Gary F., List: It was brought to my attention off-List that I inadvertently sent my last post in this thread to Gary F., rather than to the List as intended. Since his comments below are interspersed with mine, I will not bother to repeat the latter.
GF: The date of the note is of no importance. What I said was that Peirce *did not use the term “replica” after 1904 *in a semiotic context. You have not cited an example to refute that observation, nor have you cited an instance of Peirce ever using the term “Sign-Replica.” I did not attribute any importance to the date of the note, I did not deny your observation, and I did not claim that Peirce ever used the term "Sign-Replica." I simply pointed out that Peirce *did *use "Replica" quite extensively *up until* 1904. I have been advocating "Sign-Replica" as a substitute for "Sign" whenever we are referring to the *embodiment *of a Sign within a particular Sign System, rather than the Type *itself*, which can have many such embodiments in many different Sign Systems. However, I would not be averse to simply using "Replica" for that purpose, if that is less objectionable. GF: True, the two words are not synonyms in the strictest sense of the word. But a “replica is a sinsign” and a sinsign is a sign in this classification, which means that the *replica is a sign*. This is not the case in your systematization, because all signs are Types, and a Replica is not a Type, is it? Again, I am proposing that a Replica is an enduring *embodiment *of a Sign (Type) within a particular Sign System, like the multiple appearances of "the" on a printed page of written English. I believe that this is consistent with Peirce's usage of "Replica" through 1904. GF: Peirce said that there is only one word “the” in the English language, only one *Type*, regardless of whether Tokens of it are spoken or printed. A language is one Sign System, regardless of the variety of media used to utter the signs. I strongly disagree. Peirce explicitly affirmed at least twice that a translation from one language into another is a *different* Replica of the *same* Sign. CSP: The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of it is one and the same representamen. (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903) CSP: Giving to the word *sign* the full scope that reasonably belongs to it for logical purposes, a whole book is a sign; and a translation of it is a replica of the same sign. (EP 2:303; 1904) There is only one word (as a Type), *independent *of any particular language or other Sign System, that corresponds to "the" (as a Replica) in written English. "Der" or "die" or "das" in written German, and "el" or "la" in written Spanish, are Replicas of the *same* Sign; besides the different spelling, the gender aspect pertains strictly to those different Sign Systems, not to the Sign itself as a Type. Likewise, spoken English (or German or Spanish) is a different Sign System from written English (or German or Spanish), even though translating between them is much more direct than doing so between different languages. That is why an e-mail exchange does not necessarily communicate the same message as a phone conversation using identical words, and a face-to-face discussion can convey something else again. An even stronger proof is the fact that someone can be--and many people throughout history have been--fluent in hearing/speaking their native language, yet completely incapable of reading/writing it. GF: The footprint I saw in the mud just now is not a replica of any other sign or a Token of any Type. Again, I strongly disagree. My first Peirce quote above continues as follows. CSP: It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact represented. This repetitory character of the representamen involves as a consequence that it is essential to a representamen that it should contribute to the determination of another representamen distinct from itself. For in what sense would it be true that a representamen was repeated if it were not capable of determining some different representamen? (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903) The simple fact that you *interpreted* what you saw in the mud to *be* a footprint entails that an *Instance *of a Sign occurred at that moment--i.e., a Token of a Type--because it determined *another* Instance of a Sign, your subsequent thought, as its Dynamic Interpretant. Such an Instance of a Sign is not *itself* a Sign, any more than an instance of a law of nature is *itself *a law of nature. Moreover, the impression in the mud must have possessed certain significant characters (Tones) that facilitated your *recognition *of it as a footprint, and thus as a Replica of a Sign (Type). Otherwise, it would have been merely "a part of the very fact represented" by your thought about it, not a Sign *at all*. GF: The fact that we have a general concept of “footprint” does not constitute an *analysis* of that sign in the mud, or indeed of any genuine index. Why not? Please elaborate. I still cannot come up with an example of a genuine Index or other Sinsign (per the 1903 taxonomy) that *cannot* be analyzed as an embodiment (Replica) of a Type. Perhaps this is just a failure of imagination on my part, but I apparently need someone to spell it out for me if I am wrong about this. GF: I just don’t see how such repurposing of Peirce’s terms contributes anything but confusion to the understanding of signs today. The intent is not to "repurpose" Peirce's terms, but to *clarify *them by carefully distinguishing the Sign itself as a Type, which has a General Object and Final Interpretant; an Instance of the Sign as an *occurrence*, which has a Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant; and a Replica of the Sign as an *embodiment* within a particular Sign System, which has an Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant. I do not deny, and in fact readily acknowledge, that Peirce himself variously referred to *all *of these as "signs" in his writings; so perhaps an alternative is to concede that "Sign" encompasses all three, but then use "Type" for the governing Entelechy, "Instance" for each occurrence, and "Replica" for each embodiment. I would rather adopt "Token" for one of the latter two, but unfortunately (from my perspective) Peirce defined that term as encompassing *both* of them. CSP: A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening [Instance] or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time [Replica], such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does [Instance], such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book [Replica], I will venture to call a *Token*. (CP 4.537; 1906, bracketed insertions mine) Differentiating embodied Replicas from occurring Instances is thus a bit of a departure from *Peirce's *Speculative Grammar, but I personally find it illuminating and still consider it to fall within the parameters of a legitimately *Peircean *Speculative Grammar. Of course, as the saying goes these days, your mileage may vary. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Sep 19, 2018 at 2:06 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, a few brief responses inserted: > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* 19-Sep-18 13:07 > > Gary F., List: > > I was not previously aware of Peirce's marginal note about "Replica," so > thank you for bringing it to my attention; the CP editors dated it "c. > 1910," not 1904. He used "Replica" quite extensively before > that--including in "New Elements"--for each enduring *embodiment *of a Sign > within a particular Sign System, such as each appearance of "the" on a > printed page of English text. > > GF: The date of the note is of no importance. What I said was that Peirce *did > not use the term “replica” after 1904* in a semiotic context. You have > not cited an example to refute that observation, nor have you cited an > instance of Peirce ever using the term “Sign-Replica.” > > I am proposing to retain it for this purpose, mainly to differentiate > it from an "Instance" of a Sign as he defined that term in 1906, which is > an *occurrence* at exactly one time and place. As long as a book is > closed and sitting on the shelf, it contains many *Replicas *of "the," > but an *Instance *of that Sign only happens each time someone *actually > reads *one of them. Also, for the record, Peirce definitely *did not* > use "replica" as a *synonym *for "sinsign" in 1903. > > CSP: Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application, > which may be termed a *Replica *of it. Thus, the word "the" will usually > occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these > occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Each single instance > of it is a replica. The replica is a sinsign. Thus, every legisign requires > sinsigns. But these are not ordinary sinsigns, such as are peculiar > occurrences that are regarded as significant. Nor would the replica be > significant if it were not for the law which renders it so. (CP 2.246, EP > 2:291; 1903) > > GF: True, the two words are not synonyms in the strictest sense of the > word. But a “replica is a sinsign” and a sinsign is a sign in this > classification, which means that the *replica is a sign*. This is not the > case in your systematization, because all signs are Types, and a Replica is > not a Type, is it? > > In this scheme, every Replica was a Sinsign, but not an *ordinary *one, > such that *not *every Sinsign was a Replica; and a Replica was *only > *significant > because it was rendered so by the Legisign that it embodied. I acknowledge > that my current approach is different--I am proposing that *all *Signs > are what Peirce called Legisigns in 1903 (Types in 1906 and later), because > as he wrote elsewhere, a Sign *only *exists in Replicas; in itself, it is > an Entelechy (3ns), not a Matter (2ns). We *can *(and Peirce often did) > call the Replicas "Signs" in the same way that we can talk about "the" both > as *one *word and as 15 to 25 *different *words on a page. However, > for the sake of clarity--especially within technical discussions of > Speculative Grammar--I continue to advocate reserving "Sign" for the > former, calling the latter "Replicas," and using "Instance" for each > individual *event *of semiosis that produces a Dynamic Interpretant. > > GF: But it makes less sense to speak of written, printed or pronounced > instances of the word “the” as “replicas”, because they differ radically in > perceptible form ... > > I have addressed this before. Replicas of the same Sign *within *the > same Sign System will resemble each other; it is precisely their > significant characters (Tones) that make them recognizable as Replicas of > Signs *at all*. However, Replicas of the same Sign in *different *Sign > Systems--e.g., written/printed English vs. spoken English, not to mention > *other > *languages--may indeed "differ radically." > > GF: Sorry, this rationalization of your usage does not address the issue*. > *Peirce said that there is only one word “the” in the English language, > only one *Type*, regardless of whether Tokens of it are spoken or > printed. A language is one Sign System, regardless of the variety of media > used to utter the signs. > > Again, none of this amounts to an *exegetical *claim about Peirce's > writings; rather, it is a *systematic *proposal for understanding Signs > and their relations *today*. I would be glad to consider any purported > cases of "existing things or events which turn out to be significant," but > allegedly *cannot *be analyzed as Replicas/Instances of general Signs. I > have already explained in other threads why I do not view ripples on a > lake, weathercocks, thermometers, barometers, etc. as counterexamples. > > GF: Yes, I’ve seen those explanations, which mainly demonstrates your > skill at rationalizing. The footprint I saw in the mud just now is not a > replica of any other sign or a Token of any Type. The fact that we have a > general concept of “footprint” does not constitute an *analysis* of that > sign in the mud, or indeed of any genuine index. I just don’t see how such > repurposing of Peirce’s terms contributes anything but confusion to the > understanding of signs today. > > Gary f. >
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