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}Gary R, list:
Yes, I wrote: "And therefore, in a sense, no DO or even IO. One must
even wonder if it is a Sign, that triad of O-R-I?! Or is it the
"nothing of boundless freedom', or potentiality' [6.219] that is
somehow connected, in a few seconds - to semiosis [the triadic use
of this potentiality] as a source of the potential?"
Yes, I do wonder if a force in a state of pure Firstness is a
triadic Sign. I suggest that it is not. But note, the Rhematic
Iconic Qualisign - is indeed, one of Peirce's classes of Signs - and
all three Relations are in a mode of Firstness. It is, as he wrote:
'any quality insofar as it is a sign' [2.254]..and is 'interpreted as
s sign of essence, that is, a Rheme". That is, the interactions among
the triad are, in Firstness, expressed as 'feeling'. So- I don't
understand your quibble about its being a state of pure feeling.
And I apologize - I should clarify; I'm not talking about a Relation
in a triad that is in a mode of Firstness - which can be called a
Rheme - and is that state of pre-conscious feeling. I'm talking about
the mode of Firstness as it is ..as it is articulated in matter before
being constrained within the semiosic unit.
I agree there is no such thing as an 'Icon'; but the Relation
between the DO and R can be 'iconic'; i.e., in a mode of Firstness.
So I'm not sure of your point.
But that is not what I am wondering about. My question is the
natural force of spontaneity, of chance, of freedom in our world,
which is not yet a triadic sign - and what is it? We have enough
descriptions of Firstness in Peirce to understand its nature:
'presentness...'The present, being such as it is while utterly
ignoring everything else, is positively such as it is". 5.44. This
suggests to me - that this force is NOT harnessed by any Relations.
As Peirce noted, in his discussion of 'Absolute Chance [6.47--] he
rejects the arguments that 'absolute chance is inconceivable'; that
it is unintelligible'..and concludes 'by thus admitting pure
spontaneity or life as a character of the universe, acting always and
everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by law, producing
infinitesimal departures from law continually, and great ones with
infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and diversity of
the universe" 6.59.
Chance, spontaneity, that absence of Relations -- are attributes of
Firstness - and I consider that it IS 'pure Firstness'.
Edwina
On Thu 13/09/18 3:11 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, list,
In recent posts you've suggested that a Rheme is pure 1ns despite
the fact that Peirce held that there was no such thing as pure 1ns
even in phenomenology let alone semeiotic. Indeed, when one does turn
to semeiotic, he held that there isn't even a pure icon, that such
signs may at best be icon ic.
1898 | On Existential Graphs | MS [R] 484:4-5
. . . A pure icon, could such a sign exist, would present to us a
pure sense-quality, without any parts nor any respects, and
consequently without positive generality. But in fact there is no
pure icon. . .
You've written that a Rheme is a "state of pure feeling," whereas
Peirce offers no semeiotic but only phenomenological thought
experiments to suggest what might be analogous to the quality
(feeling) of 1ns as such, for example, awakening to a particular
color or sound which, out of time and space, would consume ones
hypothetical instantaneous consciousness. Here's a generalized
account of what "a state of pure feeling" (actually impossible) might
be like.
1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter I. Intended Characters of this Treatise
| CP 2.85
Let us now consider what could appear as being in the present
instant were it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only
guess; for nothing is more occult than the absolute present. There
plainly could be no action. . . There might be a sort of
consciousness, or feeling, with no self; and this feeling might have
its tone. . . I do not think there could be any continuity like
space, which, though it may perhaps appear in an instant in an
educated mind, I cannot think could do so if it had no time at all;
and without continuity parts of the feeling could not be synthetized;
and therefore there would be no recognizable parts. There could not
even be a degree of vividness of the feeling; for this [the degree of
vividness] is the comparative amount of disturbance of general
consciousness by a feeling. . . The world would be reduced to a
quality of unanalyzed feeling. Here would be an utter absence of
binarity. I cannot call it unity; for even unity supposes plurality.
I may call its form Firstness. . .
You've even suggested that the Rheme is not a Sign at all. Well,
that flies in the face of everything I know that Peirce ever wrote
about the Rheme, which he will refer to otherwise, and not
infrequently, as a Term, a typical example being a common or proper
noun.
1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 33-34
In regard to its relation to its signified interpretant, a sign is
either a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument. This corresponds to the old
division Term, Proposition, & Argument, modified so as to be
applicable to signs generally. [—] A rheme is any sign that is not
true nor false, like almost any single word except ‘yes’ and
‘no’, which are almost peculiar to modern languages.
So, I'm not sure what to make of your comments regarding the Rheme.
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 2:03 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Helmut, list
It depends on what one means by the term 'rheme'. As I understand
it, just the term itself refers to the Interpretant in a mode of
Firstness. Another meaning is 'a proposition with the subject place
left blank'. In both outlines, the key thing is that are no relations
- with an Object, with a Subject, with a Predicate. The point is,
'it', as itself is unrelated to anything else. As such it is pure
feeling without awareness or meaning. It just IS, it's a state.
Isolate.
Therefore, it is not 3-1 or Thirdness in a mode of Firstness.
Thirdness, after all, is Mind, is habit, and when it is also in a
mode of Firstness, 3-1 is an iconic habit [such as Natural Selection
which privileges icon repetitions of its stored habits].
My understanding of the IO is that it is the data - could be in a
mode of 1ns or 2ns or even 3ns- as 'contained' or 'accepted' within
the Quasi-Mind or Sign-Vehicle. That is, in an example where I hear a
loud sound, [I'm the Quasi-Mind or Sign-Vehicle], then the IO is the
data-within-my-unique-hearing-capacities. It would be in a mode of
subsequent 1ns and 2ns. It is not yet interpreted by the
Representamen [my knowledge base], so I don't know yet what that
sound is. It could be a clap of thunder, or a car accident, or the
kitchen cupboard falling off the wall.
No, I don't think that 'all existing dogs' is the DO in your
example. I don't happen to agree with the argument advanced by JAS
about 'General Objects'. In my view, in your example, if you replaced
the blank space with the dog's name [Buster], then, Buster is the DO.
My view is that generalities function only within the mode of
Thirdness and only within articulation by individual or particular
forms. So, 'dog' as a generality is a reality but doesn't have any
reality 'in itself' - for that would be a movement into Platonic
Forms. Instead, 'dog' as a generality is a reality as manifested
within particular individual material dogs. This is Aristotelian -
and Peirce was an Aristotelian.
Edwina
On Thu 13/09/18 12:42 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de [2]
sent:
Edwina, list,is a rheme pure firstness, so pure feeling, or is it
firstness of thirdness, if one might say, that relation (or
reference) to an interpretant is thirdness? So, if it was the quality
of mediation, the aroused feeling would adress something. Like, if the
rheme is the word "dog", or in the correct sense Francesco has
explained, the property or predicate (?) of something that might be
replaced with a name "is a dog", the feeling of the quality
"doggishness" might be the IO, and the real quality at the end of an
ideational complete investigation, and / or (not sure) the extension
"all existing dogs" would be the DO, I would guess. But perhaps it
still is arguable, whether relation to an interpretant is thirdness,
or if only the lines but not the columns in the sign classes table
are categorial??Best,Helmut 12. September 2018 um 22:13 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
Helmut, list
I'm a great admirer of the epistemic cut [see Harold Atmanspacher
for a good analysis] - but, in the case of a rheme, which is in a
mode of pure Firstness, I suggest that there is no epistemic cut. The
rheme is a STATE of pure feeling with no distinction between self and
other.
So, there is no cognitive interpretation going on..."Aristotle
sometimes speaks of sense as prior to reason...and "matter is prior
to form; and potency to energy". 6.388.
And therefore, in a sense, no DO or even IO. One must even wonder if
it is a Sign, that triad of O-R-I?! Or is it the "nothing of boundless
freedom', or potentiality' [6.219] that is somehow connected, in a few
seconds - to semiosis [the triadic use of this potentiality] as a
source of the potential?
Edwina
On Wed 12/09/18 3:11 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de [3]
sent: Supplement: I refer to a text by Joseph
Ransdellhttp://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/useabuse.htm
[4]and I dont understand it, neither that some sign should not have an
IO. The DO is what is, the thing itself, and the IO is what it appears
to be in the semiosic process, according to Ransdell. If there nothing
appears, no IO exists, it is not a sign, is it? A sign is about
appearance, isnt it?Further I dont understand, that the IO is a part
of the DO, and at the end of complete inquiry both are the same. See
the end of the text. Ransdell writes that then the reflexion somehow
vanishes. But isnt that a sort of magical thinking? Like if you know
everything there is to know about an inkstand, that inkstand
materializes out of thin air before you? If the DO is the inkstand,
and the IO is as what it appears to be according to the sign, even
when this appearance is complete knowledge about it, it still is just
immaterial mental knowledge, but not the material thing.I think the
epistemic cut is a cut like the cut in the EGs. On one side is the
phaneron, on the other the material and energetic world. To mention
it is not dualism. The easiest, and for me the only understandable
way of dealing with it is to assume, that everything concerning signs
is on the phaneron side of it, so the DO too. Francesco, Edwina, Jon,
List, to me it seem as if "is mortal" might have a subject, and is
quantifiable, if it means "belongs to the set of mortal entities".
But does "is mortal" mean "will die" or "may die"? In the first case,
bacteria dont belong to the set, in the latter they do. So, if
"mortal" is an unclear term, this rheme is not quantifiable. But i´m
sure, I have misunderstood it all, and should read Peirce first, so if
that is so, just dont answer. Best,Helmut 12. September 2018 um 14:29
Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
Francesco, list
Thanks for the clear and logical analysis.
I would simply say that a rheme is in a mode of Firstness and as
such, is a STATE and not an act of cognition or interpretation. As a
state [a feeling], it has no component parts and thus, has no
IO....or II or DI..etc..
Edwina
On Wed 12/09/18 1:31 AM , Francesco Bellucci
bellucci.france...@googlemail.com [5] sent:Jon, List Thanks for the
summary. To say that particular/singular/universal is a division of
propositions is to say that that which is either p, s, or u is only a
proposition, i.e. that only propositions are either p, s, or g. Now
Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are according to their IO are
either p, s, or u. This means that only that which is either p, s, or
u is divisible according to the IO (for otherwise Peirce should have
said: some signs are divisible according to the IO into p, s, g and
some other signs are divisible according to the IO into x, y, z).
Now, since only propositions are either p, s, or g and since that
which is either p, s, or u is divisible according to the IO, it
follows that only propositions are divisible according to the IO.
Now, that only propositions are divisible according to the IO
ceratinly means that propositions have an IO, but does not exclude
that non-propositional signs also have an IO. This I concede. But if
one wonders what on earth the IO of a proposition is, that
non-propositional signs have no IO becomes evident. For since
propositions are divisible according to the IO into p, s, and g, that
which constitutes the IO in them is that which allows such division. I
see no warrant for claiming that the p-s-g aspect in a proposition is
"part" of the IO, as Jon suggests. For in that case Peirce should
have made it clear that propositions are divisible according to a
part (= the quantificational part) of the IO into p, s, and g. He
should have made it clear that the IO does not exhaust the
quantificational dimension of propositions, and, I surmise, he should
have made it clear that propositions are divisible according to one
part of the IO into p, s, and g, and according to another part of the
IO into, say, x, y, and z. As far as I know, Peirce never speak of
"parts" of the IO, one of which would be the quantificational
dimension. I think it is safe to conclude that that which constitutes
the IO in a proposition is that which allows the division into p, s,
and g. That which allows the division of propositions into p, s, and
g is what Peirce calls the "subject" of a proposition: in "All men are
mortal", the Peircean subject is "For any x..." while the predicate is
"x is either not a man or is mortal"; in "Some men are wise" the
Peircean subject is "For some x..." and the predicate is "x is both a
man and mortal"; in "Socrates is mortal" the subject is "Socrates" and
the predicate "x is mortal". The predicates in these sentences are
rhemes. Rhemes do not have "subjects", they are not quantified. Since
that which allows the division into p, s, and g is the IO, and since
the IO is – in the case of those signs for which it is
comprehensible what on earth the IO is – the subject, it follows
that lack of a subject involves lack of an IO. In sum: In order for
a sign to have an IO, it should be divisible into p, s, and g (this I
think is evident from Peirce's claim taht "signs are divisible
according to the IO into p, s, and g.)Rhemes are not divisible into
p, s, and gTherefore, rhemes do not have an IO Francesco Rhemes
do not have Immediate Objects. On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 5:26 AM, Jon
Alan Schmidt wrote: Francesco, List: To clarify, I do not dispute
any of the following.
*Only Dicisigns and Arguments distinctly/separately/specially
indicate their Objects.
*Only Arguments distinctly/separately/specially express their
Interpretants.
*The Immediate Object is the Object that is represented by the
Sign to be the Sign's Object.
*Rhemes are less complete Signs than Dicisigns, which are less
complete Signs than Arguments.
*Rhemes cannot be true or false.
*Particular/singular/universal is a division of propositions.
*Quantification is an aspect of a proposition's Immediate Object.
However, I continue to to find the following inferences exegetically
unwarranted and systematically problematic.
*Rhemes do not have Immediate Objects.
*Rhemes and Dicisigns do not have Immediate Interpretants.
*Despite being Types and Symbols, propositions can have Immediate
Objects that are Possibles (vague) or Existents (singular).
*Quantification is required for any Sign to have an Immediate
Object.
It still seems to me that #1 would mean that Rhemes cannot denote
their Objects at all, while #2 would mean that Rhemes and Dicisigns
cannot signify their Interpretants at all; yet it was already
well-established in logic, and explicitly affirmed by Peirce--both
early and late--that terms (Rhematic Symbols) have Breadth and Depth.
#3 would mean that in his late taxonomy, the trichotomy according to
the Immediate Object comes after the one according to the relation
between the Sign and Dynamic Object in the order of determination.
#4 is an arbitrary restriction that Peirce himself, as far as I know,
never imposed. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas,
USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran
Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [6] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [7] On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 2:16 PM,
Francesco Bellucci wrote:Jon, List JAS: If one holds that only
Sign-Replicas distinctly/separately representing their Objects have
Immediate Objects, then one must also hold that only Sign-Replicas
distinctly/separately representing their Interpretants have Immediate
Interpretants. If a Rheme does not have an Immediate Object, then a
Rheme or Dicisign does not have an Immediate Interpretant; but
Peirce never said or implied this. Peirce said something like this,
but before the distinction between different kinds of interpretants
had emerged. He said that a proposition does not separately represent
its interpretant: CSP: " A proposition is a symbol in which the
representative element, or reason [i.e. interpretant, FB], is left
vague and unexpressed, but in which the reactive element [i.e. the
object, FB] is distinctly [i.e. separately, FB] indicated. [...] An
argument is a bad name for a symbol in which the representative
element [i.e. interpretant, FB] , or reason, is distinctly
expressed.” (R 484: 7-8, 1898)
CSP: “[a] Proposition is a sign which distinctly indicates the
Object which it denotes, called its Subject, but leaves its
Interpretant to be what it may” (CP 2.95, 1902
CSP: "A representamen is either a rhema, a proposition, or an
argument. An argument is a representamen which separately shows what
interpretant it is intended to determine. A proposition is a
representamen which is not an argument [i.e. which separately shows
what interpretant it is intended to determine, FB], but which
separately indicates what object it is intended to represent. A rhema
is a simple representation without such separate part" (EP 2: 204,
1903) CSP “A term […] is any representamen which does not
separately indicate its object; […] A proposition is a
representamen which separately indicates its object, but does [not]
specially show what interpretant it is intended to determine […] An
argument is a symbol which especially shows what interpretant it is
intended to determine” (R 491: 9-10, 1903). Now, the question is:
in light of the later taxonomy of interpretants, what is the
interpretant that the proposition does not, while the argument does,
separately represent? CSP: … every sign has two objects. It has
that object which it represents itself to have, its Immediate Object,
which has no other being than that of being represented to be, a mere
Representative Being, or as the Kantian logicians used to say a
merely Objective Being ... The Objective Object is the putative
father. (R 499; c. 1906, bold added) I beg you to notice what Peirce
says: he says "has that object which it represents itself to have",
which, if my English sustains me, means that the sign has that object
which the sign represents itself to have, not that it has the object
that the sign represents in its (i.e. the object's) qualities or
characters. That is, the immediate object is the object that is
represented by the sign to be the sign's object, not the object in
the characters that the sign represents it to have. CSP: Every
sign must plainly have an immediate object, however indefinite, in
order to be a sign. (R 318:25; 1907, bold added) This indeed seems
contrary to the claim that only propositions have an immediate
object. There is another occurrence of such a claim, in another 1907
writing (a letter to Papini). Now I beg you to notice that since the
beginning of this discussion I was talking of the classification of
signs of 1904–1906, in which the notion of immediate object first
emerged. The two contrary statements are from 1907, and I suspect
that after 1907 his notion of immediate object changed. Perhaps the
qualification " however indefinite" can help us explain how it
changed. But in general, I repeat, I think that often "sign" has to
be taken to mean "complete sign" (i.e. "proposition"). If in such
apparently contrary statements we adopt this strategy, problems
vanish. Peirce says as much: CSP: "a sign may be complex; and the
parts of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the
essential characters of a more complete sign" (R 7: 2). A rheme,
though it is a sign, may not possess all the essential characters of
a proposition. In particular, while a proposition separately
represent its own object (i.e. while it has an immediate object), a
rheme does not. CSP: "a sign sufficiently complete must in some
sense correspond to a real object. A sign cannot even be false
unless, with some degree of definiteness, it specifies the real
object of which it is false" (R 7: 3–4). Please note that R 7 was
probably composed in 1903, i.e. before the IO/DO distinction had
emerged. The sufficiently complete sign must specify, with some
degree of definiteness (either singularly, vaguely, or generally) the
object, i.e. the DO in the later terminology, this specification, this
"hint" ("The Sign must indicate it by a hint; and this hint, or its
substance, is the Immediate Objec"), being the IO. He also says that
"a sufficiently complete sign may be false" (R 7, p. 4). Rhemes
cannot be false, only propositions can, precisely because they
indicate an object of which they are false. CSP: The Immediate
Interpretant consists in the Quality of the Impression that a sign is
fit to produce, not to any actual reaction. (CP 8.315; 1909, bold
added) CSP: My Immediate Interpretant is implied in the fact that
each Sign must have its peculiar Interpretability before it gets any
Interpreter ... The Immediate Interpretant is an abstraction,
consisting in a Possibility. (SS 110; 1909, bold added) The second
quote affirms that the Immediate Object can be indefinite; i.e., it
need not be be distinctly/separately represented. There are various
other passages like the third quote, where Peirce discussed the
Immediate Object and/or Immediate Interpretant of "a Sign," implying
no limitation whatsoever on the classes that he had in mind. In
short, I see no warrant at all for claiming that he limited the
Immediate Object to Dicisigns and Arguments, or the Immediate
Interpretant to Arguments alone. The warrant is a fundamental
exegetical claim, emphasized by John Sowa few posts ago: Peirce was a
logician, and everything he says about "signs" has to have logical
relevance. The 1904–1906 distinction into vague, singular, and
general signs is a well-known logical distinction (particular,
singular, and universal propositions), and since the immediate object
is that which allows us to draw this distinction, I infer that the
immediate object is only present where quantification is present. And
rhemes are not quantified. bestFrancesco
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