. I reply that by the > definition thoughts are themselves signs, and that if it happens to be a > fact that all other signs are ultimately interpreted in thought-signs, then > that fact is irrelevant to logic. The proof that it is irrelevant is that > all the principles of logic are deducible from my definition without taking > any account of the alleged fact, much more clearly than if any attempt is > made to introduce this allegation as a premiss. Therefore, unless this > allegation be regarded as itself a truth of logic, which it is not, since > it is not of a formal nature, it is perfectly irrelevant to logic. I also > define very carefully what I mean by a “formal” law. I say nothing in the > definition about normative principles, because not all the principles of > logic are normative. Indeed, it is only the connection of logic with > esthetics through ethics which causes it to be a normative science at all. > ]] > > > > (This by the way is the only place I’ve found where Peirce uses the term > “formal semiotic.”) I think Peirce’s 1903 solution to the problem was to > trichotomize logic as Speculative Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic. > Speculative Grammar, being First in this trichotomy, is *minimally* > normative (normativity being a form of Secondness), but still connected > with logic in the broad sense. “Thus there are, in my view of the subject, > three branches of logic: Speculative Grammar, Critic, and Methodeutic” — as > Peirce said at the end of Lowell Lecture 1, and in the Syllabus (CP 1.191, > EP2:259). > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Francesco Bellucci <[email protected]> > *Sent:* 10-Sep-18 01:08 > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] How should semeiotic be classified among the > sciences? > > > > Dear John, List, > as I see it, semiotics is logic in the broad sense (comprising spec. gr., > critical logic, and methodeutic), and its place in the classification of > the sciences is the place of logic. The fact in Peirce's schemes of > classification of the sciences there never appears semiotics, is an > indication that it is simply identical with logic (and, I tend to think, > especially with the first branch of logic, spec. gr.) > > That a thinker can spend so much time and ink talking about signs, their > functioning and their varieties, and yet fail to find a place for the > science of signs in his classification of the sciences seems to be > unbelivable. Therefore, I take seriously his claim that "logic is > semiotics" and use "semiotics" as equivalent to "logic" (in the broad > sense). If this identification is made, every problem about semiotics' > collocation in the scheme disappears > > Best > > Francesco > > On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 1:17 AM, John F Sowa <[email protected]> wrote: > > In his 1903 classification of the sciences (CP 1.180-202) > Peirce classified formal logic under mathematics, but he also > classified logic as a normative science. > > Question: Where is semeiotic? > > As a formal theory, it would be classified with formal logic > under mathematics. But semeiotic is also an applied science when > it is used in perception, action, communication... > > When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification, > I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it. > But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram. > Where? > > I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every > perception involves signs. See the attached CSPsemiotic.jpg. > > Does anyone have any comments? > > John >
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