Helmut, list
I'm a great admirer of the epistemic cut [see Harold Atmanspacher
for a good analysis] - but, in the case of a rheme, which is in a
mode of pure Firstness, I suggest that there is no epistemic cut. The
rheme is a STATE of pure feeling with no distinction between self and
other.
So, there is no cognitive interpretation going on..."Aristotle
sometimes speaks of sense as prior to reason...and "matter is prior
to form; and potency to energy". 6.388.
And therefore, in a sense, no DO or even IO. One must even wonder if
it is a Sign, that triad of O-R-I?! Or is it the "nothing of boundless
freedom', or potentiality' [6.219] that is somehow connected, in a few
seconds - to semiosis [the triadic use of this potentiality] as a
source of the potential?
Edwina
On Wed 12/09/18 3:11 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Supplement: I refer to a text by Joseph Ransdell
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/useabuse.htm
and I dont understand it, neither that some sign should not have an
IO. The DO is what is, the thing itself, and the IO is what it
appears to be in the semiosic process, according to Ransdell. If
there nothing appears, no IO exists, it is not a sign, is it? A sign
is about appearance, isnt it? Further I dont understand, that the IO
is a part of the DO, and at the end of complete inquiry both are the
same. See the end of the text. Ransdell writes that then the
reflexion somehow vanishes. But isnt that a sort of magical thinking?
Like if you know everything there is to know about an inkstand, that
inkstand materializes out of thin air before you? If the DO is the
inkstand, and the IO is as what it appears to be according to the
sign, even when this appearance is complete knowledge about it, it
still is just immaterial mental knowledge, but not the material
thing. I think the epistemic cut is a cut like the cut in the EGs. On
one side is the phaneron, on the other the material and energetic
world. To mention it is not dualism. The easiest, and for me the only
understandable way of dealing with it is to assume, that everything
concerning signs is on the phaneron side of it, so the DO too.
Francesco, Edwina, Jon, List, to me it seem as if "is mortal" might
have a subject, and is quantifiable, if it means "belongs to the set
of mortal entities". But does "is mortal" mean "will die" or "may
die"? In the first case, bacteria dont belong to the set, in the
latter they do. So, if "mortal" is an unclear term, this rheme is not
quantifiable. But i´m sure, I have misunderstood it all, and should
read Peirce first, so if that is so, just dont answer. Best, Helmut
12. September 2018 um 14:29 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
Francesco, list
Thanks for the clear and logical analysis.
I would simply say that a rheme is in a mode of Firstness and as
such, is a STATE and not an act of cognition or interpretation. As a
state [a feeling], it has no component parts and thus, has no
IO....or II or DI..etc..
Edwina
On Wed 12/09/18 1:31 AM , Francesco Bellucci
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com sent: Jon, List Thanks
for the summary. To say that particular/singular/universal is a
division of propositions is to say that that which is either p, s, or
u is only a proposition, i.e. that only propositions are either p, s,
or g. Now Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are according to
their IO are either p, s, or u. This means that only that which is
either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO (for otherwise
Peirce should have said: some signs are divisible according to the IO
into p, s, g and some other signs are divisible according to the IO
into x, y, z). Now, since only propositions are either p, s, or g
and since that which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to
the IO, it follows that only propositions are divisible according to
the IO. Now, that only propositions are divisible according to the
IO ceratinly means that propositions have an IO, but does not exclude
that non-propositional signs also have an IO. This I concede. But if
one wonders what on earth the IO of a proposition is, that
non-propositional signs have no IO becomes evident. For since
propositions are divisible according to the IO into p, s, and g, that
which constitutes the IO in them is that which allows such division. I
see no warrant for claiming that the p-s-g aspect in a proposition is
"part" of the IO, as Jon suggests. For in that case Peirce should
have made it clear that propositions are divisible according to a
part (= the quantificational part) of the IO into p, s, and g. He
should have made it clear that the IO does not exhaust the
quantificational dimension of propositions, and, I surmise, he should
have made it clear that propositions are divisible according to one
part of the IO into p, s, and g, and according to another part of the
IO into, say, x, y, and z. As far as I know, Peirce never speak of
"parts" of the IO, one of which would be the quantificational
dimension. I think it is safe to conclude that that which constitutes
the IO in a proposition is that which allows the division into p, s,
and g. That which allows the division of propositions into p, s,
and g is what Peirce calls the "subject" of a proposition: in "All
men are mortal", the Peircean subject is "For any x..." while the
predicate is "x is either not a man or is mortal"; in "Some men are
wise" the Peircean subject is "For some x..." and the predicate is "x
is both a man and mortal"; in "Socrates is mortal" the subject is
"Socrates" and the predicate "x is mortal". The predicates in these
sentences are rhemes. Rhemes do not have "subjects", they are not
quantified. Since that which allows the division into p, s, and g is
the IO, and since the IO is – in the case of those signs for which
it is comprehensible what on earth the IO is – the subject, it
follows that lack of a subject involves lack of an IO. In sum:
In order for a sign to have an IO, it should be divisible into p, s,
and g (this I think is evident from Peirce's claim taht "signs are
divisible according to the IO into p, s, and g.) Rhemes are not
divisible into p, s, and g Therefore, rhemes do not have an IO
Francesco Rhemes do not have Immediate Objects. On
Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 5:26 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Francesco,
List: To clarify, I do not dispute any of the following.
*Only Dicisigns and Arguments distinctly/separately/specially
indicate their Objects.
*Only Arguments distinctly/separately/specially express their
Interpretants.
*The Immediate Object is the Object that is represented by the
Sign to be the Sign's Object.
*Rhemes are less complete Signs than Dicisigns, which are less
complete Signs than Arguments.
*Rhemes cannot be true or false.
*Particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions.
*Quantification is an aspect of a proposition's Immediate Object.
However, I continue to to find the following inferences
exegetically unwarranted and systematically problematic.
*Rhemes do not have Immediate Objects.
*Rhemes and Dicisigns do not have Immediate Interpretants.
*Despite being Types and Symbols, propositions can have Immediate
Objects that are Possibles (vague) or Existents (singular).
*Quantification is required for any Sign to have an Immediate
Object.
It still seems to me that #1 would mean that Rhemes cannot denote
their Objects at all, while #2 would mean that Rhemes and Dicisigns
cannot signify their Interpretants at all; yet it was already
well-established in logic, and explicitly affirmed by Peirce--both
early and late--that terms (Rhematic Symbols) have Breadth and Depth.
#3 would mean that in his late taxonomy, the trichotomy according to
the Immediate Object comes after the one according to the relation
between the Sign and Dynamic Object in the order of determination.
#4 is an arbitrary restriction that Peirce himself, as far as I know,
never imposed. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas,
USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 2:16 PM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
Jon, List JAS: If one holds that only Sign-Replicas
distinctly/separately representing their Objects have Immediate
Objects, then one must also hold that only Sign-Replicas
distinctly/separately representing their Interpretants have Immediate
Interpretants. If a Rheme does not have an Immediate Object, then a
Rheme or Dicisign does not have an Immediate Interpretant; but
Peirce never said or implied this. Peirce said something like this,
but before the distinction between different kinds of interpretants
had emerged. He said that a proposition does not separately represent
its interpretant: CSP: " A proposition is a symbol in which the
representative element, or reason [i.e. interpretant, FB], is left
vague and unexpressed, but in which the reactive element [i.e. the
object, FB] is distinctly [i.e. separately, FB] indicated. [...] An
argument is a bad name for a symbol in which the representative
element [i.e. interpretant, FB] , or reason, is distinctly
expressed.” (R 484: 7-8, 1898)
CSP: “[a] Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the
Object which it denotes, called its Subject, but leaves its
Interpretant to be what it may” (CP 2.95, 1902
CSP: "A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an
argument. An argument is a representamen which separately shows what
interpretant it is intended to determine. A proposition is a
representamen which is not an argument [i.e. which separately shows
what interpretant it is intended to determine, FB], but which
separately indicates what object it is intended to represent. A rhema
is a simple representation without such separate part" (EP 2: 204,
1903) CSP “A term […] is any representamen which does not
separately indicate its object; […] A proposition is a
representamen which separately indicates its object, but does [not]
specially show what interpretant it is intended to determine […] An
argument is a symbol which especially shows what interpretant it is
intended to determine” (R 491: 9-10, 1903). Now, the question is:
in light of the later taxonomy of interpretants, what is the
interpretant that the proposition does not, while the argument does,
separately represent? CSP: …every sign has
two objects. It has that object which it represents itself to have,
its Immediate Object, which has no other being than that of being
represented to be, a mere Representative Being, or as the Kantian
logicians used to say a merely Objective Being ... The Objective
Object is the putative father. (R 499; c. 1906, bold added)
I beg you to notice what Peirce says: he says "has that object
which it represents itself to have", which, if my English sustains
me, means that the sign has that object which the sign represents
itself to have, not that it has the object that the sign represents
in its (i.e. the object's) qualities or characters. That is, the
immediate object is the object that is represented by the sign to be
the sign's object, not the object in the characters that the sign
represents it to have. CSP: Every sign must plainly
have an immediate object, however indefinite, in order to be a sign.
(R 318:25; 1907, bold added) This indeed seems contrary
to the claim that only propositions have an immediate object. There
is another occurrence of such a claim, in another 1907 writing (a
letter to Papini). Now I beg you to notice that since the beginning
of this discussion I was talking of the classification of signs of
1904–1906, in which the notion of immediate object first emerged.
The two contrary statements are from 1907, and I suspect that after
1907 his notion of immediate object changed. Perhaps the
qualification " however indefinite" can help us explain how it
changed. But in general, I repeat, I think that often "sign" has
to be taken to mean "complete sign" (i.e. "proposition"). If in such
apparently contrary statements we adopt this strategy, problems
vanish. Peirce says as much: CSP: "a sign may be complex; and the
parts of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the
essential characters of a more complete sign" (R 7: 2). A rheme,
though it is a sign, may not possess all the essential characters of
a proposition. In particular, while a proposition separately
represent its own object (i.e. while it has an immediate object), a
rheme does not. CSP: "a sign sufficiently complete must in some
sense correspond to a real object. A sign cannot even be false
unless, with some degree of definiteness, it specifies the real
object of which it is false" (R 7: 3–4). Please note that R 7
was probably composed in 1903, i.e. before the IO/DO distinction had
emerged. The sufficiently complete sign must specify, with some
degree of definiteness (either singularly, vaguely, or generally) the
object, i.e. the DO in the later terminology, this specification, this
"hint" ("The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or its
substance, is the Immediate Objec"), being the IO. He also says that
"a sufficiently complete sign may be false" (R 7, p. 4). Rhemes
cannot be false, only propositions can, precisely because they
indicate an object of which they are false.
CSP: The Immediate Interpretant consists in the Quality of the
Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any actual reaction.
(CP 8.315; 1909, bold added) CSP: My Immediate
Interpretant is implied in the fact that each Sign must have its
peculiar Interpretability before it gets any Interpreter ... The
Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction, consisting in a
Possibility. (SS 110; 1909, bold added) The second quote
affirms that the Immediate Object can be indefinite; i.e., it need
not be be distinctly/separately represented. There are various other
passages like the third quote, where Peirce discussed the Immediate
Object and/or Immediate Interpretant of "a Sign," implying no
limitation whatsoever on the classes that he had in mind. In short,
I see no warrant at all for claiming that he limited the Immediate
Object to Dicisigns and Arguments, or the Immediate Interpretant to
Arguments alone. The warrant is a fundamental exegetical
claim, emphasized by John Sowa few posts ago: Peirce was a logician,
and everything he says about "signs" has to have logical relevance.
The 1904–1906 distinction into vague, singular, and general signs
is a well-known logical distinction (particular, singular, and
universal propositions), and since the immediate object is that which
allows us to draw this distinction, I infer that the immediate object
is only present where quantification is present. And rhemes are not
quantified. best Francesco
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