Jon, list, Jon wrote:
JAS: Could you please provide citations where Peirce associated possibility (1ns), existence (2ns), and conditional necessity (3ns) with phenomenology, rather than metaphysics? I understand those to be modes of Being, rather than irreducible elements of experience; I think of the latter as quality (1ns), reaction (2ns), and mediation (3ns) I'll have to split my response up a bit because of time constraints, and so will offer for now only places where Peirce associates 1ns with possibility (I'll take up the other categories in later posts). I agree that Peirce most frequently associates 1ns with quality, but there are other words he uses to distinguish that category from 2ns and 3ns. Here are examples of his associating 1ns with possibility. 1903 | Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed. Lecture III [R] | CP 1.25 Firstness is the mode of being which consists in its subject’s being positively such as it is regardless of aught else. That can only be a possibility. For as long as things do not act upon one another there is no sense or meaning in saying that they have any being, unless it be that they are such in themselves that they may perhaps come into relation with others. The mode of being a *redness*, before anything in the universe was yet red, was nevertheless a positive qualitative possibility. And redness in itself, even if it be embodied, is something positive and *sui generis*. That I call Firstness. We naturally attribute Firstness to outward objects, that is we suppose they have capacities in themselves which may or may not be already actualized, which may or may not ever be actualized, although we can know nothing of such possibilities [except] so far as they are actualized. You can see here as well the germ of his also characterizing the categories (first, in a late letter to William James as I recall) as may-be's, is's, and would-bes. So, commenting on (in the quotation above) only of 1ns*: "*We naturally attribute Firstness to outward objects, that is we suppose they have capacities in themselves which *may or may not be* already actualized, which *may or may not ever be* actualized, although *we can know nothing of such possibilities [except] so far as they are actualized.* Perhaps I might better have characterized the first category as that of may-be's (btw, Peirce also writes of can-be's and might-be's). In the quotation below, 1ns is characterized here as being "an abstract possibility" (there is also a passage where he speaks of its "indeterminacy." We *know* 1ns, however, only "immediately," that is, in *present* experience. 1905-06-01 | The Logic Notebook | MS [R] 339:242r *Firstness* is the Mode of Being of that which is such as it is positively and regardless of anything else. It is thus an abstract possibility, It can therefore only be known to us immediately. This final quotation gives *possibility* as one of several ideas in which 1ns is "prominent." 1904 | A Brief Intellectual Autobiography by Charles Sanders Peirce | Peirce, 1983, p. 72; MS [R] L107:22 *Firstness* is the mode or element of being by which any subject is such as it is, *positively* and regardless of everything else; or rather, the category is not bound down to this particular conception but is the element which is characteristic and peculiar in this definition and is a prominent ingredient in the ideas of quality, qualitativeness, absoluteness, originality, variety, chance, possibility, form, essence, feeling, etc. The point of Peirce associating 1ns with possibility is, I think, that while we *may *come to know it most characteristically as "quality," before it is so known it is a mere *qualitative possibility*. JAS: I think of the [irreducible elements of experience] as quality (1ns), reaction (2ns), and mediation (3ns) I mainly do myself. But I also believe that there are reasons to expand our categorial associations to include, not only possibility, but to see 1ns as "a prominent ingredient in the ideas of quality, qualitativeness, absoluteness, originality, variety, chance, possibility, form, essence, feeling, etc." In short, to limit 1ns to "quality" seems to me all too restrictive in a way, perhaps, tending to limit the power of phenomenological thinking about it. In my view, to associate it *only*, or even mainly, with 'quality' might tend to persuade one to gloss over phenomenological 1ns and, so, to plunge willy-nilly into logic as semeiotic with an insufficient sense of how this category finds a place in that science. Still, even more abstract than 'quality' or 'possibility', at its most abstract, it is but a Pythagorean number, 1ns, which "characterization" Peirce would seem to have come to prefer. Yet I think that *that* move actually allows all the associations listed above (and more) to co-mingle in our thinking, perhaps especially our semeiotic thinking. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 9:25 AM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R., List: > > Could you please provide citations where Peirce associated possibility > (1ns), existence (2ns), and conditional necessity (3ns) with phenomenology, > rather than metaphysics? I understand those to be modes of Being, rather > than irreducible elements of experience; I think of the latter as quality > (1ns), reaction (2ns), and mediation (3ns). > > Thanks, > > Jon S. > > On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:44 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, list, >> >> Jon wrote: >> >> JAS: To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a >> significant role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion >> that I questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to >> imply that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My >> understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally >> *phenomenological*. >> >> >> Well, of course, and by definition, "the Categories are most >> fundamentally *phenomenological*." I BI would hope that goes without >> saying. But of all the sciences *following* phenomenology, I believe >> that the categories are more central to semeiotics than to any of the other >> cenoscopic sciences, certainly more central there than to esthetics and >> ethics, metaphysics, the special sciences. >> >> JAS: I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the >> constituents of three *Universes*, not *Categories*, although there is >> an obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these >> Universes are truly *metaphysical*; after all, they are the primary >> basis for classifying Signs within *Speculative Grammar*, the first >> branch of *logic as semeiotic*. >> >> >> But *in* Phenomenology Peirce defines 1ns (in part) as the possible, 2ns >> as the existent, and 3ns with would-be's, that is, what would necessarily >> be if certain conditions were to come into being and prevailed. Therefore I >> have to modify my earlier suggestion that these three are essentially >> metaphysical, but now recall that the are essentially phenomenological. In >> short, this language of possible/ existent/ necessitant is first >> *introduced* in phenomenology. As you noted, all the categories have >> applications in semeiotic (theoretical grammar in particular) as well as >> metaphysics. Jon continued: >> >> JAS: I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's remark in "New Elements" to >> the effect that the employment of metaphysical terms and concepts in that >> context is a kind of *hypostatic abstration*. >> >> >> CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still >> less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to >> express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind >> ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such >> as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were >> substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904) >> >> >> As I see it, this is more along the line of Peirce's saying that the >> sciences lower in the classification can offer examples, perhaps even >> terminological suggestions, to those above it. But it is the principles of >> logic as semeiotic which, as you yourself have noted, properly understood >> and applied, become those of metaphysics. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> *718 482-5690* >> >> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Gary R., List: >>> >>> GR: While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have >>> noted, signs are not studied in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. >>> >>> >>> Representation/mediation (3ns) is *one *irreducible element of the >>> Phaneron, but so is quality (1ns), and so is reaction (2ns). >>> >>> GR: I think to reduce the application of the cat[eg]ories to the 3ns of >>> signs + "the Universes of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again, >>> not semeiotic but metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity >>> the central importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics >>> but, in my opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it. >>> >>> >>> To clarify, I wholeheartedly agree that the Categories play a >>> significant role throughout Peirce's entire architectonic. The assertion >>> that I questioned was that they are "central to semiotic," which I took to >>> imply that they are somehow more prominent in that branch than others. My >>> understanding is that instead the Categories are most fundamentally >>> *phenomenological*. >>> >>> I must point out again that Possibles/Existents/Necessitants are the >>> constituents of three *Universes*, not *Categories*, although there is >>> an obvious alignment with 1ns/2ns/3ns. I am no longer convinced that these >>> Universes are truly *metaphysical*; after all, they are the primary >>> basis for classifying Signs within *Speculative Grammar*, the first >>> branch of *logic as semeiotic*. I continue to be intrigued by Peirce's >>> remark in "New Elements" to the effect that the employment of metaphysical >>> terms and concepts in that context is a kind of *hypostatic abstration*. >>> >>> CSP: The logician is not concerned with any metaphysical theory; still >>> less, if possible, is the mathematician. But it is highly convenient to >>> express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind >>> ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such >>> as "humanity," "variety," etc., and speak of them as if they were >>> substances, in the metaphysical sense. (EP 2:304; 1904) >>> >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 8:25 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon, John, Francesco, Gary F, Auke, list, >>>> >>>> I too am mystified as to why John is suggesting that semeiotic should >>>> be placed below phenomenology in Peirce's classification of sciences. As >>>> JAS wrote: Why expect Peirce to mention logic as semeiotic in >>>> connection with phenomenology, when he explicitly classified it as a >>>> Normative Science? >>>> >>>> But perhaps a hint as to what John may have in mind occurs in his >>>> initial post in this thread: >>>> >>>> JS: When I drew a diagram to illustrate Peirce's classification, >>>> I did not include semeiotic because he had not mentioned it. >>>> But since it is a science, it belongs somewhere in that diagram. >>>> Where? >>>> >>>> I believe that it belongs directly under phenomenology, since every >>>> perception involves signs. >>>> >>>> >>>> While perhaps "every perception involves signs," as several have noted, >>>> signs are not *studied* in phenomenology but in logic as semeiotic. >>>> And while I'm not yet ready to fully commit to this suggestion, I am >>>> tending to think that Auke may be correct in suggesting that the study of >>>> semeiotics *per se** principally* occurs in the first of the three >>>> branches of logic, i.e., theoretical grammar. The second branch, critical >>>> logic ("logic as logic" as Peirce at least once characterized it) concerns >>>> itself *principally* with "classif[ying] arguments and determin[ing] >>>> the validity and degree of force of each kind," while the third and >>>> final branch, methodeutic (or, theoretical rhetoric) principally takes up >>>> "the methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the >>>> exposition, and in the application of truth." But all of these >>>> branches of logic are, as I see it, informed by the categories. >>>> >>>> >>>> 1903 | Syllabus: Syllabus of a course of Lectures at the Lowell >>>> Institute beginning 1903, Nov. 23. On Some Topics of Logic | EP 2:260 >>>> >>>> All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded >>>> as the science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: >>>> (1) *Speculative Grammar*, or the general theory of the nature and >>>> meanings of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; (2) >>>> *Critic*, which classifies arguments and determines the validity and >>>> degree of force of each kind; (3) *Methodeutic*, which studies the >>>> methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, >>>> and in the application of truth. *Each division depends on that which >>>> precedes it *(boldface added). >>>> >>>> >>>> I recall that many years ago Joe Ransdell and I had a list discussion >>>> about the place, not of semiotics but of phenomenology. At one point he >>>> suggested that it might not be a science at all and, in any event, even if >>>> it were, there wasn't much scientific work to do there and, moreover, >>>> Peirce had already done most all the important work in it. As you might >>>> imagine, I disagreed. >>>> >>>> I think that it's possible (and in my experience, a fact) that some >>>> logicians and semioticians have trouble imaginingg that, "since every >>>> perception involves signs," that wherever you *might* place >>>> phenomenology--if you classify it as a science at all--semiotics has either >>>> to replace it or, as John has done, place semiotics very near phenomenology >>>> (so, near the head of cenoscopic science). It may be that *everything >>>> is semiotic*, but semiotic is studied in *semeiotic* (I always use >>>> this spelling when referring to Peirce's tripartite science). >>>> >>>> I have sometimes thought, and a few times on this list introduced the >>>> notion, that this issue might be at least partially resolved by considering >>>> more seriously Peirce's distinction between *logica utens*, the >>>> ordinary logic we all use and must use, and *logica docens*, the >>>> formal study of logic as a normative science. For it is surely true that if >>>> we are to say anything at all about phenomenological inquiries-and, for >>>> that matter, theoretical esthetical and ethical inquiries, we are fairly >>>> dependent on our ordinary logic, our *logica* *utens*. Theoretical >>>> ethics, esthetics, and logic as semeiotic (that is, the normative sciences) >>>> can, however, offer *examples* to the first cenoscopic science, >>>> phenomenology. So, along with such exemplary cases, since we have a *logica >>>> utens *we can make progress in that under-studied and, in my opinion, >>>> under-appreciated science. Phenomenology is hard to do, as Peirce in >>>> several places makes clear, such that, as in every discipline, some are >>>> drawn to it and others are not, some have great intellectual capacity for >>>> tackling it, some have less. >>>> >>>> JAS wrote: Also, in what sense are his Categories "central to >>>> semiotic"? His trichotomies for Sign classification are divisions into the >>>> *Universes *of Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants, rather than the >>>> *Categories* of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. >>>> >>>> I would disagree with Jon in this matter since I *do*, as does John, >>>> see the Categories as "central to semiotic," that there is much more >>>> categorial involvement in semeiotics than "the *Universes *of >>>> Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants" which are, after all, >>>> principles that the science following logic as semeiotic, that is, >>>> metaphysics offers. However, a discussion of this would divert us from the >>>> present one. >>>> >>>> JAS wrote: What Peirce *did *say on various occasions is that Signs >>>> are the paradigmatic exemplars of the phenomenological Category of 3ns, >>>> which is the element of representation or (more generally) mediation. >>>> >>>> Yes, and this is yet another way in which the categories figure in >>>> semeiotic. Why the three branches of semeiotic are themselves categorially >>>> informed (as most of Peirce's classication of sciences are). Many of the >>>> topics of semeiotic relating especially, but not exclusively, to the >>>> classification of signs, but also to to critical logic and theoretical >>>> rhetoric (including pragmatism) draw upon phenomenology . I think to reduce >>>> the application of the catories to the 3ns of signs + "the *Universes *of >>>> Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants," (again, not semeiotic but >>>> metaphysical categories) is to reduce almost to absurdity the central >>>> importance of the Universal Categories not only to semeiotics but, in my >>>> opinion, almost all the sciences which follow it. While it seems clear >>>> enough that the triad possibles/existents/necessitants is itself >>>> tricategorial. >>>> >>>> JAS concluded: Nevertheless, again, the science that *studies *Signs >>>> is not part of phenomenology, but of Normative Science >>>> >>>> Regarding this there seems to be, for good reason as I see it, more >>>> agreement than disagreement. >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary >>>> >>>> *Gary Richmond* >>>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >>>> *Communication Studies* >>>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >>>> *718 482-5690* >>>> >>>
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