Gary F., List: Here is what Peirce actually wrote at EP 2:373 (1906).
CSP: *The idea of growth,*--the stately tree springing from the tiny grain,--was the key that Aristotle brought to be tried upon this intricate grim lock. In such trials he came upon those wonderful conceptions, *δύναμις *and *ἐ**νέργεια*, *ὕ**λη *and *μορφή *or *ε**ἶ**δος*, or, as he might still better have said, *τύπος*, the blow, the *coup*. (*A propos* of what was said above about the way to read, the sentence just set down is an instance of one beyond which a reader had better not proceed, until he pretty nearly understands the point of view from which the force of that remark appears.) This idea of Aristotle's has proved marvellously fecund; and in truth it is the only idea covering quite the whole area of cenoscopy that has shown any marked uberosity. Notice what he stated immediately after mentioning *τύπος*. Unfortunately, per the EP endnotes, the earlier pages where he apparently discussed "the way to read" are missing. That only gives greater weight to his warning about not proceeding without understanding "the point of view from which the force of that remark appears." It seems very tenuous to me to conclude from this one sentence that "*form* is the active and forceful side of the matter/form duality, while *matter* is the passive side," such that "*matter* corresponds to Firstness and *form* to Secondness." On the contrary, Peirce quite unambiguously associated Form with 1ns and Matter with 2ns, not only in "New Elements" but also in "Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" (NEM 4:292-300; 1904) and other contemporaneous manuscripts. For example ... CSP: A *Quality*, or *Form*, of which qualities of feeling, such as *red*, are examples, is something which is whatever it is quite regardless of anything else ... A *Quoddam*, or *Matter* ... of which a *non-ego*, or resisting something, is an example, is such that its being consists entirely in its reactions with other quoddams. As reacting, it really exists and is *individual* ... (R 5:25-26[6-7]; 1904) And even more so ... CSP: *Form*,--the true, Aristotelian form,--brings matter together, but is quite passive, being all that it is within itself ... When we ask what a form is, we set out from the immediately known qualities of feeling and suppose that there is something of the same sort beyond feeling, out of consciousness. When we ask what matter is, we set out from the directly experienced resistance of an obstacle against which we push, and suppose that something like that fills the outer world. This philosophy cannot be improved upon ... (R 5:48-49[33-34]; 1904) He even highlighted a key difference between Aristotle's concepts of Form vs. Matter and those of the scholastics, characteristically aligning himself with the latter. CSP: Aristotle's metaphysics undoubtedly belongs to the general type of evolutionary systems ... Matter is, for him, that which is what it is in itself. Form is that which is only so far as it is embodied in matter, and is essentially dichotomic, as Plato made it. The scholastic metaphysics, on the other hand, looks upon the pure nature, or Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as prior to any embodiment of it ... From this point of view, matter (it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of, or that which simply exists) ought to be held to exist only by reaction, and so to be that which is what it is by force of *another*. It is not necessary for the logician to embrace either of these theories (of which I prefer the second.) (R 517:92-93[18-19]; 1904) Lest anyone wonder if perhaps Peirce changed his mind about all of this over the ensuing two years ... CSP: Matter is that by virtue of which an object gains Existence, a fact known only by an Index, which is connected with the object only by brute force; while Form, being that by which the object is such as it is, is comprehensible. (NEM 4:322; 1906) He even discussed Form and Matter as they specifically pertain to Existential Graphs. CSP: ... I ask you to recall the definitions of Matter and Form that go back to Aristotle (though it is hard to believe they are not earlier; and the metaphysical application of *ϋλη* sounds to me like some late Ionic philosopher, and not a bit like Aristotle, whom it would also have been more like to claim it, if it were his). Form is that which makes anything such as it is, while matter makes it to be. From this pair of beautiful generalizations are born a numerous family of harmonious and interresemblant acceptions of the two words. In speaking of Graphs we may well call the Principles of their Interpretation (such as the Endoporeutic Principle) the Form; the way of shaping and scribing them (such as leaving the Line without barbs) the Matter. Nothing could be in better accord with the general definitions of Form and of Matter. (NEM 4:329-330; 1906) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Dec 7, 2018 at 5:15 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > John S, list, > > Speaking of Aristotle’s influence on Peirce, and in particular the > connection between *De Anima* and Peirce’s concept of *quasi-mind*, there > is a very explicit example in one of Peirce’s 1906 drafts for his *Monist* > series on pragmatism, the one beginning at EP2:371. Peirce deals here not > with the mind-matter distinction but with the Aristotelian distinction > between *form* and *matter*. A close look at this shows that the concept > of *matter* emerging from this distinction is very different from the > concept of *matter* that is usually contrasted with *mind* in current > metaphysical thinking. > > This essay, “The Basis of Pragmatism in the Normative Sciences,” points > out that “Idioscopy,” which includes all of the “special sciences” (such as > physics, biology, psychology and sociology), depends for its basic > principles on “cenoscopy” (which “embraces all that positive science which > rests upon familiar experience”). “A sound methodeutic requires heuretic > science to found its researches upon cenoscopy, passing with as slight a > gap as possible from the familiar to the unfamiliar” (EP2:373). But > formulating this methodeutic “presents a certain difficulty” because it > involves reconsidering some of our own beliefs, which requires critical > thinking. “Each criticism should wait to be planned, and each plan should > wait for criticism. “Clearly, if we are to get on at all, we must put up > with imperfect procedure.” This is where Peirce appeals to Aristotle’s *De > Anima* (as the EP2 editors point out in an endnote) for a “key … to be > tried upon this intricate grim lock.” > > This “key” is “*The idea of growth*,— the stately tree springing from the > tiny grain” (Peirce’s italics). Now, *growth* is one of the key > *semeiotic* ideas in Peirce’s late philosophy, which frequently asserts > an analogy (if not an identity) between *sign* processes and *life* > processes. The example (or metaphor) he gives here, and indeed nearly all > of Peirce’s uses of the term “growth” in semeiotic contexts, suggest that > the idea is very close if not identical to what we now call > *self-organization*. Peirce does not quote a Greek term which Aristotle > used for this idea of “growth,” but he does quote some other Greek terms > which he calls “wonderful conceptions” that Aristotle “came upon” in > developing the idea: “δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, ὕλη and μορφή or εἶδος, or, > as he might still better have said, τύπος, the blow, the *coup*.” > > The terms δύναμις and ἐνέργεια are typically translated as “potentiality” > and “actuality” respectively; ὕλη and μορφή or εἶδος are the terms for > “matter” (ὕλη) and “form” (either μορφή or εἶδος). This gives us a pair > of metaphysical dualities, which is itself significant in that Peirce > focusses in this essay on the “hard dualism” of *Normative Science*, > which “forms the midportion of cenoscopy and its most characteristic part” > (EP2:376). Peirce had earlier introduced the concepts of Aristotelian > *matter* and *form* as a complementary pair in his “New Elements” essay > (EP2:304), where they correspond to subject and predicate, or denotation > and signification. But in this 1906 essay he gives a new twist to this > matter/form distinction by saying (as quoted above) that instead of μορφή > or εἶδος, Aristotle might better have used the term “τύπος, the blow, the > *coup*.” (As I showed in a blog post recently, the earliest meaning of > τύπος — which later evolved to mean the same as the English “type” — was “a > blow.”) > > This suggests that *form* is the active and forceful side of the > matter/form duality, while *matter* is the passive side. In phaneroscopic > terms, *matter* corresponds to Firstness and *form* to Secondness. This > is a bit startling at first — at least it struck me that way — but as > Peirce explains it (using the duality of the sexes as a metaphor) it does > become a key to the methodeutic of cenoscopy and thus to the very nature of > reasoning, inquiry and semiosis itself. Perhaps I don’t need to show how > this duality plays out in Peirce’s 1906 essay (but I will in another post > if anyone wants me to). But I think it’s significant that around this same > time, Peirce was saying to Lady Welby that “the Form is the Object of the > Sign,” and defining the Sign as a “medium for the communication or > extension of a Form” (EP2:477). He was saying this in a draft which dealt > largely with Existential Graphs, for a reason which he explained in this > paragraph (SS:195): > > I should like to write a little book on ‘The Conduct of Thoughts’ in which > the introductory chapter should introduce the reader to my existential > graphs, which would then be used throughout as the apparent subject, the > parable or metaphor, in terms of which everything would be said,—which > would be far more scientific than dragging in the “mind” all the time, in > German fashion, when the mind and psychology has no more to do with the > substance of the book than if I were to discourse of the ingredients of the > ink I use. > > He goes on to explain that in EGs, “the blank leaf itself [i.e. the sheet > of assertion] is the quasi-mind.” Now, if we apply the matter/form > distinction to EGs, I think we would have to say that the blank sheet is > the *matter* which gets *determined* by some *form* being scribed upon > it, just as any sign is determined by its object to determine an > interpretant. For Peirce, what is essential both to quasi-minds and to > symbols is that they are *indeterminate*, i.e. subject to further > determination. That is pretty close to the concept of *matter* (ὕλη) as > Aristotle defined it in Book 2 of *De Anima.* In this sense, then, *mind* > is *matter*, not form. No wonder, then, that the *mind/matter* > distinction seems quite foreign to Peirce’s late semeiotic. > > I don’t know how much sense this makes to readers of the list, but I’ll > try to clarify if necessary. I do find it significant in that this same > period saw the publication of Peirce’s “Prolegomena to an Apology for > Pragmaticism,” his most elaborate attempt to connect his EGs with his > “proof” of pragmatism and thus with the rest of his philosophy. > > Gary f. >
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