Jon, list, Thanks for this post as it appears to me from these passages (and many other which I'm sure could be cited and which I vaguely recall) that I will *not* have to revise/upend/reverse everything I've ever thought about how Peirce viewed form and matter; and that I can continue to safely associate form with 1ns, matter with 2ns.
Whew! I was worried there for a moment! Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *718 482-5690* On Fri, Dec 7, 2018 at 9:52 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary F., List: > > Here is what Peirce actually wrote at EP 2:373 (1906). > > CSP: *The idea of growth,*--the stately tree springing from the tiny > grain,--was the key that Aristotle brought to be tried upon this intricate > grim lock. In such trials he came upon those wonderful conceptions, *δύναμις > *and *ἐ**νέργεια*, *ὕ**λη *and *μορφή *or *ε**ἶ**δος*, or, as he might > still better have said, *τύπος*, the blow, the *coup*. (*A propos* of > what was said above about the way to read, the sentence just set down is an > instance of one beyond which a reader had better not proceed, until he > pretty nearly understands the point of view from which the force of that > remark appears.) This idea of Aristotle's has proved marvellously fecund; > and in truth it is the only idea covering quite the whole area of cenoscopy > that has shown any marked uberosity. > > > Notice what he stated immediately after mentioning *τύπος*. > Unfortunately, per the EP endnotes, the earlier pages where he apparently > discussed "the way to read" are missing. That only gives greater weight to > his warning about not proceeding without understanding "the point of view > from which the force of that remark appears." > > It seems very tenuous to me to conclude from this one sentence that " > *form* is the active and forceful side of the matter/form duality, while > *matter* is the passive side," such that "*matter* corresponds to > Firstness and *form* to Secondness." On the contrary, Peirce quite > unambiguously associated Form with 1ns and Matter with 2ns, not only in > "New Elements" but also in "Sketch of Dichotomic Mathematics" (NEM > 4:292-300; 1904) and other contemporaneous manuscripts. For example ... > > CSP: A *Quality*, or *Form*, of which qualities of feeling, such as *red*, > are examples, is something which is whatever it is quite regardless of > anything else ... A *Quoddam*, or *Matter* ... of which a *non-ego*, or > resisting something, is an example, is such that its being consists > entirely in its reactions with other quoddams. As reacting, it really > exists and is *individual* ... (R 5:25-26[6-7]; 1904) > > > And even more so ... > > CSP: *Form*,--the true, Aristotelian form,--brings matter together, but > is quite passive, being all that it is within itself ... When we ask what a > form is, we set out from the immediately known qualities of feeling and > suppose that there is something of the same sort beyond feeling, out of > consciousness. When we ask what matter is, we set out from the directly > experienced resistance of an obstacle against which we push, and suppose > that something like that fills the outer world. This philosophy cannot be > improved upon ... (R 5:48-49[33-34]; 1904) > > > He even highlighted a key difference between Aristotle's concepts of Form > vs. Matter and those of the scholastics, characteristically aligning > himself with the latter. > > CSP: Aristotle's metaphysics undoubtedly belongs to the general type of > evolutionary systems ... Matter is, for him, that which is what it is in > itself. Form is that which is only so far as it is embodied in matter, and > is essentially dichotomic, as Plato made it. The scholastic metaphysics, > on the other hand, looks upon the pure nature, or Form, as that which is > what it is in itself, and as prior to any embodiment of it ... From this > point of view, matter (it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of, or > that which simply exists) ought to be held to exist only by reaction, and > so to be that which is what it is by force of *another*. It is not > necessary for the logician to embrace either of these theories (of which I > prefer the second.) (R 517:92-93[18-19]; 1904) > > > Lest anyone wonder if perhaps Peirce changed his mind about all of this > over the ensuing two years ... > > CSP: Matter is that by virtue of which an object gains Existence, a fact > known only by an Index, which is connected with the object only by brute > force; while Form, being that by which the object is such as it is, is > comprehensible. (NEM 4:322; 1906) > > > He even discussed Form and Matter as they specifically pertain to > Existential Graphs. > > CSP: ... I ask you to recall the definitions of Matter and Form that go > back to Aristotle (though it is hard to believe they are not earlier; and > the metaphysical application of *ϋλη* sounds to me like some late Ionic > philosopher, and not a bit like Aristotle, whom it would also have been > more like to claim it, if it were his). Form is that which makes anything > such as it is, while matter makes it to be. From this pair of beautiful > generalizations are born a numerous family of harmonious and > interresemblant acceptions of the two words. In speaking of Graphs we may > well call the Principles of their Interpretation (such as the Endoporeutic > Principle) the Form; the way of shaping and scribing them (such as leaving > the Line without barbs) the Matter. Nothing could be in better accord with > the general definitions of Form and of Matter. (NEM 4:329-330; 1906) > > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Dec 7, 2018 at 5:15 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > >> John S, list, >> >> Speaking of Aristotle’s influence on Peirce, and in particular the >> connection between *De Anima* and Peirce’s concept of *quasi-mind*, >> there is a very explicit example in one of Peirce’s 1906 drafts for his >> *Monist* series on pragmatism, the one beginning at EP2:371. Peirce >> deals here not with the mind-matter distinction but with the Aristotelian >> distinction between *form* and *matter*. A close look at this shows that >> the concept of *matter* emerging from this distinction is very different >> from the concept of *matter* that is usually contrasted with *mind* in >> current metaphysical thinking. >> >> This essay, “The Basis of Pragmatism in the Normative Sciences,” points >> out that “Idioscopy,” which includes all of the “special sciences” (such as >> physics, biology, psychology and sociology), depends for its basic >> principles on “cenoscopy” (which “embraces all that positive science which >> rests upon familiar experience”). “A sound methodeutic requires heuretic >> science to found its researches upon cenoscopy, passing with as slight a >> gap as possible from the familiar to the unfamiliar” (EP2:373). But >> formulating this methodeutic “presents a certain difficulty” because it >> involves reconsidering some of our own beliefs, which requires critical >> thinking. “Each criticism should wait to be planned, and each plan should >> wait for criticism. “Clearly, if we are to get on at all, we must put up >> with imperfect procedure.” This is where Peirce appeals to Aristotle’s *De >> Anima* (as the EP2 editors point out in an endnote) for a “key … to be >> tried upon this intricate grim lock.” >> >> This “key” is “*The idea of growth*,— the stately tree springing from >> the tiny grain” (Peirce’s italics). Now, *growth* is one of the key >> *semeiotic* ideas in Peirce’s late philosophy, which frequently asserts >> an analogy (if not an identity) between *sign* processes and *life* >> processes. The example (or metaphor) he gives here, and indeed nearly all >> of Peirce’s uses of the term “growth” in semeiotic contexts, suggest that >> the idea is very close if not identical to what we now call >> *self-organization*. Peirce does not quote a Greek term which Aristotle >> used for this idea of “growth,” but he does quote some other Greek terms >> which he calls “wonderful conceptions” that Aristotle “came upon” in >> developing the idea: “δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, ὕλη and μορφή or εἶδος, or, >> as he might still better have said, τύπος, the blow, the *coup*.” >> >> The terms δύναμις and ἐνέργεια are typically translated as >> “potentiality” and “actuality” respectively; ὕλη and μορφή or εἶδος are >> the terms for “matter” (ὕλη) and “form” (either μορφή or εἶδος). This >> gives us a pair of metaphysical dualities, which is itself significant in >> that Peirce focusses in this essay on the “hard dualism” of *Normative >> Science*, which “forms the midportion of cenoscopy and its most >> characteristic part” (EP2:376). Peirce had earlier introduced the concepts >> of Aristotelian *matter* and *form* as a complementary pair in his “New >> Elements” essay (EP2:304), where they correspond to subject and predicate, >> or denotation and signification. But in this 1906 essay he gives a new >> twist to this matter/form distinction by saying (as quoted above) that >> instead of μορφή or εἶδος, Aristotle might better have used the term >> “τύπος, the blow, the *coup*.” (As I showed in a blog post recently, the >> earliest meaning of τύπος — which later evolved to mean the same as the >> English “type” — was “a blow.”) >> >> This suggests that *form* is the active and forceful side of the >> matter/form duality, while *matter* is the passive side. In >> phaneroscopic terms, *matter* corresponds to Firstness and *form* to >> Secondness. This is a bit startling at first — at least it struck me that >> way — but as Peirce explains it (using the duality of the sexes as a >> metaphor) it does become a key to the methodeutic of cenoscopy and thus to >> the very nature of reasoning, inquiry and semiosis itself. Perhaps I don’t >> need to show how this duality plays out in Peirce’s 1906 essay (but I will >> in another post if anyone wants me to). But I think it’s significant that >> around this same time, Peirce was saying to Lady Welby that “the Form is >> the Object of the Sign,” and defining the Sign as a “medium for the >> communication or extension of a Form” (EP2:477). He was saying this in a >> draft which dealt largely with Existential Graphs, for a reason which he >> explained in this paragraph (SS:195): >> >> I should like to write a little book on ‘The Conduct of Thoughts’ in >> which the introductory chapter should introduce the reader to my >> existential graphs, which would then be used throughout as the apparent >> subject, the parable or metaphor, in terms of which everything would be >> said,—which would be far more scientific than dragging in the “mind” all >> the time, in German fashion, when the mind and psychology has no more to do >> with the substance of the book than if I were to discourse of the >> ingredients of the ink I use. >> >> He goes on to explain that in EGs, “the blank leaf itself [i.e. the sheet >> of assertion] is the quasi-mind.” Now, if we apply the matter/form >> distinction to EGs, I think we would have to say that the blank sheet is >> the *matter* which gets *determined* by some *form* being scribed upon >> it, just as any sign is determined by its object to determine an >> interpretant. For Peirce, what is essential both to quasi-minds and to >> symbols is that they are *indeterminate*, i.e. subject to further >> determination. That is pretty close to the concept of *matter* (ὕλη) as >> Aristotle defined it in Book 2 of *De Anima.* In this sense, then, *mind* >> is *matter*, not form. No wonder, then, that the *mind/matter* >> distinction seems quite foreign to Peirce’s late semeiotic. >> >> I don’t know how much sense this makes to readers of the list, but I’ll >> try to clarify if necessary. I do find it significant in that this same >> period saw the publication of Peirce’s “Prolegomena to an Apology for >> Pragmaticism,” his most elaborate attempt to connect his EGs with his >> “proof” of pragmatism and thus with the rest of his philosophy. >> >> Gary f. >> >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
