BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List:
I disagree that this section states that Form is associated with 1ns
and Matter with 2ns. After all, that would suggest that Form is an
action of chance, spontaneity and freedom. I consider that Form,
which is not simply external appearance but 'how' matter is organized
into its identity cannot function with such randomness. And - It is
important, I think, not to confuse the three modes of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness, with ordinality. That is, I consider it an
error to think that the term 'Firstness' means - first in order of
existence etc.
Peirce writes "Form, as that which is what it is in itself, and as
prior to any embodiment of it. It is looking upon being as created,
and regards its evolution as having the mode of movement of practice"
. This suggests instead to me, that Form is 3ns and its priority is
akin to its nature, not of ordinality but of continuity. This does
NOT mean that it is pre-existent! It simply means that Form or habits
of organization are continuous rules rather than individual
embodiments. And that matter, which is to say, the individual, or
'that which simply exists' is 2ns and exists within the constraints
of continuous rules/habits.
See also 'matter prior to form' 6.388 where he outlines but does not
reject, Aristotle.
As to what emerged, ordinally first in our cosmos - matter or form,
Peirce's outline of cosmology suggests that 'bits of matter' [which
are existent in 2ns] spontaneously [1ns] emerged first and the
'habits' of their interactions emerged gradually afterwards and
became rules 3ns]. [1.412]. As to what 'matter' is, apart from its
being constituted within discrete individual units, I'd suggest it's
energy.
Edwina
On Thu 13/12/18 11:01 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Gary F., Helmut, List:
GF: ... do you know of any text where Peirce actually said that
“form” was first and “matter” second?
I offered several representative quotes in a previous post to
demonstrate that Peirce consistently associated Form with 1ns and
Matter with 2ns, rather than the other way around. The following is
the most relevant to your question as posed here, this time without
any omissions.
CSP: Aristotle's metaphysics undoubtedly belongs to the general
type of evolutionary systems, as does for example, that of Hegel. As
I understand it, he identifies the mode of the evolution of being with
that of the evolution of theory, notwithstanding his incessant
oppositions of πρότερον ούσίᾳ and πρότερον
λόγῳ. Matter is, for him, that which is what it is in itself.
Form is that which is only so far as it is embodied in matter, and is
essentially dichotomic, as Plato made it. The scholastic metaphysics,
on the other hand, looks upon the pure nature, or Form, as that which
is what it is in itself, and as prior to any embodiment of it. It is
looking upon being as created, and regards its evolution as having the
mode of movement of practice. Scotus appears to look upon
individuation as an unintelligible act of force. From this point of
view, matter (it is always the Aristotelian matter I speak of, or
that which simply exists) ought to be held to exist only by reaction,
and so to be that which is what it is by force of another. It is not
necessary for the logician to embrace either of these theories (of
which I prefer the second.) He had better remain aloof. (R
517:92-93[18-19]; 1904)
In the evolution of being, what comes first is "that which is what
it is in itself," and what comes second is either "that which is only
so far as it is embodied" or "that which is what it is by force of
another." Hence for Aristotle, Matter is first and Form is second;
but for the scholastics and Peirce, Form is first and Matter is
second. It is Matter, not Form, that corresponds to force.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
Links:
------
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
