Robert, List: Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Sep 20, 2018 at 12:10 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > List, > > Robert Marty addressed this post to me and to the list, but apparently > didn’t send it to the list address, so I’m forwarding it here. It contains > some important comments on Peirce’s use of the term “replica.” Thank you, > Robert! > > Gary f. > > *From:* marty.rob...@neuf.fr <marty.rob...@neuf.fr> > > *Sent:* 20-Sep-18 09:28 > > Gary, list, with your indulgence for my very bad English, > > In the dated text 1903 (CP 2.254 - 2.263) Peirce uses exactly 15 times the > term "replica" , 9 times in the only one 2.261. The first appearance is in > 2.258, the iconic legisign ; consequently all 15 "replicas" appear > exclusively in the classes which are legisigns or symbols ; but all the > symbols are necessarily legisigns and we can say that replicas are > consubstantially related with the legisigns . > > The nature of the relationship is specifed immediately in 2.258 : "* Being a > Legisign, its mode of being is that of governing single **Replicas**, each of > which will be an Iconic Sinsign of a peculiar kind"*. As a result we have > that the mode of being of the *replicas* is to be governed by the legisigns ; > and we must remember that they are sinsigns "*of a peculiar kind"* which > means that all the sinsigns are not replicas. This is very important ; I > explain the reasons further. > > Previously I examine the others appearances. Within 2.259 and 2.260 it's > exactly the same with again t*he "peculiar kind"*. Examining 2.261(the > rhematic symbol) with its 9 appearances, we have the guess of the riddle in > the first sentence: *"A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme [**e.g., **a common > noun] is a sign connected with its Object by an association of general ideas > in such a way that its **Replica** calls up an image in the mind which image, > owing to certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a > general concept, and the **Replica** is interpreted as a Sign of an Object > that is an instance of that concept." C*learly since a symbol is necessarily > a legisign the relationship is again the same BUT here Peirce says that these > replica (eg a common noun) is an instance of a concept. When I write the word > "freedom", I write one instance of the concept which produces the idea of > freedom in the mind of every one which know english and perceive the > graphism. It's the same that to say that the word "freedom" written anywhere > of any way is a member of the extension of the concept, himself regarded as > an intension. Frege says that the noun written "fall" under the concept; > Clearly a replica is an instance and personally I always considered this an > obvious fact. > > Continuing with 2.261 there is nothing new except that Peirce "cascades" the > assertions concerning the classes of signs described previously. And he > specify everytime *"peculiar kind*", thus showing that all the set of the > sinsigns is cut out in instances of various kinds according to the legisigns > which governs them. > > 2.262 and 2.263 only consolidate my conclusions. > > There is a simple manner of considerer this question by using the lattice of > the classes of signs ; it's one true diagrammatisation of the Peirce's text. > I develop this point of view in an article to appear. > >
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